

Deliverable 10.3

Working Paper on Targeted Strategies

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DISSEMINATION LEVEL

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1. Introduction¹

Scholarship on global governance has proliferated. It has identified the principles on which global governance is based. According to Zürn (2018) the idea of global governance rests on three principles. First, it is based on the idea that some common goods need to be achieved together and cannot be solved within the current system of territorial segmented political communities and states. Second, it is based on the principle that current state-based political authorities are not absolute and that citizens and non-state-actors have a legitimate claim on rule-making beyond the state in which they are based. The third principle states that international actors such as international organisations have authority to make transnational rules.

Global governance scholarship has also described the many different global governance institutions that aim to address transnational and global problems (Coen and Pegram 2018; Lake 2010; Marx and Wouters 2018; Roger et al. 2022). It shows that many issue areas of global politics, such as trade, climate change, and global health, that were once governed by relatively distinct rule-sets and few organisations, are today regulated by multiple institutions that overlap and interact with one another in various ways. The different issue-based GLOBE reports detail this proliferation and diversification of global governance institutions in the areas of trade, development, climate, finance, security, migration and health.

The European Union (EU) has emerged as a formidable player in global governance as it has increasingly expanded its foreign policy aims and capacities (Manners 2022; Damro 2012). The EU is

¹ This deliverable is based on all previous GLOBE deliverables and discussions with stakeholders and experts in a series of **workshops** (GLOBE Stakeholder Workshop on Climate Change, Brussels, 7 July 2022; GLOBE Annual Meeting, Brussels, 8 July 2022; Workshop on Regionalism, International Organizations and Global Challenges in Fragmented World, Barcelona, 17 February 2020; International Conference on Rethinking Global Governance in Trade and Investment: International Perspectives, Brussels, 30 August 2019; Panel Debate: International and European Perspectives on Trade in Global Governance, Brussels, 30 April 2019) and **webinars** (GLOBE Webinar: Petros Mavroidis & André Sapir - China and the WTO: Why Multilateralism Still Matters, 13 September 2022; GLOBE Webinar: Ryan Federo & Angel Saz-Carranza - Management and Governance of Intergovernmental Organizations, 20 June 2022; GLOBE Webinar: Launching a WTO reform process at MC12: A perspective from emerging economies, 10 June 2022; GLOBE Webinar: Transatlantic cooperation on WTO reform: challenges and opportunities for MC12, 2 June 2022; GLOBE Webinar: Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal - The Spectrum of International Institutions, 31 May 2022; GLOBE Webinar: Tobias Lenz - Interorganizational Diffusion in International Relations, 8 February 2022; GLOBE Webinar: Kristen Hopewell - Clash of Powers: US China Rivalry in Global Trade Governance, 18 November 2021; GLOBE Webinar: Allison Carnegie and Austin Carson - Secrets in Global Governance, 20 October 2021; GLOBE Webinar: Julia Kreienkamp and Tom Pegram - Global Climate Governance, 6 May 2021; GLOBE Webinar: Augusto Lopez-Claros - Global Governance and the Emergence of Global Institutions, 11 March 2021; GLOBE Webinar: Alexandru Grigorescu - The Ebb and Flow of Global Governance, 14 January 2021; GLOBE Webinar: Stefan Renckens - Private Governance and Public Authority, 10 December 2020; GLOBE Webinar: James Harrison and Adrian Smith - Free Trade Agreements and Global Labour Governance, 12 November 2020; GLOBE Webinar: Anu Bradford - The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World, 23 September 2020; GLOBE Webinar: Amrita Narlikar - Poverty Narratives and Power Paradoxes, 15 June 2020; GLOBE Webinar: Charles Roger - The Origins of Informality, 28 May 2020; GLOBE Webinar: Liesbet Hooghe - A Theory of International Organization, 16 March 2020; GLOBE Webinar: Michael Zürn - A Theory of Global Governance, 5 February 2020). The work in WP 10 resulted in the publication of a special issue in the *Journal of European Integration*: Marx, A., Roger, C. & O. Westerwinter (2022)(eds.) *Navigating Complexity: The European Union in Global Governance*. The special issue is available in open access: <https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/geui20/44/5?nav=tocList> The authors thank Jacint Jordana and Adam Holesch for comments on a previous draft.

both uniquely poised and uniquely bound to undertake international relations in pursuit of securing its interests and values. While global governance evolves and different types of institutions gain or lose prominence and influence, the EU will need to adapt its strategy to ensure optimal engagement with these different global governance institutions. Legally committed to upholding multilateralism, much of the EU's strategy will need to be geared towards the Union's interactions with the traditional bearers of global governance namely formal intergovernmental organisations (IOs)². However, despite the continued importance for the EU of engaging at the multilateral level, the EU has faced a number of challenges in pursuing its governance goals through traditional IOs because of its legal status as an IO itself, which often limits how the EU is able to operate at the multilateral level. Moreover, newer and less traditional institutions are becoming increasingly important in global governance, while traditional actors are facing considerable challenges. The EU will therefore need to develop strategies toward different global governance institutions, striking a careful balance among them.

The EU is a prominent part of this web of entangled global governance institutions and its position within this web shapes its foreign policy, how it can influence global governance, and ultimately its ability to contribute to addressing global challenges. In its many strategy documents the EU recognises the importance of international action and global governance institutions to achieve its goals. Even the Treaty explicitly refers to global governance in Article 21 which states that “the Union shall ... promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance” (Article 21, 2.h). The EU seeks to better leverage its considerable weight as a bloc of 27 to contribute to resolving pressing global challenges, especially in areas of key interest to the EU including trade and investment, development, security, migration, climate change and global finance. To do so will require the EU to amplify its foreign policy influence overall, a point which is repeatedly underscored in recent strategic documents that have been communicated by the EU.

In the next section, we identify some of these key strategic documents of the EU to first elucidate the EU's recent position across sectors that relate to global governance, zooming in on the importance the EU accords the role of different forms of global governance institutions in pursuing its global governance strategy. These strategy documents propose concrete actions towards different types of global governance institutions, which include reforming existing multilateral organisations, creating new informal clubs and networks, and engaging private global governance institutions in public regulation to give body to the EU's aim to pursue more ‘strategic autonomy’. Throughout GLOBE we studied these institutions and can offer insights on their strengths and weaknesses and their opportunities and threats.

As a result, in this deliverable we aim to link some of our main findings on different global governance institutions to these strategy documents and map out the different global governance institutions with which the EU engages, with specific attention to the sectors considered particularly important to the EU as outlined in the 2016 EU Global Strategy, namely trade and investment, development, security, migration, climate change and global finance. Several deliverables in GLOBE map out the EU's interactions with different types of global governance institutions. We aim to identify the possibilities and limitations of each of these global governance institutions identified in specific strategies of the EU. In this way, this deliverable aims to link GLOBE findings to EU strategies. The deliverable does not focus on the *objectives* of strategies, but on the *instruments*, i.e. through which institutions can the EU pursue global goals and interests.

² While recognising the vast array of institutional arrangements that can be considered international organisations, throughout this paper, we will use ‘IOs’ and ‘formal intergovernmental organisations’ interchangeably. When referring to other types of IOs, we will specify them as such, e.g. ‘informal IOs’.

In light of this, GLOBE has taken an institutional approach and distinguished between different types of global governance institutions including formal intergovernmental organisations, informal intergovernmental organisations, transnational regulatory networks, and (public and private) standards-based organisations. Towards these different types of institutions, different targeted strategies can be developed. Understanding the potential of these different types of global governance institutions for future global governance policies will help in refining different strategies and options which the EU can pursue.

GLOBE recognises that there are also many bilateral instruments that can be used in the context of foreign relations and the EU is indeed actively pursuing bilateral partnerships and agreements. We do not extensively cover these separately in this deliverable as a possible strategic option, since we focus on institutions and instruments which target multiple actors.

The ultimate aim of this deliverable is to provide guidance to the EU on how to navigate a complex institutional landscape. The deliverable will first introduce the different strategy documents of the EU that relate to global governance. These documents detail the priorities of the EU in terms of global governance institutions as well as approaches. In section two, we discuss the main GLOBE insights in relation to the priorities and global governance institutions identified by the EU. Then in section three, four and five, we highlight the main findings of GLOBE research for EU engagement at the formal multilateral level (section three), through informal and low-cost institutions (section four), and with private institutions in global governance (section five). Based on this we propose fifteen strategies for the EU to utilise towards different global governance institutions, identifying also some of the challenges related to these strategies (section six). We end with a conclusion.

2. EU's Strategic Toolbox

Recent communications outline the EU's strategic priorities with regard to the EU's role in global governance. Since 2020, most of the issue-specific (e.g. on trade, environment, or security) and cross-cutting communications related to global governance are undergirded by a common, overarching goal for the EU to become more autonomous, less dependent on other states, and more assertive in pursuing and protecting EU interests and values – a strategy which has been increasingly referred to as '(open) strategic autonomy' (OSA) since the concept was articulated in the May 2020 Communication from the EU Commission, 'Europe's moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation' (European Commission, 2020). To meet this overarching goal, the EU is pursuing various strategies towards different global governance institutions that are articulated in both cross-cutting and issue-specific communications relevant to global governance.

These communications provide the strategic vision for the European Union outlined by the European Commission. They lay out the strategic choices for the EU and the future actions which will be developed to address the challenges for the European Union. Whether these strategies will fully materialise in policy outputs depends on different domestic and international factors. However the communications do provide authoritative statements by the European Commission on future priorities and actions.

2.1 Overall strategies on EU in Global Governance

The Joint Communication on ‘strengthening the EU’s contribution to rules-based multilateralism’ (European Commission 2021) asserts that in the face of increasing protectionism, unilateral action and challenges to international law undertaken by many states, multilateralism and rules-based international cooperation remain relevant and important. However, while the EU remains committed to multilateralism, the communication calls for the EU to become more assertive in defending its interests and values through multilateral fora by taking a “more interests-based approach” (European Commission 2021, 3). In particular, the communication emphasises the promotion of peace and security, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, global health, sustainable development and economic growth, and the management of migration and asylum.

To achieve these goals at the multilateral level, the communication proposes that the EU and its member states collectively support and push for substantial reform of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Health Organization (WHO), as well as advance multilateral regulatory cooperation on other issue areas.

Additionally, the communication proposes that the EU can enhance its leverage in multilateral fora by coordinating EU’s external action and internal policies, ensuring coherence between member states, better leveraging financial contributions to international organisations, seek to advance EU leadership in international organisations’ governing bodies, upgrading the EU’s member status in fora where it does not have membership rights of its own, and strengthening and cultivating partnerships with other states and regional organisations to form coalitions or leverage strength on common interests within multilateral fora. Finally, the communication calls for seeking partnerships and regular cooperation mechanisms with international organisations themselves. Overall, the EU seeks a double agenda of strengthening the multilateral system and improving its effectiveness, while also cultivating greater influence within multilateral fora in order to better shape outcomes in line with the interests and values of the EU.

