REPORT

Mapping of Global Security Threats and the Global Security Architecture

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<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BTWC</td>
<td>Biological Weapons Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention for the Elimination of Violence Against Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CICTE</td>
<td>Inter-American Committee against Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSecR</td>
<td>Corporate Security Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTITF</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWC</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People's Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASBRICOM</td>
<td>Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>EU Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUGS</td>
<td>EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Euratom</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAS</td>
<td>Federation of American Scientists</td>
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<tr>
<td>FATF</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIGO</td>
<td>Formal Intergovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>FMCT</td>
<td>Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty</td>
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<td>GPG</td>
<td>Global Public Good</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUAM</td>
<td>Organization for Democracy and Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICAN</td>
<td>International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ICoC</td>
<td>International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers</td>
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<td>ICPD</td>
<td>International Conference on Population and Development</td>
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<td>ICR</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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IGO  Intergovernmental Organization
IIGO  Informal Intergovernmental Organization
ILO  International Labour Organization
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IMO  International Maritime Organization
Interpol  International Criminal Police Organization
IPCC  UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISIL  Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JCPOA  Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
MECR  Multilateral Export Control Regimes
Mercosur  Mercado Común del Sur
MEWMDFZ  Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone
MNC  Multinational Corporations
MTCR  Missile Technology Control Regime
NARC  North Africa Regional Capability
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO  Non-governmental Organizations
NPT  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSA  Non-state Actor
NSG  Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWC  Nuclear Weapons Convention
OAS  Organization of American States
OAU  Organization of African Unity
OBSEC  Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
OCHA  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIC  Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OPCW  Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PMSC  Private military and security companies
PPP  Public-private Partnerships
PSC  Peace and Security Council (of the African Union)
PSO  Peacebuilding Support Office
R2P  Responsibility to Protect
SADC  South African Development Community
SCO  Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEANWFZ  Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
TEU  Treaty on European Union
TIP  Trafficking in Persons
TPNW  Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
UN  United Nations
UNASUR  Unión de Naciones Suramericanas
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Emergency Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WCP</td>
<td>World Court Project</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WP</td>
<td>Work Package</td>
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1 INTRODUCTION

This paper offers a preliminary overview of the current configuration of the global governance of international peace and security, along with some reflections on its strengths, weaknesses and current directions.

The approach taken in this paper has been inspired by Michael Zürn’s “three layers of the global governance system” (Zürn, 2018). As such, we commence by defining substantive focus of global governance, i.e., the global public good that must be delivered: international peace and security. We start by reviewing the conceptual challenges and evolution of this concept before explaining the definition applied in this paper. Given that international peace and security is most usefully studied through the prism of security threats, we continue by identifying the threats to this global public good — through a stocktaking exercise of the threat perceptions of 14 key states (all G7, E7 and BRICS countries) and the EU – and offer a classification of threats for the purposes of this paper.

Turning to the second layer, the actors and institutions actively involved in global governance, we provide an initial map of the formal intergovernmental organizations, informal intergovernmental organizations, international courts and tribunals, and non-state actors that work to provide international peace and security. For each actor, we provide a cursory exploration of how they work to mitigate the three security threats that are universally accepted by all studied states: the use of force, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (particularly nuclear weapons) and international terrorism. We also briefly discuss how these actors have evolved in the recent past and touch on their main achievements and challenges.

In section 4 of the document, we arrive at the third level: the macro-view of the global governance architecture of our global public good. Although the scope of this document does not allow us to create an exhaustive map of the governance configurations, we provide insights into the dimensions that define the shape of the architecture, including the relative weight and role of each category of actor; the hierarchy or organization among them, such as overlaps, specialization and division of labour; and the role of hard and soft law, informal and formal rules. We also provide some reflections on the strengths and shortcomings of the global governance of international peace and security.