Reflecting similar priorities, the Communication from the Commission on ‘An EU Strategy on Standardisation Setting global standards in support of a resilient, green and digital EU single market’ (European Commission 2022) outlines measures intended to enable the EU to remain or become competitive in setting standards in order to shape global governance to reflect EU interests and values. To do this, the communication proposes the EU increase the speed at which standards are set and review existing standards to identify gaps where new standards are needed in order to ensure EU standards have a first-mover advantage. Additionally, the communication lays out the rationale for legislative proposals to improve regulations governing European standardisation. Moreover, at a global level, the EU proposes to use international standard-setting to promote EU interests and values, by becoming more assertive in international standard-setting fora, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and others, and to ensure EU standardisation bodies and industries better coordinate with international standardisation processes and WTO principles. To increase the EU’s leverage in this regard, the communication proposes cultivating and strengthening partnerships with key states and organisations.

2.2 Issue-specific strategies on security, climate, trade and finance

The ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence - For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’ (European Council 2022) lays out the

EU's aims with regard to making the EU a stronger collective actor in security and defence. It begins by setting the stage with a threat assessment, which highlights the growing need for the EU to enhance its strategic autonomy as a security actor, particularly as the rules-based international order is threatened by a return to power politics (European Council 2022, 7). The Compass then details policies divided into four categories of action: 'Act', 'Secure', 'Invest', and 'Partner'. The policies detailed under 'Act' aim to improve the EU's crisis-response, those under 'Secure' focus on preparedness, primarily through increased intelligence and disarmament, and those under 'Invest' detail how the required investments in security and military capacities will be funded. While overall the strategy focuses on strengthening the EU's autonomy, it nevertheless emphasises the importance of cooperation at multilateral (UN, G7) and regional levels (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the African Union) and the goal to uphold the rules-based international order. The 'Partner' section calls for seeking and strengthening partnerships, which can 'help us uphold the rules-based international order and effective multilateralism, with the UN at its core, set international norms and standards and contribute to peace and security around the world' (European Council 2022, 39). As the EU seeks to reduce dependencies on other states for security and defence, it seeks to enhance multilateral cooperation.

Additionally, the Communication from the Commission on 'the European Green Deal' (European Commission 2019) focuses on the EU's strategy to address climate change and environmental challenges, including by implementing the United Nations' 2030 Agenda and the sustainable development goals. The European Green Deal introduces a number of specific policy imperatives for both the EU and member state levels, seeking coherence across national policies that implement and reinforce EU measures. Emphasising, moreover, that the challenges of climate change and environmental degradation require global action, the European Green Deal articulates the EU's ambition to shape global policy, through bilateral and multilateral channels, particularly the United Nations, the G7, the G20, and the WTO. The strategy centres on the Paris Agreement, committing the EU to ensure the agreement 'remains the indispensable multilateral framework for tackling climate change' (European Commission 2019, 640). Alongside its support for the Paris Agreement and multilateral cooperation, the strategy proposes to use trade policy, standard-setting, investment and other economic tools as well as strategic partnerships with other states and regional organisations to combat climate change and environmental degradation.

Third, the Commission's 'Trade Policy Review: An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy' (European Commission 2021b) lays out a new strategy toward trade policy. This strategy is centred on the goal of achieving 'open strategic autonomy', by which the EU will maintain its openness to trade partners, while becoming more assertive not just in defending its values and interests, but shaping global policy in line with EU values. This choice – to become more assertive – is situated within the global context of increasing unilateralism, protectionism and geo-economics tension that are undermining cooperation at the multilateral level (particularly the WTO). To achieve open strategic autonomy, the strategy eschews protectionism and commits to remaining open to trade. However, it seeks to reduce dependencies on third countries or a single supplier in critical or sensitive areas by evaluating value chains and diversifying suppliers as necessary. In addition, the EU seeks to promote its geopolitical interests via trade, among which is its interest in upholding multilateralism and the rules-based international order. Moreover, updating the global rules to make trade sustainable and "support the green transition" is a key concern for the EU. As the EU sees the WTO as the principal forum for shaping global trade rules, the strategy therefore prioritises reform of the WTO, both as a forum for dialogue and dispute settlement.

Lastly, the Communication from the Commission on a ‘Strategy for Financing the Transition to a Sustainable Economy’ (European Commission 2021c), puts forth a finance and investment strategy to establish a more efficient and long-term capital market in order to finance the EU’s efforts to meet climate and environmental sustainability goals and to achieve a sustainable recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic. While much of the communication is focused on internal measures, a section is devoted to the EU’s global ambition to make the EU the ‘global hub for sustainable finance’ (European Commission 2021c, 18). To achieve this, the strategy emphasises the need for (and current lack of) robust global architecture for sustainable finance capable of setting and enforcing global rules. The strategy envisions a combination of formal and informal cooperation at bi-pluri and multilateral levels, making some concrete suggestions such as the expansion of the mandate of the Financial Stability Board, the advancement of the International Platform on Sustainable Finance, which represents a joint undertaking with seven third countries, and establishment and strengthening of international fora such as the G20 Sustainable Finance Working Group and standard-setting organisations. The strategy foresees that cooperation - particularly in multilateral settings - will be bolstered by bilateral partnerships and support for low and middle-income economies.

Taken together, the strategies described above can be understood as formulating the EU’s current toolbox for attaining its goal of open strategic autonomy in and through global governance. Across both the cross-cutting and issue-specific communications, the key strategies remain more or less consistent across issue areas and identify some similar global governance institutions:

- Uphold and champion multilateral cooperation and support reform of multilateral intergovernmental organisations to ensure they are fit for purpose
- Recognise the potential of new forms of multilateral cooperation through more informal organisations and clubs
- Become more assertive in taking action that advances EU interests and uphold and promulgate EU values and principles through more autonomous measures based on (regulatory) standards
- Strengthen existing and cultivate new partnerships (especially with neighbouring/enlargement countries, US, Asia Pacific, Latin America, Africa and China)
- Ensure greater coherence of EU member states’ policies with one another and of member states’ actions in multilateral fora

These strategies have implications for different global governance institutions covered by the GLOBE project. While the EU works to become more autonomous and assertive, it nevertheless remains committed to the rules-based international order and it continues to pursue multilateralism as both a goal in itself and as a means to achieve other priorities. This implies that the EU needs to develop actions towards different types of global governance institutions. We discuss each of these institutions.

3. Multilateral approach: formal intergovernmental organisations

In GLOBE we focused extensively on multilateral organisations, or what we call ‘formal intergovernmental organisations’ or IOs. Engaging with multilateral organisations constitutes the cornerstone of the EU’s global governance strategy as identified in the above section. It also becomes apparent in the different instruments and strategies used by the EU in its external affairs. They often integrate multilateral commitments, conventions and agreements and refer to the rules upheld by IOs.

Formal intergovernmental organisations emerge out of an international negotiation between states who conclude treaties and agreements. These treaties often establish formal intergovernmental organisations to oversee the implementation of the agreements. The agreements outline the obligations for the signatory states, the organisation's membership criteria and funding, and its mandate and rules of procedure, including rules for decision-making and enforcement. A formal international organisation is one that (1) is established by formal international treaty or agreement, (2) has a permanent secretariat and (3) has states as members who are the decision-makers. Many formal intergovernmental organisations have a headquarters and permanent staff.

In the GLOBE mapping papers (Marx et al. 2019; Coen et al. 2019; Sánchez Cobaleda et al. 2019; Levi-Faur & Blumsack, 2020), we identified many formal intergovernmental organisations in different issue areas with which the EU needs to engage and build collaboration. The mapping revealed a larger number of IOs in specific issue areas such as trade, security and climate. For global trade governance, the most important formal IO at the multilateral level is the World Trade Organization, though the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) also plays a role. Importantly, at the regional level, numerous regional organisations are relevant to the governance of trade, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, ASEAN, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) among many others. In security governance, the primary formal IOs at the global level are the United Nations, particularly the UN Charter and the UN Security Council, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Regional and intercontinental security IOs are also central in security governance. Intercontinental formal IOs include NATO, with members from North America and Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), with members from North America, Europe and Asia. In the global governance of climate change, the primary formal global IOs are the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and UN Environment. However, as climate change is a cross-cutting challenge, other formal IOs include climate change within their mandate, including the WTO and a number of other institutions within the UN system. The Global Environment Facility is particularly relevant and many others within the UN system also carry out activities related to climate governance. This short description exemplifies the many different IOs active in global governance.

These IOs constitute a first type of global governance institution that the EU engages with. Though the European Union actively participates in multilateral cooperation and is a major funder of many formal intergovernmental organisations, the European Union is often unable to participate fully in formal intergovernmental organisations as a formal member because of its status as a regional intergovernmental organisation and not a sovereign state (Lenz 2021). However, many formal intergovernmental organisations allow a select group of organisations or states that are not formal members to participate as observers. Observers are given certain privileges of participation, though they are unable to vote or propose resolutions. The EU's access to IOs based on its official status within the IO is critical for the EU's capacity to engage with the IO in pursuit of its values and interests, and is determined by a number of factors. This issue was closely examined in WP7 and is discussed in greater depth in section 3.1.

The level of international engagement with and participation in IOs is partially determined by the issue areas covered by the IOs, since the EU has different levels of competence to make policy across different issue areas (Wessel and Odermatt 2019). For some policy areas, the EU has exclusive competence and for others, shared or supporting competence. We return to this in section 3.1. Accordingly, the EU is often just an observer and not a full member of many formal intergovernmental organisations, such as the

United Nations, while the EU member states participate as full members. A small number of formal intergovernmental organisations, however, have recognised the EU as a full member, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the WTO due to the importance competences the EU has in the issue areas of agriculture and trade.

Notwithstanding that the EU is only a full member of some IOs, engaging with IOs is a key priority for the EU. Through the development of new datasets and detailed case studies, we provide some insights into the possibilities and limitations with regard to the engagement with IOs which align with issues discussed in the EU strategy documents. Three main challenges come to the front in these strategy documents: (1) deepening interaction with IOs through improving access to IOs, (2) reforming existing IOs, and (3) fostering a coherent approach towards IOs, both with respect to the alignment of EU priorities and EU member states ‘acting as one’ in IOs.


3.1 Challenge 1: Access to formal intergovernmental organisations

A first dimension that influences the degree to which the EU pursues multilateral strategies is the EU’s access to IOs. In order to pursue global governance strategies through IOs, the EU needs sufficient access to these IOs. Understanding the conditions under which access is granted generates insights into the EU’s opportunities and limitations in pursuing global governance strategies through IOs.