Incorporated periodically throughout the document are boxes that engage with the text through the lenses of gender awareness and feminist theorising. These boxes provide the reader with access to alternative, critical views on the concept of security and the gendered assumptions it can be argued to perpetuate, as well as examples of mainstreaming gender awareness in the institutional architecture of global security. As the boxes will reveal, on some issues there are large and essentially insurmountable differences of opinion about how to achieve security, between tradition views rooted in state-centric militarism and those making humans the referent objects, and within that, questioning the gendered conceptualisation of the human subject to be secured. Thus, solely for the sake of clarity, the texts stand apart from the main.

In keeping with the approach taken in the mapping papers of each of GLOBE’s issue areas, this document is based chiefly on existing secondary literature, with the exception of the stocktaking exercise on threat perceptions in section 2. In terms of the time frame under study,
the document aims to provide an overview of the current global governance of international peace and security (that is, focusing on the past 10-15 years at most), although at times, a more historical perspective is taken when necessary for the analysis. Finally, the target audiences for the document include policymakers, academics, the general public, and – internally speaking – the rest of the GLOBE partners, for comparisons across issue areas later in the project.

This first contribution to GLOBE’s Work Package 4 also forms the starting point for the in-depth case studies in this work package, on the European security architecture and its contemporary challenges (D4.2), the global governance of cybersecurity (D4.3), and the nexus between security and migration (D4.4).

What’s in the box? A discussion about gender

‘The EU and its Member States will ensure that the gender perspective is systematically mainstreamed across all policies […] and] will accelerate their efforts to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of women.’ This quotation, taken from the June 2017 document titled The New European Consensus on Development, is important because it represents a commitment by the Council, Commission and European Parliament to accept gender equality and awareness of gender as guiding principles in all areas of EU policy making.

The EU has a long record of promoting gender awareness in security issues at the United Nations, evidenced not least (and not exclusively) by European support for UNSCR 1325 and the follow-up resolutions (Shepherd, 2008). Indeed, support for this has been a bell weather for EU norm advocacy in the face of increasing skepticism from previously supportive UN members (see boxes below). At the same time, it is undeniable that the field of security has traditionally paid very little attention to the importance of gender, although this is a paradox for critical security scholars who for decades have pointed out that the very concept of securing the national territory is one of the most gendered actions in international relations (Elshtain, 1995; Enloe, 1989; Tickner, 1992).

The task of mapping the architecture of global security is therefore presented with a conundrum: how should one map institutional architecture that is, from one perspective, inherently gendered, while from another perspective blind to gender? This mapping paper takes the form of a dialogue between the mainstream security field and the critical voices that speak to the issues of power relations, gender, inequality and disciplinary politics. The reason for this is that we recognize that the weight of research and literature, for historical reasons, remains disposed to seeing security through state-centric lenses, both as the referent object made secure and as the primary actors involved.

However, recognition should also be made of relatively recent developments such as human security that demonstrate concern for individuals and the violence experienced in their everyday lives, and the logical two following steps thereafter – the variation in security between individuals and structural reasons why those variations exist. While this paper seeks to represent all views, given the centrality of gender to the EU, the text boxes highlight contemporary scholarship and feminist theorizing most relevant to the provision of security.
2 DEFINING THE GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD AND RELATED POLICY OBJECTIVES

2.1 Basic definition of the global public good

In the field of international security, the global public good (GPG)\(^1\) *par excellence* is international peace and security. This concept, however, must be clearly defined in order to better identify the main actors and activities that aim to deliver it (Sagasti & Bezanson, 2001, p. xxii).

Peace and security are two separate terms which, in our field, are commonly treated together as two sides of the same coin (Bothe, 2008, p. 475). It is not our intention here to delve into endless debates about whether security is a prior condition of peace or a consequence of it (Buzan, 1983, p. 2); rather, we regard them as a single concept, just as the Charter of the United Nations (UN) does. Maintaining “peace and security” appears as a joint objective of the United Nations already in the preamble of the Charter, even before it is clearly defined as a purpose of the organization, in Article 1(1). The unified nature of this concept is further strengthened by the multiple references to “peace and security” that can be found throughout the text of the Charter, especially in Chapter III (when the competencies of the organs are established (Article 11, 12, 15, 18, 23, 24, 26)), and, naturally, in Chapter VII.\(^2\)

2.1.1 Conceptual challenges and evolution

Before attempting to provide a clear delimitation of our GPG, it is necessary to draw attention to its inherent conceptual challenges. The conceptualization of our GPG has traditionally been elusive due to its ambiguous and elastic meaning (Art, 1993, p. 821). International security does not enjoy a broadly accepted definition nor is it static; rather, it can take on different meanings across time and across different audiences. In order to make sense of these conceptual challenges, some authors have labelled security as an “essentially contested concept”.\(^3\) This idea suggests that it is inherently impossible to create a commonly accepted definition of security in any general sense, as it is more “an area of concern rather than a precise condition” (Buzan, 1983, p. 6).

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\(^1\) For a deeper look at the concept of global public goods, please see the GLOBE working paper on the conceptual framework for WP3-8 (D2.1).

\(^2\) Note that in Chapter VII, the term “peace” is used on its own in Article 39, in the context of “actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression”. However, the term is only employed in order to define how a threat or a breach of peace triggers the Security Council’s enforcement powers. More specifically, the Article (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”) refers to peace as a separate item right before jointly referring to “peace and security” in the frame of the measures that must be taken to stop or avoid such threats. In other words, the purpose of coercive measures is maintaining and restoring a situation where peace and security prevail (Bothe, 2008, p. 476).

\(^3\) According to W.B. Gallie who first formulated the idea, some concepts — say democracy, or justice — are so value-laden that no amount of debate can generate an agreement on a single version of these concepts as the “correct or standard use” (Gallie, 1956).
While an exhaustive analysis of the concept’s evolution is well beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to highlight that the end of the Cold War was a crucial turning point for international security studies. As David Baldwin emphatically puts it, until 1990, “security studies was composed mostly of scholars interested in military statecraft. If military force was relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue; and if military force was not relevant, that issue was consigned to the category of low politics” (Baldwin, 1997, p. 9). By extension, since only states could use military force, interstate conflict was the only security matter of substance and states were the only relevant referent object of security. Surely, the politics of language had adapted to post-WWII sensitivities by reclassifying ‘war’ as ‘peace and security’ and rebranding ministries of war as ministries of defence (Barkawi, 2011, p. 702), but the concept of security had essentially remained intact.

This narrow and exclusive focus on national military security started to transform into a wider and deeper security concept during the early 1990s, as two phenomena combined. For one, the collapse of the USSR (the only power capable of existentially threatening the West) ended a long-standing confrontation and made it possible to reorient national security from a strict focus on force towards a wider agenda of economy, environment and society (Barkawi, 2011, p. 702; Bothe, 2008, p. 476). For another, the forces of globalization and interdependence started to erode the prevalence of traditional military threats between superpowers, giving more visibility to previously suppressed intrastate conflicts in the Global South (Krahmann, 2005b). Concurrently, the increasing porosity of national borders internationalized local or regional security threats – from organized crime, separatism and religious extremism to economic crises and epidemics – and broadened the field of action of non-state actors, such as transnational criminal networks and terrorist groups. In general, the referent object of security in international relations also shifted and deepened, and began to include not just states, but also individuals and regions. In brief, new threats and actors started to affect international security, occupying more and more space on the global security agenda.