Traditionally access to IOs is conceptualised based on membership. As highlighted above, the EU is a special organisation in terms of engagement with IOs since sometimes it is an observer and other times a member. This is due to the unique nature of the EU, which is neither a full federal state nor purely an intergovernmental regional organisation (Hix and Hoyland 2011). The EU has characteristics of both, since it is the most institutionalised and integrated regional organisation with a set of supranational institutions that have competences to coordinate policies in various issue areas (Lenz 2021). The level of the EU’s international engagement and participation in world politics is partially determined by the issue area, since the EU has different levels of competence to make policy across different issue areas (Wessel and Odermatt 2019). The competences conferred upon the EU are classified into three principal categories: (1) exclusive competences; (2) shared competences; and (3) supporting competences. For some issue areas, such as international trade, the EU has exclusive competence. This division of competence determines, to a degree, access to formal intergovernmental organisations.

However, GLOBE research reveals that access to IOs is not only determined by the current division of competences. The work in WP7 (Tokhi and Ebetürk 2020; Tokhi 2022) starts from the observation that the EU has become involved in several international organisations in different types of capacities, from an observer to a full member (WTO). Figure 1 plots the proportion of IOs with active EU participation based on the International Authority Database (IAD) (Zürn et al., 2021), which contains 34 IOs. Figure 1 clearly shows the increasing engagement of the EU with IOs.

Figure 1: Involvement of EU in other IOs



Source: Tokhi, 2022

Starting from a broader conceptualisation of access following Tallberg et al. (2014), which focuses not only on membership but also on influence, GLOBE (Tokhi, 2022) examines the conditions under which IOs grant the EU access to their decision-making processes. ‘Access’ is defined as the explicit grant of formal participation rights in an IO’s policymaking processes to non-state actors (which include the EU). Tokhi (2022) suggests that while the baseline expectation for EU access to formal IOs is formed by overlapping competences, such as those outlined above (e.g. WTO, FAO,...), this does not tell the full story.

The research in WP7 puts forth that an additional factor influences the likelihood of EU access, namely an IO’s authority, which is determined by the level of autonomy an IO has. Tokhi (2022) suggests that three rationales might propel IOs to grant access to the EU. The first rationale concerns the fact that granting EU access to the IO can mitigate negative externalities for IOs and their members that might occur when the EU has less access and resorts to unilateral action that disrupts the IO’s rule-setting and implementation. Granting the EU access might preempt conflicts through joint deliberations and might also allow the IO to constrain the EU to some extent. These negative externalities can be greater for more authoritative IOs, so the motivation to grant more access to the EU may be higher. A second rationale is that the EU’s resources and authority may be attractive for IOs wishing to enhance the implementation of their own policies. While this may be a double-edged sword, more authoritative organisations can guard themselves against undue influence of the EU. The third rationale springs from the structure of global governance. Inter-organisational conflict or cooperation may arise due to the lack of a central meta-authority. Accordingly, authoritative IOs should be more likely to adjust their policies, adopt binding rules and effectively cooperate with each other. The control of each Member State over the IO is reduced, which minimises the possibilities for a member state or group of member states to veto the establishment of formal relations with other IOs. Concerns over state sovereignty, then, play a less prominent role, facilitating the opening up of the IO to the EU. These three rationales and the role of IO

authority results in the following testable expectation: More authoritative IOs are more likely than less authoritative IOs to grant access to the EU.

To systematically test this hypothesis, GLOBE researchers code whether or not the EU has access to a sample of 33 IOs from the IAD. The sample of 33 IOs is representative of the geographic and thematic distribution of IOs in the 21st century. Modelling the results, the author finds that more authoritative IOs are more likely to grant access to the EU. IO authority is statistically significant and positively related to the probability of access. His analysis shows a strong link between the level of authority of a formal intergovernmental organisation and the access granted to the EU. In other words, the gains that formal intergovernmental organisations perceive to receive from the EU also play an important role. Access to the formal intergovernmental organisation for the EU is a result of the perceived benefits for the formal intergovernmental organisation. In this way, EUs engagement in global governance does not only depend on the willingness and strategy of the EU to engage (as suggested by some ‘power’ based approaches in the literature such as “normative” power (Manners 2002), “market” power (Damro 2012), “structural” power (Keukeleire and Delreux 2015) and others) or its division of competence, but is also determined by the opportunities offered by the formal intergovernmental organisations. The World Health Organization and the International Criminal Court are examples of formal intergovernmental organisations that give more access to the EU than might be expected on the basis of the current division of competences within the EU. These opportunities differ between organisations and hence influence the EU’s capability to engage. Developing strong bilateral relations with authoritative IOs might result in greater EU access to these IOs and also enable the EU to exert greater influence within these IOs as global governance actors.

3.2 Challenge 2: Reforming formal intergovernmental organisations

A second key-issue across the cross-cutting and issue-specific strategy documents concerns the priority for IO reform. GLOBE explored the future role of IOs, including their potential role in so-called new forms of experimentalist governance. Concerning the latter, Haftel and Broude (2022) focused on the investment regime and explored the role of UNCTAD and UNCITRAL. They found little evidence of a shift to new forms of global governance but the key importance of IOs in their more traditional role. To fully use that more traditional role the issue of IO reform is important. There are several issues involved in IO reform of which three received significant attention in GLOBE, namely the need for reform, the possibilities for reform and alignment between IOs and the EU.

3.2.1 Identifying the need for reform

Throughout the mapping exercises GLOBE has analysed the many internal and external challenges with which IOs are confronted, highlighting the importance for reform but also identifying barriers to reform. This led to a separate deliverable detailing key challenges with which multilateral organisations are confronted. GLOBE research showed that increasing external pressures on international organisations – such as the rise of multipolarity, increasing use of unilateral and protectionist measures, and a proliferation of actors engaged in global governance – have an amplified effect on IOs’ capacity to achieve their governance goals because their mandates, internal governance processes and resources are no longer fit for purpose. Many IOs were established in a very different world order, with which their design, procedures and *modus operandi* were aligned. These organisations now face difficulties in adjusting to a changed external environment. This misalignment is likely one of the reasons why we observe a growing lack of capacity to respond to new challenges for IOs across policy areas.

When looking at the challenges of the current governance models, GLOBE research in WP 8 identified the following problem areas: governing structures of international organisations (IOs), decision-making rules, mandates and autonomy, and available resources such as funding and information (Otteburn & Marx 2020). While these are not universal problems, the observed trends and patterns around these three areas affect many IOs across multiple sectors and types of organisations. These findings were further supported by evidence from the GLOBE survey on ‘IOs and the Future of Global Governance’ (Jordana et al. 2022)

Firstly, IOs face difficulties balancing the needs of a diverse set of members and stakeholders due to unsuitable decision-making rules and/or the inflexibility of governance structures and/or stark differences in preferences between member states (cross-ref to global deliverables in the issue areas).

The concerns on governing structures are also reflected in the answers of IO staff to the GLOBE Survey. When asked about the likelihood of their IO facing certain problems, a lack of organisational efficiency as well as a lack of policy effectiveness ranked highest (for more details see GLOBE Policy Brief 3).

Secondly, IOs face limitations on their mandates, and they are often not granted with sufficient policy autonomy or scope of action to meet their goals (Globe Report 8.1; GLOBE mapping papers). This impedes on their legitimacy. Deliverable 7.1 mapped the legitimacy challenges related to IOs across GLOBE issue areas and showed that IOs are confronted with several legitimacy challenges resulting from (1) incongruences of the different constituencies they serve (e.g., states and the ‘global public’), (2) incongruences between the different normative expectations directed at them in often a limited and confined mandate, (3) and, of course, the fact that any reform must be approved by states, particularly powerful states that often have a stake in status quo arrangements.

This can create significant challenges related to the mandate of IOs, which GLOBE examines in depth in WP9 (GLOBE 2022 Report: Trends in Global Governance and Future Scenarios 2030). On the one hand, an IO’s mandate may be too narrow and therefore not allow an IO to undertake all the necessary activities to meet its expected governance goals nor grant the IO enough independence and flexibility to adapt to changing global conditions. Several IO’s are confronted with new demands which they cannot or only partially address since it falls outside their mandate, such as, for example, human rights concerns related to trade (Marx et al. 2019). On the other hand, an IO’s mandate might be seen as too broad, limiting their ability to meet different targets, particularly when it lacks the means to meet its mandate. For example, some UN agencies have a very broad agenda, such as the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), which creates challenges for dealing with a wide range of environmental issues including climate change, making them less effective (Coen et al., 2019; Coen et al. 2020). GLOBE research also highlighted that IOs do have flexibility in terms of mandate, especially when it comes to new global governance challenges. For example with regard to security, GLOBE paper 4.2 shows that NATO and OSCE have responded to new security challenges such as the pandemic and expanded their mandate (Sánchez Cobaleda, 2020). A detailed case study of the global governance of cybersecurity, creating a novel dataset of 85 global governance institutions involved in the global governance of security, shows that there is tendency to govern issues of cybersecurity from existing global governance institutions, including existing IOs, rather than to create new ones (Kouliopoulos, Vandendriessche and Saz-Carranza 2020).

Thirdly, many IOs struggle with limited resources, which can take different forms. GLOBE research found that IOs frequently lack the necessary resources, including funding, staff and access to information,

with the latter two usually being a function of the first. These budget gaps are partially still due to the 2008/2009 financial crisis, after which some member states of IOs limited their financial contributions to IOs. This creates uncertainty for IOs, leading to difficulties for an IO to perform (Coen, Kreienkamp & Pegram 2021). Recent research has shown that when an IO is less financially secure – often reliant on voluntary contributions earmarked for specific purposes – it is likely to have fewer permanent staff, which is likely to negatively impact its autonomy and performance (Ege and Bauer 2017). For example, the lack of access to funding and information is a major challenge for both the UNEP and the UNFCCC in climate governance (Coen, Kreienkamp & Pegram 2021). Moreover, lack of support is likely to be self-perpetuating in many IOs. For instance, in security governance, the lack of financial support from some member states to NATO has led the biggest funder – the US – to reconsider its own support (Sánchez Cobaleda 2020, p. 44). As states limit the resources available to an IO, it is increasingly unable to fulfil its roles and is likely to face further difficulties in garnering sufficient support.

It is hard to forecast or speculate on the evolution of IO budgets, as they are subject to many fluctuating factors. To get an approximation of the most plausible pathways for how IO budgets may evolve in the upcoming years, GLOBE relied on the GLOBE survey. While also operating under incomplete information and with similarly bounded capacities to predict the future, IO staff draws on vast experience working within the institution and the wider system, and hence their expert opinion may yield more reliable indications as to future developments. Hence, in the GLOBE Survey we also asked IO staff about their perceptions regarding the likely future evolution of their IO's budget. Through two different questions (likelihood of IO increasing its annual budget; likelihood of IO suffering from a shortage of financial resources), we are able to draw a detailed picture of how IO staff anticipate their IOs budgetary situation to evolve. In general, IO staff expect their IO to suffer from a shortage of financial resources (more details in GLOBE Policy Brief 3).

In sum, GLOBE research recognises the urgent need for reform of IOs with clear priority areas in terms of decision-making procedures, mandate and resources. These factors, among others, might impede the effectiveness of IOs and need to be addressed. Coen, Kreienkamp & Pegram (2021) in WP 7 analysed the question of effectiveness in a broader context across GLOBE issue areas. Notwithstanding important differences between the IOs included in GLOBE, Coen et al (2021) were able to identify a few cross-cutting challenges that impede institutional effectiveness across most issue areas. These include political conflict and growing politicisation, concerns over IO legitimacy and representation, and the expansion and complexification of global problems. These challenges are interrelated and not easily resolved. For example, because complex problems are evolving and ambiguous, they are likely to increase political conflict. In turn, efforts to reduce political conflict through institutional reform – e.g. by introducing majority voting – is likely to heighten concerns over legitimacy and representation. The relationship between legitimacy and effectiveness is particularly interesting, since these two attributes can be mutually reinforcing but also mutually constraining (Sommerer and Agné 2018). Without sufficient legitimacy, IOs are arguably less able to engage in effective problem solving. In turn, a lack of effective output is likely to further decrease legitimacy. This shows the complex interrelation between different factors which contribute to the limited effectiveness of IOs and which also relate to how they operate and their particular mandate.

3.2.2 Exploring possibilities for reform

The possibilities and limitations of reforming global governance institutions were also analysed in GLOBE with a specific focus on the WTO. The WTO was chosen because trade constitutes a global

governance issue area where the EU holds exclusive competence and can pursue its global policies as an integrated and institutionalised regional organisation (Lenz 2021). In this way, the WTO constitutes a unique case to explore the possibilities for reform pursued by the EU. While the GLOBE project was ongoing, the MC12 also took place, which allowed for observing the possibilities and constraints of reforming an IO. In their contribution on the reform of global trade governance, Wouters and Hegde (2022) focus on the WTO and the existential challenges it is facing with regard to further integrating developing countries into the WTO, addressing unfair subsidies, reforming the dispute settlement system and some other issues. On all these issues, the EU interacts with the WTO and its members to advance their reform agenda for the WTO.

There are clear limits on what can be achieved in terms of reforms. Reform proposals have primarily focused on two WTO functions which have come under considerable strain in recent years: (1) the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism and (2) the WTO as a negotiating forum and rule-maker for trade policy.

With regard to the first function, the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism (DSM), which is critical for the implementation and enforcement of WTO rules, has been essentially defunct since December 2019. This is a direct result of unilateral action taken by the US, which has blocked all new appointments to the Appellate Body (a key body tasked with hearing appeals of WTO panel reports) of the DSM. The contribution by Kerremans in GLOBE (Wouters et al. 2020) shows that the objection of the US to the DSM is already long-standing and is based on the US' fundamentally different viewpoint as to the degree to which international organisations can constrain national policymaking. Reform proposals focus on perceived problems and deficiencies in the dispute settlement mechanism that pre-date the breakdown of the Appellate Body and which are considered to be the impetus for the US' blockage of new appointments to the Appellate Body. One influential set of reform proposals for the Appellate Body are referred to as the "Walker Principles", and seek to address a number of concerns of member states, including *inter alia* to respect the time limit for issuing reports, not to issue advisory opinions outside the issues raised by disputing parties, and not to review domestic laws of member states (Van der Loo 2022). However, the US is not expected to end its blocking of new appointments nor engage in reform discussions (Van der Loo, 2022; Wouters et al. 2020). In light of this, a group of 20 member states, including the EU, have established an interim mechanism called the Multiparty Interim Appeal Arbitration Agreement (MPIA) to carry out appellate review of WTO disputes between the 20 signatories. Interestingly, the MPIA already incorporates some of the Walker Principles, namely the time limits and limitations on the authority of the body to address only issues that are necessary for the dispute (Wouters, Hedge and Raina 2020). The MPIA, however, is obviously limited by its membership and its temporary status which limits the scope of multilateral reform.

With regard to the second function, though some limited progress was made at the MC12, the WTO has struggled to respond to the growing need for trade policy on numerous substantive issues related to trade, including regulatory divergence, special and differential treatment for developing countries, digital services, sustainability and human rights, investment, intellectual property, and others. The WTO's role as a negotiating forum is hamstrung by two key features of WTO rulemaking: the principle of "single undertaking", which mandates that WTO members adopt negotiation packages in totality (Wouters, Hegde and Raina 2020), and decision-making by consensus, which has been all but impossible to achieve among 164 members with diverging perspectives and interests. One option for reform in this area that has gained some momentum and support is to reform and develop the WTO to operate at "multiple speeds" through differentiated integration. Toward this end, the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) entered into force as an exception to the single undertaking and consensus principles with ratification by

141 out of 164 members, and applies only to states that have ratified it. The TFA allowed for substantive progress on eliminating bottlenecks to trade and in integrating less developed countries into the global trading system through capacity building and room for alternative approaches to implementation. Though the TFA has been criticised by some member states for bypassing key principles of WTO rulemaking and other issues, it has allowed progress on rulemaking that would otherwise have likely not materialised. Other attempts to move forward in a similar way among a sub-group of member states have been less successful, such as the negotiations on an Environmental Goods Agreement which have not yet resulted in an agreement.

The in-depth case studies of the WTO show on the one hand that reform is currently extremely hard due to opposing preferences of powerful member states but also offer some insights on alternative strategies the EU can pursue in the context of the WTO, such as pursuing differentiated integration through multilateral side agreements on specific issues with fewer WTO members.

3.2.3 Alignment between priorities of IOs and EU

The issue of IO reform, from an EU perspective, partially hinges on whether a given IO's position on reform matches with the EU's position. This relates to the alignment between the EU and the IOs on certain issues. In GLOBE, we analysed the degree to which EU priorities align with priorities of IOs. Concerning alignment between the EU and IOs, research by Saz-Carranza et al. (2022) analyses the interactions between the EU and 36 formal intergovernmental organisations as reported via global news sources. The analysis uses the Goldstein conflict-cooperation scale to assess the dyadic relations between the EU and each of the formal IOs, drawing on the quantity (number of interactions/intensity) and quality (degree of cooperation and conflict of interactions) of interactions between the EU and the formal IOs based on information from the Global Data Event Language and Tone (GDELT) database, which codifies world events based on news sources and contains more than 150,000 news sources in multiple languages. Saz-Carranza et al. aim to understand what determines the quality and intensity of interactions between the EU and formal intergovernmental organisations, focusing on three factors, namely the authority of the formal intergovernmental organisation, the policy overlap between the formal intergovernmental organisation and the EU and the nature of involvement (type of membership) of the EU in the formal intergovernmental organisation.

They find significant variation in how the EU interacts with IGOs both in terms of intensity as well as in terms of conflict and cooperation. These interactions are driven by the EU's involvement in IGOs as member or observer, the policy overlap between the Union and other IGOs, and the level of pooling and delegation of the organisation the EU interacts with. Interestingly, they find that when there is significant policy overlap, i.e. the stakes are high for both organisations involved, the interactions tend to be more conflictual indicating that the preferences or priorities of IOs and EU do not always align and hence constituting a possible barrier to reform.

3.3 Challenge 3: Multi-level governance and vertical coherence

A third issue with regard to engaging with IOs concerns vertical coherence or degree to which EU and its Member States align in engaging on the international scene. In this context GLOBE research contributed by analysing two issue areas, namely climate (WP 5) and investment (WP 3), in addition to focusing on the ratification of an international convention, namely the Istanbul Convention on Action against violence against women and domestic violence (WP7).

In the area of global climate governance, the EU has for a long time positioned itself as a global governance leader. Kreienkamp et al. (2022) note in their contributions that this ambition has shaped the EU interactions with the UNFCCC and propelled the development of a vast body of EU policies, laws, and regulatory instruments in response to the rules developed within the climate change regime complex and with an aim to steer rule-making at the international level. However, they also observe that EU climate policy has not advanced consistently over time and policy outcomes have not always matched European climate leadership aspirations. Their research tries to understand this outcome by focusing on how multilevel interaction processes between the EU, its member states, and the international level have shaped climate policy development in the EU and explain when, why, and how non-incremental policy change has occurred. They argue that European climate policy is an outcome of complex multi-level dynamics between EU and Member States and EU and global level which might enable policy innovation but can also lead to policy stagnation, contestation, and resistance. Integrating and applying a multi-level and multiple-streams theoretical framework they show that the current internal set-up of EU's decision-making provides "ample space for well-resourced veto players and 'policy obstructers'" (Kreienkamp et al. 2022: 16). As a result the international influence of the European Commission is largely determined by power shifts within domestic political systems. Only when domestic policy preferences align and political momentum arises ('opportunity structures' in Kitschelt's (1986) classic conceptualisation) can the EU really play a global leadership role. In this way, a lack of vertical coherence can influence global governance outcomes. However, their analysis is that the degree of vertical coherence within a policy area is not black and white and that the degrees of vertical coherence vary across time and issue within a policy area, in this case climate change.

The importance of vertical coherence and the degree to which it influences global governance outcomes and enables global governance reforms was also explored by Broude and Haftel for WP 3. Broude and Haftel (2020; 2022) focus on the global investment regime which comprises thousands of international investment agreements and different global arbitration institutions. Their paper first examines the evolution of the regime and pays particular attention to the ways in which the EU and its member states engage in the investment regime and the reform proposals to create a more coherent global investment regime. Concerning the latter, their work zooms in on the debates around states' regulatory space and how it is potentially constrained by investment agreements, and on the EU's initiative to form a permanent multilateral investment court through the reform process led by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. Broude and Haftel (2022) focus on the role of the EU and its member states in the reform of the global investment regime with a specific focus on the issue of state regulatory space. The current investment regime created international tensions on possible constraints put on governments to develop public policy in areas, such as environment, energy, health, and human rights, constraining their state regulatory space. Following the 2009 Lisbon Treaties, policymaking on investment was included in the EU's Common Commercial Policy, which originally was conceived of as an exclusive competence that transformed the EU into a key player in the international investment regime. However, EU member states challenged the exclusivity of the competence creating multi-level tensions and constraints. Consequently, as in the case of climate change, the EU has to operate in a three-level game (international, EU, and domestic), as Kreienkamp et al. (2022) identify it. However, Broude and Haftel find that EU leadership is not significantly constrained and the EU is able to put its "'signature' on the regime for years to come" (Broude and Haftel, 2022) in terms of steering the debates on reform of the investment regime. The investment regime constitutes an example where a significant degree of vertical coherence is achieved.

Finally, considering the study on the Istanbul Convention, Ebetürk and Tokhi (2021) show that there are important differences in how European countries commit to the Convention. First, there are some that ratify quickly, notably the Southern European states. Second, most other states from Northern and Western Europe take on average longer to ratify the Convention. Third, Eastern European states eschew ratification of the Convention. Not even half of eligible states from that region have ratified the Convention. Based on their descriptive macro-level analysis of ratification patterns, they formulate some propositions that help understand the differences and lack of coherence among European states. They focus on political and sociological explanations, drawing from both comparative politics, human rights research, and political sociology. They argue that new forms of relationships between civil society and the state in contexts of democratic backsliding are important to understand ratification patterns. The role played by the state in supporting or organising the contestation against the Convention is key in many cases. Moreover, governments' refusal and delay to ratify the Convention, especially in a highly institutionalised regional environment with many overlapping and interlocking human rights norms, severely undermines international efforts to build and implement a consistent and effective protection of individual liberties. This degree of coherence affects effective international action and undermines global governance efforts in this area.

4. Informal Low Cost Global Governance Institutions

Besides focusing on IOs, the EU can also engage with other global governance institutions, especially to pursue a more autonomous agenda as outlined in the different strategy documents discussed in section 2. We focus here on different types of global governance institutes such as informal intergovernmental organisations and transnational regulatory networks. These are so-called low-cost institutions (Westerwinter, Abbott, Biersteker 2021; Abbott and Faude 2020) that offer some potential benefits to pursue global governance strategies since they might enable cooperation between a limited number of actors in times of polarisation and gridlock and possibly expand the governance options. They are called low-cost institutions since the costs of creating, operating, changing and exiting are lower than in the case of formal intergovernmental organisations.

4.1 Informal intergovernmental organisations

The EU can initiate and participate in a variety of arrangements and forums for intergovernmental cooperation that are less formalised, such as the “G groups” (e.g. G7/G20) (Vabulas and Snidal 2013). This form of cooperation is a result of a shift from formal international law-making to informal international law-making (Pauwelyn, Wessel, and Wouters 2014). The extending of multilateral engagements is also stressed by the European Commission in its communication on a rules-based multilateral order (European Commission, 2020, p. 8):

“The EU has an interest in extending international norms, standards and global cooperation in priority areas where there is limited or no global governance or where reinforcement is needed such as democracy, rule of law, international taxation, digital cooperation, consumer protection, environmental degradation, oceans, natural resource governance and raw materials security and sustainability as well as green technologies and renewable energy.”


These informal intergovernmental arrangements emerge from non-binding international agreements (e.g. memorandums of understanding) (Roger 2020; Vabulas and Snidal 2013) and lack the formal authority and autonomy, clear rules, and enforcement mechanisms commonly found in formal, treaty-based IGOs.

In addition, these bodies generally do not have a secretariat or permanent staff, headquarters, or institutional structure (Vabulas and Snidal 2013), or if they do, their “bureaucratic footprint is light” (Roger 2020: 3). While informal intergovernmental organisations vary in terms of formality and function, to be considered an informal organisation, there should be some degree of organisation, such as a defined list of members and explicitly shared purpose or goals (Roger 2020; Vabulas and Snidal 2013), collective outputs (Roger 2020), and/or regular meetings (Vabulas and Snidal 2013). Thus, they are organisational entities with varying degrees of agency but often lack the formal organisational structures that are characteristic of formal IGOs.

In the GLOBE mapping papers, we also identified the most relevant informal intergovernmental organisations for each issue area. For trade governance, the G7 and G20 play a key role and decisions reached in the context of these informal fora are often reflected in members’ positions at the WTO. While trade governance is now dominated by more formal arrangements, historically, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs was itself an informal intergovernmental organisation until it was replaced by the WTO in 1995. For the governance of climate change, the G7 and G20 again play leading roles, with the G7 (formerly G8) the first global governance institution to develop real measures against climate change, even before the UN (Coen, Kreienkamp and Pegram 2021). Additionally, the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF) launched by US President Barack Obama in 2009 played an important role in providing a forum for high-level political discussions on climate change until it became dormant during the Trump administration and replaced by the EU, Canada and China-led Ministerial on Climate Action. The global governance of security involves a wide array of informal intergovernmental organisations, often with an aim to address a particular and salient security threat for a given region, such as nuclear proliferation or terrorism, or to function as an ad hoc contact group. While the G7 and G20 again play the most prominent role, the GLOBE Mapping of Global Security Threats and the Global Security Architecture provides a list of no fewer than 42 informal intergovernmental organisations active in security governance. Finally, within global financial governance (GLOBE deliverable 6.1), banking networks and committees play key roles in enabling cooperation and information-sharing among central banks and financial regulators. Within the umbrella of a formal intergovernmental organisation – the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) – a number of networks and committees that are not founded by formal international agreement are active and play a role in ensuring financial stability and shaping financial policy. Among the committees hosted by the BIS, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is particularly influential in global financial governance and provides a forum for discussions on banking regulations and fosters cross-border cooperation.

The rate at which informal intergovernmental organisations are being formed and employed by states has grown substantially in recent decades, while the rate of establishment of their more formal counterparts has levelled off (Vabulas and Snidal 2013, 2021; Roger 2020)(see figure 2). In fact, Roger (2020) estimates that the percentage of informal organisations has increased from about 5 to 15 percent of all international organisations after World War II to close to one third or even 40 per cent (Roger and Rowan 2021) of all international organisations today, putting the current total number of informal international organisations at more than 100. According to Roger (2020, 4-5), this increase of informality is a result of two trends that have developed in recent decades. First, an increase in domestic political polarisation that has increased domestic hurdles for policymakers interested in more formal agreements and international cooperation. Second, an increase in states’ reliance on independent agencies for the regulation of various policy areas. As a result, informal organisations are increasingly playing a prominent role in global governance and, if the trends continue, are likely to play an even greater role in the future. Informal organisations have a variety of interactions with other global governance actors.

Figure 2: Growth of formal and informal IOs



Source: Roger and Rowan 2022

Despite their uncertain legal standing in international law (Roger 2020; 2022), informal organisations have a number of advantages and a unique role to play in global governance. First, they offer states a forum for dialogue and consensus-building that is less restrictive of state sovereignty or that offers a greater level of confidentiality (Wouters and Odermatt 2014). Further, informal intergovernmental organisations can be more flexible and nimble in responding to crises or abrupt changes (Vabulas and Snidal 2013; Wouters and Odermatt 2014), in addition to being able to take on a wider variety of topics that might fall outside the mandate of an IGO. Finally, informal organisations may be a desirable alternative to more formal agreements when governance is necessary but prevented by domestic constraints (Roger 2020).

The EU is involved in several informal intergovernmental organisations. As Wouters, Kerckhoven, and Odermatt (2013) note, the EU has been one of the best students of the G20 in terms of following up on G20 decisions. However, on the aggregate, there were no studies which more systematically analyse the role of the EU in informal intergovernmental organisations. GLOBE aimed to fill this gap and explore the potential of informal intergovernmental organisations for the EU.


The importance of pursuing global governance through these instruments is also stressed in the Commission communication. GLOBE research confirms the opportunities offered by informal law-making. In his contributions to GLOBE, Roger builds on his earlier work on informal intergovernmental organisations and focuses on the interaction between formal and informal intergovernmental organisations. This research characterises the EU as a formal intergovernmental organisation that interacts with and supports informal intergovernmental organisations through providing them with key resources and services. Moreover, the research explores why states have increasingly relied on informal IOs as instruments of cooperation and argues for the necessity of formal IOs in the proliferation of informal institutions. Roger advances that the existing literature neglects the crucial role that formal IOs have played in making informality work. This is especially relevant for the EU since it plays an important role in the formation of informal IOs. In making this argument, Roger focuses on the ‘supply’ side of informal organisations, theorising that when formal IOs extend services and resources to

informal bodies, it increases their viability and thus changes the cost-benefit calculations of informality. He subsequently analyses the aggregate patterns of formal IO support, drawing on the dataset of informal IOs developed by Roger and Rowan.

Within the dataset, Roger focusses on 200 informal IOs and examines the instances of direct and indirect assistance that the informal IOs have received from formal IOs, including the European Union. This assistance occurs via several mechanisms. First, formal IO assistance can reshape the choice for informality by making policymakers more confident that informality can work at the outset; or by making it more likely that an informal design will be maintained when problems change later. Second, in practical terms, larger bodies can lower the costs of producing governance by lending resources and extending key services to informal IOs. They thereby facilitate the proliferation of new institutions that would not otherwise present viable solutions on their own. This feeds into theories on IO ‘mutualism’: as organisations develop links with one another, they mutually strengthen and legitimise themselves (Green and Hadden, 2021).

The results indicate that formal IOs have been heavily relied upon to augment informal bodies. Nevertheless, the paper shows that only one fifth of all active formal IOs, at the time of the research, were found to be assisting informal IOs and within this group, levels of activity vary considerably. The paper puts forth that the EU is the most significant provider of direct and indirect support (responsible for 31 instances of support) (see figure 3).

Figure 3: Counts of direct and indirect assistance given to informal institutions by IOs



Source: Roger 2022

Overall the research demonstrates that the EU interacts in various ways with informal types of global governance institutions and in some cases actively promotes and supports them through the provision of key resources, services and capacity-building. Indeed, Roger shows that the EU is, by far, the most important organisation that directly or indirectly provides support to informal intergovernmental organisations. Such support not only helps these informal intergovernmental organisations to function, but has also underpinned their proliferation as a global governance institution.

4.2 Transnational regulatory networks

A specific type of informal law-making is pursued through regulatory networks. Indeed, some researchers identify horizontal and vertical regulatory networks, mainly consisting of administrators, as significant global governance institutions (Slaughter 2000; Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart 2005). Slaughter and Zaring defined regulatory networks as “informal institutions linking actors across national boundaries and carrying on various aspects of global governance in new and informal ways” (2006, 215). These regulatory networks serve several governance functions and constitute important global governance “intermediaries” (Jordana 2017). Their relevance is also recognised by legal scholars. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart (Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart 2005) describe different types of administrative global governance including based on collective action by transnational networks of cooperative arrangements between national regulatory officials. The rise of regulatory networks as global governance institutions is partially driven by the proliferation of different types of trade and economic cooperation agreements (Bull et al. 2015).

Within the EU, these regulatory networks have developed very quickly and have become a key governance structure that has received ample academic attention (Bach et al. 2016; Coen and Thatcher 2008; Maggetti 2014). The EU and its member states have developed several “regulatory agencies” tasked with governing specific issue areas in the last decades. Regulatory agencies can be defined as public entities formally separated from governmental departments and bureaucracies that are tasked with executing regulatory tasks (Bianculli et al. 2013, 9-10). Within the EU, many regulatory agencies have been set up. These regulatory agencies in turn create transnational networks between member state agencies (and sometimes go beyond EU member states). The model of regulatory agencies has diffused globally through different mechanisms (Jordana, Levi-Faur, and i Marín 2011), allowing the formation of transnational networks of regulatory agencies on a range of policy issues. Besides European regulatory agencies creating transnational networks, several regulatory networks between national agencies are created on a range of policy issues (Eberlein and Newman 2008). How the EU interacts more systematically with these transnational regulatory networks has been less researched. Globalising the regulatory network approach would be a strategy that could be pursued by the European Union.

Expanding an existing dataset on regulatory agencies, the GLOBE work by Jordana et al. analyses the involvement of the EU in transnational regulatory networks. They examine the establishment of TRNs composed of national regulatory agencies. They define the TRNs as “entities that are primarily composed of public actors such as governmental units or independent agencies involved in regulatory governance that operate internationally, either globally, or in regional or subregional spaces” (Jordana et al. 2022, 678). The purpose of the TRNs is to share information and approaches on regulations, policy, harmonised data bases and to network with international organisations.

They analyse under which conditions the EU is involved in the promotion and expansion of these networks. To explore these conditions, they rely on an original dataset of TRNs established by national

regulatory agencies throughout the world in the last 40 years in 22 different policy areas. To zoom in on the role of the EU, they focus on whether the headquarters of regulatory networks are based in the EU and are sponsored financially by the EU. They complement their quantitative analysis with two case studies of global regulatory networks on food safety and energy. They identify the characteristics of the EU sponsored regulatory networks and measure their global reach.

Jordana et al. (2022) show the increasing involvement of the EU in transnational regulatory networks. Their paper shows that transnational regulatory entities are prominent forms of global governance and in some areas are the dominant form of global governance institutions. They find that more than half of the regulatory networks they identified and are currently actively operating in the world have some relationship with Europe. However, the EU's involvement is selective and often not global. The European Commission is only involved in a few truly global TNRs. EU regulatory agencies are also involved in some. Hence, the EU is only sporadically providing direct support to truly global transnational regulatory networks completely outside of the EU borders. By contrast, the EU is mainly involved in regulatory networks within their borders and with countries neighbouring their borders. Hence, in terms of participation in transnational regulatory agencies that are more regional in scope, but not limited to the EU and EU member states, they find that the EU interacts more frequently and intensively. These are typically networks, which include EU member states and European Free Trade Area members or which include other states, for example, around the Mediterranean area. One of the explanations focuses on the contribution these networks bring to the EU in terms of consolidating and expanding their regulatory standards in a vast range of policy areas.

To promote global governance capacities outside of Europe, the EU could focus on sectors which are not yet dominated by other international organisations or where TRNs are already well integrated. On the other hand, there are interesting opportunities for expansion and promotion of EU reach in new sectors where TRNs are already common. Part of the current efforts to develop networks in the EU neighbouring areas could be shifted to other regions like Africa to obtain a more expansive global approach via TRNs.

5. Global Governance through Private Global Governance Institutions

5.1 Global Governance through standard-setting and engaging private actors

Previous global governance institutions involve multiple partners and cooperation. As the strategy documents make clear, the EU also wants to pursue a more autonomous strategy. This is in line with what other actors do. Indeed, global governance is also increasingly pursued unilaterally by public and private actors through the use of technical and non-technical standards. The launch of the European Commission strategy on standardisation testifies to the importance of using standards to govern globally (see section 2.1) – which has also been identified as a key mechanism for governing globally by several scholars.

The way the EU engages in this form of global governance was recently described by Anu Bradford (2020) in her book the 'Brussels Effect'. According to Bradford, the EU single market has been largely based on the adoption of common standards in a wide variety of domains. Over the years this internal goal has also created external effects. Bradford refers to the EU's external standard-setting power as the "Brussels Effect". The Brussels Effect does not always occur, but only when five cumulative factors appear: market size; regulatory capacity; stringent standards; inelastic targets; and non-divisibility. Concerning the first, market size, a large internal market such as the EU forms the basis for exercising standard-setting power over third states. Market size creates an incentive for external producers to comply

with the standards prevailing in the internal market. The EU is the second largest importer of goods and the largest importer of services in the world. Moreover, the EU is arguably the world's most significant consumer market due to the high purchasing power of EU consumers. Therefore, external producers are inclined to gain market access into the EU by adjusting their products and services to EU standards despite the adjustment costs. Second, the EU has significant standard-setting capacity through institutional structures that are capable of adopting and enforcing EU standards effectively. The latter entails on the one hand the authority to impose sanctions in case of non-compliance and on the other hand the necessary technical expertise and financial resources such as effective and independent bureaucratic institutions overseeing standards. Third, the EU promulgates stringent standards that reflect the preferences of citizens within the EU. Within the EU, public opinion demands the EU to adopt strict standards to remedy the risks to the environment, public health and society at large that industry and companies might pose. Fourth, the Brussels Effect only comes about for so-called inelastic targets such as consumer markets. Fifth, and finally, non-divisibility entails that the EU standards will only become global standards when the benefits of adhering to a single global standard are greater than the benefits of taking advantage of laxer standards in more lenient jurisdictions. Multinational corporations might voluntarily decide to extend EU standards to their global operations. This incentive is most at play when a corporation's production or conduct is non-divisible across different markets. Complying with one standard might allow a corporation to maintain a single production process, which is less costly than tailoring its production to meet divergent standards for different markets. Thus, not all EU standards are globalised but a significant number are and the relevance of standards for global governance is recognised in the Commission's standardisation strategy (see section 2).

Besides public standard-setting strategies, a large number of non-state actors have become important actors in global governance through standard-setting. The most important non-state actors in this context are multinational enterprises (MNEs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The past three decades have seen a significant increase in private and public-private governance initiatives and private and public-private actors have become increasingly involved in global governance (Abbott 2012; Abbott, Levi-faur, and Snidal 2017; Abbott and Snidal 2009; Abbott and Snidal 2009a). These actors define either mandatory or voluntary standards with which other actors need to comply. These standards aim to regulate and govern transnational policy concerns such as data-protection, chemical pollution or human rights, just to name a few. Especially relevant in this context are so-called Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI), which aim to develop sustainability standards that are increasingly integrated in EU policies. GLOBE has extensively analysed the emergence and proliferation of these initiatives and standards (Depoorter, Marx and Otteburn 2021).

These initiatives are becoming increasingly important because the EU to a degree institutionalises these global governance instruments in their own regulatory approach. One can find references to these initiatives in trade policy (ref.), public procurement policies (ref.) and increasingly also in new regulatory approaches based on the concept of due diligence and which use global value chains to govern behind borders. The OECD-FAO Guidance elaborates a Five-Step Framework for Due Diligence comprising the steps enterprises need to follow: "(i) Establish strong enterprise management systems for responsible supply chains; (ii) identify, assess and prioritise risks in the supply chain; (iii) design and implement a strategy to respond to identified risks in the supply chain; (iv) verify supply chain due diligence, and (v) report on supply chain due diligence" (OECD and FAO 2016: 22). MSI initiatives contribute to due diligence in designing and implementing a strategy to respond to risks as required in step (iii) of the OECD-FAO Five-Step Framework, as certification could keep a check on the identified human rights and environmental objectives in supply chains. These instruments could also help verify supply chain due diligence as required in step (iv).

Especially in the context of human rights and sustainable development due diligence and commodity based due diligence, the integration of private standard-setting mechanisms is becoming important. The Commission released its long awaited regulatory proposal. The Commission Directive establishes a corporate due diligence duty. The core elements of this duty are identifying, bringing to an end, preventing, mitigating and accounting for negative human rights and environmental impacts in the company's own operations, their subsidiaries and their value chains. In addition, certain large companies need to have a plan to ensure that their business strategy is compatible with limiting global warming to 1.5 °C in line with the Paris Agreement. Directors are incentivised to contribute to sustainability and climate change mitigation goals. The Directive also introduces duties for the directors of the EU companies covered. These duties include setting up and overseeing the implementation of the due diligence processes and integrating due diligence into the corporate strategy. The Directive applies to large EU companies.

Besides this initiative, several other due diligence-based initiatives exist or are under consideration in the EU. The EU Timber regulation, for example, aims to ensure that timber coming on the European market is not illegally logged. Similarly, the Conflict Minerals Regulation requires EU companies to ensure they import minerals (tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold) from responsible and conflict-free sources only and put in place due diligence measures. A proposal for a regulation on deforestation-free supply chains focuses on certain agricultural commodities. It has a very specific objective, namely to reduce the impact of EU consumption and production on deforestation and forest degradation worldwide. The proposal for a new Batteries regulation also has the specific objectives of reducing environmental, climate and social impacts throughout all stages of the battery life cycle. It requires economic operators placing industrial or electric vehicle batteries (including incorporated in vehicles) larger than 2 kWh on the Union market to establish supply chain due diligence policies. Additionally, the forced labour proposal aims to keep the EU market free from products made, extracted or harvested with forced labour, whether they are made in the EU or elsewhere in the world. The Proposed Regulation applies to economic operators – both natural and legal persons, including associations of persons – that place or make available products internally, or which export products from the EU market and extends to all products, including their components, regardless of industry or geographic origin.

Given the importance and relevance of these new forms of global governance, GLOBE conducted in-depth research into multi-stakeholder initiatives. The research points to a few relevant findings with regard to MSI and MSI as global governance tools. First, they constitute a relevant global governance tool for the governance of global value chains for specific commodities relevant from an EU regulatory perspective. Second, we observe some stagnation in the number of MSIs but also a consolidation, which probably means that some MSIs will continue to grow and become significant global governance institutions. Third, their integration in a range of public policies and other global governance instruments targeting global value chains and economic actors will most probably contribute to a further consolidation of MSI as global governance tools. Fourth, our research reveals that although MSIs operate truly globally, there are distributional differences across the globe. Some countries are less involved in global MSI dynamics. This is a point of concern from a distributional perspective but can also be addressed to a degree by providing support for MSI adoption. Fifth, the application of MSIs remains limited to a number of commodities.

These findings hold some relevant policy implications. First of all, we observed that MSIs are increasingly integrated in public policies, especially in the EU. This integration is based on the assumption that MSIs deliver on their stated objectives. This is subject to debate and further research is

necessary to provide more clarity on this. In the deliverable we did not engage in a full-fledged meta-analysis on different types of impact studies. Such meta-reviews are available and they show some positive impact on some relevant sustainability parameters, but more research is needed to further substantiate the assumption especially also in relation to the question of which MSIs perform better in terms of sustainability impacts. Second, the integration of MSIs in public policy requires policymakers to select a number of MSIs which are relevant for a specific policy initiative. In our research we showed that there are many MSIs and that they differ significantly in design. The mechanisms through which policy initiatives and instruments recognise private standard-setting global governance institutions will become increasingly important. Currently, there are several recognition systems in place. Investigating possible convergence and strengthening of recognition systems should be a policy priority. These recognition systems should take into account several aspects including the institutional design of MSIs, evidence of their sustainability impact, costs related to obtaining specific MSIs and potential negative externalities.

Third, assuming MSIs contribute to achieving sustainable development and that it is important to increase their use or adoption, this deliverable showed that there are significant barriers related to the adoption of MSI and that the adoption of MSI is uneven across the globe. Addressing these barriers with a specific focus on providing technical and financial assistance should constitute a policy priority.

5.2 Global Governance via Public-Private Partnerships

In collaboration with Westerwinter, GLOBE researchers (Marx & Westerwinter 2022; Westerwinter, 2022) also analysed transnational public-private partnerships as global governance institutions and the role of the EU therein. Public-private partnerships encompass collaborative hybrid governance arrangements between private and public entities.

Though the types of initiatives that may be categorised as public-private partnerships vary widely, initiatives that are transnational in nature and focus on providing a global public good or solving a global problem are most relevant (Pattberg et al. 2012). They are generally considered as becoming significant global governance institutions in terms of providing global public goods.

These initiatives have grown in number and prominence in recent decades, reflecting a broader trend to engage private actors in global governance (Abbott and Snidal 2009). A mapping of these transnational governance initiatives (TGIs) by Westerwinter (2021) suggests that in 2017 there were 570 such initiatives in operation as part of the global governance architecture. The EU is an active participant in these partnerships. Participation here is defined broadly as the involvement of the EU in a partnership, which may or may not include voting rights. The EU may, for example, participate in a TGI by orchestrating its activities (Hale and Roger 2014; Abbott et al. 2015), engaging in joint projects, or funding its activities. For example, the EU is a full member of the Kimberley Process with voting rights and has chaired the initiative's working group on monitoring for many years.

In his contribution, Westerwinter provides an analysis of the EU's participation in public-private partnerships based on his existing dataset (Westerwinter 2021). He focuses on the frequency of EU participation in these initiatives, in which type of partnerships the EU participates, and what may motivate the EU to interact with partnerships. Based on his dataset he identifies more than 150 transnational partnerships in which the EU is involved. Together with the World Bank, the EU is the most active actor in transnational public-private partnerships. He shows that several factors contribute to the EU's engagement with public-private partnerships including the resources of TGIs, their organisational capacity, their geopolitical relevance, and their functional fit with EU mandates and competences. These

public-private partnerships hold potential for addressing specific global governance issues and extending international norms, standards and global cooperation on a range of new issues (European Commission 2020, p. 8).

5. Fifteen targeted strategies for the EU in global governance

In the 1990s we observed a proliferation of different new global governance institutions. Many new informal intergovernmental organisations, transnational regulatory networks and private global governance institutions emerged. They started to co-exist alongside existing formal intergovernmental organisations. Now we are witnessing a consolidation of some of these new global governance institutions. In this complex institutional landscape, the EU needs to navigate and develop strategies. Cross-cutting targeted strategies can focus on specific global governance institutions. With regard to each type of institution a strategy can be developed, but one should also consider that each of these institutions are confronted with some limitations. Table 5.1 summarises some of these strengths and weaknesses of different global governance institutions for the EU identified in GLOBE research.

Table 5.1: Strengths and Weaknesses of Global Governance Institutions for the EU

	Strengths	Weaknesses
Formal Intergovernmental Organisations	<p>Inclusiveness</p> <p>Binding rule-making authority</p> <p>Multilateral on a global scale</p>	<p>Doubts regarding effectiveness due to resource and mandate constraints</p> <p>Difficult to reform and adjust to new challenges</p> <p>Limitations to access for non-state actors, including regional organisations</p>
Informal Intergovernmental Organisations	<p>Flexible in coordination, organisation and mandate</p> <p>Claim leadership of informal global governance institutions through supporting them</p> <p>Low Cost to set up and run</p>	<p>Exclusive of other relevant actors</p> <p>Difficult to agree on binding rules and commitments</p>
Transnational Regulatory Networks	<p>Strong issue focus and low barriers to cooperation on concrete issues</p> <p>Low Cost to set up and run</p>	<p>Limited scope both in terms of substance and countries</p>
Private global governance institutions integrated in unilateral policies	<p>Extraterritoriality</p> <p>Leverage power of value chains to regulate globally</p> <p>Strong enforcement procedures</p>	<p>Issues of legitimacy and credibility</p> <p>Necessity to meta-regulate</p> <p>Cost of compliance</p>

Translated to different global governance institutions, the following targeted strategies can be formulated.

Strategy 1: Provide strong (technical and financial) support for formal intergovernmental organisations. IOs remain key global governance institutions for the EU. GLOBE research identified limited and decreasing resources as one of the challenges with which formal intergovernmental organisations are confronted. Strengthening support for IOs will strengthen the organisations themselves, improving their autonomy, as well as the EU's position (access) within them (see section 3.1).

Strategy 2: Further pursue a reform strategy for key formal intergovernmental organisations. Keep focus on reforming multilateral organisations to ensure they continue to be fit for purpose. International organisations operate in a continuously changing environment which necessitates reform. The EU recognizes this in its strategy documents and pursues a reform agenda for several international organisations. Proposed reforms include making the decision-making procedures of some IOs less dependent on veto-players and hence move in the direction of giving more autonomy to IOs. Strong and more autonomous IOs based on a clear set of principles fit within the EU's vision of 'rules-based multilateralism'. However, based on in-depth GLOBE research on selected IOs, it is important to be realistic about the likelihood of and possibilities for reform. Several reform discussions are confronted with diverging preferences of Member States of the IOs as to the resolution of various issues, and are expected to continue to linger for a long time.

Strategy 3: Secure (greater) access to other formal intergovernmental organisations. Further pursue engagement with other multilateral organisations and keep pace with expanding policy mandates of IOs. The EU has had limited engagement in certain IOs. In some cases, this resulted from a lack of alignment between the EU and the IOs original mandate. In other cases, it has had more to do with the IO generally dealing with a topic that fell outside the EU's share of competences. However, GLOBE research shows that EU access to other IOs' decision-making processes is more substantial than often assumed and not only a function of the division of competences within the EU. Given the expansion of IOs' policy mandates, the EU should focus on enhancing its formal status in other IOs, even in those areas where it has shared competences with its member states. This will further increase the substantial policymaking influence the Union already has in global governance through IOs.

Strategy 4: Diversify the global governance strategy to other global governance institutions. Further diversify the range of different global governance institutions with which the EU engages. Formal intergovernmental organisations remain important global governance institutions, but GLOBE research also makes clear that these are difficult to reform and also not always the best equipped to tackle new challenges. New types of global governance institutions, including informal intergovernmental organisations and transnational regulatory networks, might be better equipped to deal with new issues or specific global governance challenges. The EU should consider further expanding its existing development and support of informal intergovernmental organisations and possibly extend engagement toward transnational public-private partnerships. It should also identify some of the new key global governance institutions with which it can engage. However the EU should recognise that some of these institutions may only have limited resources and power to address global challenges in an effective way and that it will be important to remain aware of their capacities and limitations

Strategy 5 : Carefully consider how multilateral the multilateral approach should be and whether progressing in smaller clubs through plurilateral agreements is an option. There are significant trends to work more closely and deepen collaboration with only a smaller number of countries, both within the context of existing forms of multilateral organisations as well as outside of multilateral organisations. Within existing organisations this can lead to differentiated multilateral integration. These

dynamics are visible for example in the World Trade Organization where closer collaboration between some countries is pursued in the context of specific agreements. While this approach might lead to stronger collaboration on certain topics, it might also distance other members of the multilateral organisation from these dynamics and create tension between members in multilateral organisations that may be detrimental in the long run. So, this can also potentially lead to disengagement by some countries within multilateral organisations. Making open-ended agreements with easy access to other members might mitigate this risk. Hence, this strategy should be pursued with care, but can contribute to deepening multilateral collaboration and global governance on key issues.

Strategy 6: Further pursue global governance through informal global governance institutions.

GLOBE research has demonstrated the possible benefits of informal law-making and informal intergovernmental organisations and how the EU actively promotes them through direct and indirect support. Roger shows that the strength of informal IOs does not only come from their institutional design, but is also linked to the direct and indirect support they receive from formal IOs such as the European Union. Hence, the EU should further engage with developing informal organisations. This is not to argue that the creation of informal IOs should be pursued at all times. Some authors see great opportunities to address new global challenges such as financial crises, pandemics, terrorism, etc. through informal IOs because they can be set up quickly, are flexible, and can operate under greater uncertainty and with confidentiality. These advantages were confirmed in the work by GLOBE (Roger 2020) However, as the contributions by Roger make clear, informal IOs are not always the ‘right’ choice in terms of pursuing global governance. Formal IOs might be better suited to solve prisoners’ dilemma problems than informal IOs because they provide greater certainty as to the actions of other Member States. Informal IOs, on the other hand, might be better suited to address general coordination problems for which states are less dependent on the actions of other states, such as the use of different regulatory standards.

Strategy 7: Harness the power of regulatory standards. GLOBE research and discussions made clear that governing through standards will become even more important in the coming years. The recognition of the ‘Brussels effect’ (Bradford, 2020) and the recent Commission communication on standardisation (European Commission 2022) underscores this development. Standards, diffused through global value chains, can create extraterritorial effects and can contribute to the diffusion of European values, rules and standards globally. Strengthening the standards-based approach to global governance can be applied to many areas of global governance, including new global governance challenges such as cybersecurity. This strategy relies on first developing strong standards for the internal market which are then externalised to other countries.

Strategy 8: Strengthen the regulatory power of the EU through transnational regulatory networks.

The EU is an important global regulator. Through its regulatory standards and different diffusion mechanisms, the EU influences regulatory standard-setting on a global scale. However, the EU is less involved in developing transnational regulatory networks. Transnational regulatory networks aim to coordinate, harmonise and align standard-setting activities and in this way aim to foster cooperation. Given that the EU is sometimes criticised for unilaterally imposing standards, the development of cooperation through transnational regulatory standard-setting would allow the EU to lead in this area while retaining greater cooperation with partners. This is an area of global governance institution-building that can be further elaborated and pursued. However, the potential use of this type of global governance institution will vary across sectors and might only be appropriate for some sectors.

Strategy 9: Integrate private global governance institutions in regulatory approaches to operationalise the strategy of open strategic autonomy. Governing behind borders on issues of core

importance to the EU, such as sustainable development and human rights, is challenging. The EU is now applying a new set of regulatory tools to pursue global governance goals based on the concept of due diligence, which constitutes an important shift in global governance. In this approach the EU aims to create extraterritorial impact by making market access conditional on compliance with value-based standards. It proceeds by integrating private global governance instruments into EU regulations and directives. It uses private actors in two distinct ways. First, businesses, as the main target of the regulation, need to comply with requirements, conditions and standards *throughout* their entire value chains, which often cover the globe. Second, private actors, ranging from NGOs and multi-stakeholder initiatives to large consultancy firms, need to ensure that businesses comply with the requirements, conditions and standards. This is a far-reaching integration and use of private actors for global governance purposes and gives more substance to the concept of strategic autonomy. These private actors offer a distinct set of strengths, such as resources and expertise, to pursue global governance, but there are also risks linked to this form of private-led global governance. The EU should also be aware that private regulatory organizations actively engage to be integrated in public policy and in this way shape the design of regulatory approaches (Renckens, 2020).

Strategy 10: Strengthen regulation and control of private global governance institutions that are integrated in the EU's strategic autonomy strategy. The integration of private regulation in public policy creates a new form of global governance that holds considerable potential for global regulation, but is also vulnerable to the weaknesses of the private forms of governance that it integrates. A key weakness of some private regulatory measures is that they are not credible and effective, often lacking oversight. Being aware and addressing this weakness should be an important point of attention in further pursuing this form of global governance. In this context *regulating the private regulators* should become an important point of attention. Many global governance challenges will be addressed by a combination of global governance institutions, public and private. Identifying credible private global governance institutions must become a key priority. Developing frameworks that are able to distinguish credible from non-credible private instruments that align with EU interests should become a key priority.

Strategy 11: Engage in developing and strengthening public-private partnerships in addressing global issues. GLOBE research has shown that public-private partnerships are also becoming a key global governance institution and that the EU is actively engaged in public-private partnerships. This approach is not only important for achieving specific policy goals but can also contribute to the aim of strengthening existing multilateral organisations. As Grigorescu (2020) argues, multilateral organisations display combined characteristics of both purely intergovernmental organisations and nongovernmental organisations. Non-governmental actors do play a role in the decision-making, financing and deliberation of multilateral organisations. In some periods, governmental actors play an important role and in other times, nongovernmental actors play a more important role. This also became evident in the GLOBE mapping papers and the detailed case-studies in selected issue-areas. The shifts and dynamics between these types of actors are primarily determined by shifts in preferences of powerful states. Understanding that multilateral organisations are best placed on an 'intergovernmental - nongovernmental continuum' in which nongovernmental actors can play a role opens up the mechanism of public-private partnerships to contribute to strengthening (or at least not weakening) multilateral organisations.

Strategy 12: Recognise the complementarity between global governance institutions. In the different issue areas studied by GLOBE, it has become clear that some global governance institutions are crucial for fostering agreement on global rules, while others might be more suited for the monitoring and enforcement of these rules. The GLOBE paper on the Sustainable Development Goals (WP3) clearly highlighted the different roles different types of institutions can play in global governance. More

generally, WP7 showed that the effectiveness of IOs is constrained by a range of factors, including low levels of authority across policy functions, especially those related to compliance monitoring and enforcement. IOs are more than faithful servants of their masters, yet their ability to induce behavioural change in states is carefully circumscribed. Thus, IOs must engage in the “art of the possible” (Keohane 1982), using their comparatively strong agenda-setting powers and multiple pathways of influence to pursue their mission and contribute to the attainment of globally defined goals. In order to strengthen the enforcement functions and to improve coordination and flexibility, they might solicit and integrate other global governance institutions.

Strategy 13: Adjust strategies towards global governance institutions depending on the future development of world politics. The application of the targeted strategies towards specific global governance institutions will depend on the likely future developments and the materialisation of the four scenarios identified in GLOBE WP9 (Rueda-Sabater, Saz- Carranza, Vandendriessche et al. 2021). Depending on the future developments, the focus might shift between different global governance institutions. In WP9 we identified four possible scenarios. The drifting scenario describes a bipolar world with multiple tensions. A shifting scenario characterised by instability and the prevalence of North-South conflicts. In a rising scenario, markets and states lead in global regulatory governance. A flowing scenario is characterised by a multipolar world with strong regional governance. Under these different scenarios, the utility and prominence of specific types of global governance institutions are likely to shift, and it may be more efficient and effective to focus on one type of institution over others. Table 5.2 shows, in a stylised version, the global governance institutions on which the *main* focus of the strategies should be under each of the four scenarios.

Table 5.2: Key Global Governance Institutions for the EU under different scenarios

	Drifting	Shifting	Rising	Flowing
Formal intergovernmental organisations				X
Informal intergovernmental organisations	X			
Transnational Regulatory Networks			X	
Regulating through private institutions and public-private partnerships		X		

Strategy 14: Strengthen internal coherence and coordination between EU MS in different policy areas. It is often claimed that speaking with ‘one voice’ is of crucial importance and that the EU and its MS should align in international affairs. Research on coherence in the EU, also in relation to foreign affairs, is prolific. Much of this research recommends further coordination between EU MS in order to achieve higher levels of coherence. GLOBE research confirms this finding and shows that there is still room for improvement, especially in certain areas. The climate case studies clearly show the dependence of the EU on its MS in global affairs. The investment case shows the significant progress that can be made by ‘acting as one’ and pursuing strong coordination between EU MS. GLOBE research shows that, despite the contestation of EU exclusive competence on investment by some EU MS, EU coherence on investment reform at the multilateral level has been strong and the EU has gained, in recent years,

significant actorness in the field of foreign direct investment. Strengthening coherence will generate strategic gains on the global stage.

Strategy 15: Address fragmentation in global governance. The proliferation of global governance institutions has led to, and will continue to lead to, increased fragmentation. GLOBE research shows that the proliferation of institutions is not occurring as fast as in the 1990s, but there is still an increase in the number of institutions. This leads to further fragmentation and less coordination. A multiplicity of institutions, actors, and organisations characterise contemporary global governance, leading often to inter-institutional conflicts and disputes. To the extent that these become salient, they limit the system's ability to produce and distribute global public goods. The lack of a central authority in global governance exacerbates such coordination problems. Strengthening coordination should become a priority. Relatively little attention is paid in the strategy documents to the possible orchestrating and coordinating role the EU could play. Because of its substantial involvement in global IOs, the Union is in a position to coordinate institutions and global policies. To do so, however, the Union should develop a long-term strategy, flanked with sufficient resources, to strengthen the coherence of global policymaking and to avoid inter-institutional conflicts. A first focus on addressing fragmentation could be on strengthening international regulatory cooperation between IOs. This could be done by developing joint instruments, participating in coordination institutions, organising joint meetings and exchanging information (OECD, 2016).

6. Conclusion

Global governance is increasingly becoming important, both as a subject of academic research as well as of political action (Roger et al. 2022). The GLOBE project analysed key developments with regard to different types of global governance institutions in the context of specific issue areas of key importance to the EU, namely trade, security, climate change and global finance. Through analysis undertaken in a number of papers, GLOBE shows that the EU interacts with a broad range of global governance institutions beyond formal intergovernmental organisations and is actively promoting informal or low-cost institutions (Marx et al. 2022).

Recent EU strategies recognise the importance of the diversification of strategies towards different global governance institutions. A series of recent communications outlining various aspects of the EU's global strategy can, taken together, constitute a strategic vision for the EU. From these strategies, we distilled the aims and goals most relevant to the EU's pursuit of its interests and values through global governance.

In this deliverable, we aimed to connect the EU's strategic vision with GLOBE insights into different global governance institutions, ultimately deriving a series of 15 targeted recommendations for the EU to implement to best engage different global governance institutions to achieve its overarching governance goals.

First, in order to achieve the EU's goal to uphold and champion multilateral cooperation as well as support necessary reforms of these institutions, the EU should provide strong (technical and financial) support to these organisations (strategy 1), further pursue a reform strategy for key IOs (strategy 2), and obtain (greater) access to other formal intergovernmental organisations (strategy 3). Additionally, as other formal IOs and other global governance institutions proliferate, the EU should also address fragmentation in order to avoid inter-institutional conflicts (strategy 15), in part through the recognition of the complementarity between global governance institutions (strategy 12).

With regard to the second goal to recognise the potential of new forms of multilateral cooperation through more informal organisations and clubs, the EU should diversify its global governance strategy to include engagement with other global governance institutions (strategy 4) including informal IOs (strategy 6), regulatory standards (strategy 7), private regulators (strategy 10) and public-private partnerships (strategy 11). The EU should also recognise that the strategies towards each of these institutions in addition to formal intergovernmental organisations should be responsive to the development of world politics, possibly requiring a shift in strategy in response to changing contexts (strategy 13). Finally, here too, the EU should take care to address fragmentation among institutions, developing a strategy to promote regulatory cooperation among different institutions (strategy 15). This will again rely in part on recognising the complementarities between institutions, promoting a more efficient ‘division of labour’ between institutions based on their respective strengths (strategy 12).

Third, to become more assertive in taking action that advances EU interests and uphold and promulgate EU values and principles through more autonomous measures based on (regulatory) standards, the EU should weigh the costs and benefits of progressing through smaller clubs via plurilateral agreements within or alongside multilateral cooperation (strategy 5), seek to strengthen the regulatory power of the EU through transnational regulatory networks (strategy 8), and directly regulate private actors including for activities conducted outside the EU (strategy 9).

Fourth, to meet the goal of strengthening existing and cultivate new partnerships (especially with neighbouring/enlargement countries, US, Asia Pacific, Latin America, Africa and China), the EU can cultivate and build on partnerships by working more closely with strategic partners to pursue plurilateral cooperation (where beneficial) (strategy 5) as well as cooperating through more informal IOs (strategy 6) and through transnational regulatory networks (strategy 8).

Finally, in order to meet the goal of ensuring greater coherence of EU member states’ policies with one another and of member states’ actions in multilateral fora, the EU should strengthen internal coherence and coordination between EU MS in different policy areas, recognising that even in areas of non-exclusive competence, the EU can play a significant role in global governance if the member states speak with ‘one voice’ (strategy 14).

Overall, while formal intergovernmental organisations remain central in global governance and multilateral engagement with formal IOs should remain a main part of the EU’s strategy, other types of global governance institutions, such as informal intergovernmental organisations, transnational regulatory networks and private governance mechanisms which operate through standards, offer important benefits and should be used strategically by the EU to pursue its global goals. At the same time, each of the global governance institutions have various drawbacks and limitations that any EU strategy towards these institutions should take into account. This deliverable summarised the benefits and limitations of these global governance institutions while linking them to specific strategies.

The future cannot be predicted and will provide different types of global governance challenges to the EU. However, the EU can engage with a host of global governance institutions to address global issues and should develop well-informed institution-specific strategies with which to do so.

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