These new realities fuelled vivid debates among scholars about the necessity to reconceptualise security (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1997; Krause & Williams, 1997; Walt, 1991) and widened the divide between those who “stayed with the military agenda despite the ending of the Cold War” and those who sought to expand the concept of security to new threats and actors (Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p. 156, 187). The first, referred to as ‘traditionalists’, defend a conceptualization of security in military and state-centric terms and define international security studies narrowly as “the study of the threat, use and control of military force” (Walt, 1991, p. 212). For the second, known as ‘wideners’ and ‘deepeners’, there is a broader security agenda – comprising securitization theory, critical security studies and human security5 – that shifts attention away from military affairs to non-military threats and from the state to individuals (Barkawi, 2011, p. 702). They argue that new economic, environmental and social threats endanger the lives of individuals more than the survival of states.

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4 The securitization theory was put forward by the Copenhagen School theorists like Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde (Buzan et al., 1997; Wæver, 1995) while critical theory and the concept of emancipation were inspired by the work of Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, the founders of the Welsh (or Aberystwyth) School (Booth, 1991a, 1991b; Wyn Jones, 1995, 1996).

5 At the UN, the idea of freedom from fear and want can be traced back to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, before it was picked up in human security.
Although an expansion of the concept beyond an exclusively ethnocentric, state-based and Western definition was welcome in the post-Cold War era, some have argued that “security must not be broadened to such a degree that it loses all analytical usefulness” (Ayoob, 1997, p. 139). Over the past decades, wideners have moulded security into various forms and contexts by adding a defining adjective to the noun. This trend has led the security debate to become increasingly normative, with academics engaging “in a value-oriented debate about the actors that should be included and the issues that should be examined” (Tarry, 1999, p. 1). The ideological cleavage between these lines of thought has created an inconclusive debate that makes consensus on what constitutes security extremely difficult.

2.1.2 The definition applied in this paper

Taking into account this conceptual evolution and the debates that have accompanied it, in this document, we define international peace and security as (1) the absence of organized collective violence between major human groups – particularly nations, but also classes, racial and ethnic groups (Galtung, 2005, p. 12) – and (2) freedom from fear of man-made physical violence or direct threats to a state’s integrity or an individual’s safety and physical integrity. International peace and security cannot be said to exist unless both of these dimensions are present.

For the first dimension, we have drawn from Johan Galtung’s concept of “negative peace”, while for the second dimension, we were inspired by the wider and deeper approach to security studies – more concretely, its focus on human security over state security. From the human security perspective, international peace and security is often understood from two different angles: as freedom from fear and freedom from want. We have excluded the latter aspect (which was defined for the first time in 1994 by the United Nations Development Programme (1994)) from our conceptualization of the GPG. Similarly, we have chosen not to include Galtung’s definition of “positive peace” (Galtung, 1969, pp. 170–171). Although both terms (positive peace and freedom from want) may enhance individuals’ sense of security and even end up reducing the likelihood of large-scale violence, our choice to exclude them from the present analysis is based on two reasons. Firstly, these concepts (which are substantially close to one another) are too vague and all-encompassing to be treated rigorously (Galtung, 2005, p. 12). Secondly, the concept of freedom from want includes cross-cutting issues like the elimination of poverty and inequality, which fall under other fields of international studies, notwithstanding their marked security ramifications.

Adhering to the terms of negative peace and freedom from fear therefore allows us to delimit the contours of our GPG, and consequently the global governance architecture working to provide it. We recognise, however, that international peace and security is more than just the

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6 To name a few common examples, there is economic security, environmental security, military security, social security, physical security, identity security, climate security, energy security and national security. In these instances, the adjectives indicate the differences, while the noun draws attention to the similarities (Baldwin, 1997, p. 23).

7 Freedom from want regards underdevelopment, as well as economic and social boundaries, as contributing factors to insecurity.

8 Positive peace refers to an absence of not only direct violence, but also “structural violence” (Galtung, 1969, pp. 170–171).
absence of war and fear. A negative definition such as the one we have provided (i.e. alluding to what something is not, to the qualities it does not have or to what it lacks) does not capture the whole picture of the security landscape. Thus, in addition to the absence of war and fear, we acknowledge that there are many factors that should ideally be in place so that our GPG can be fully available to all. These work as “enabling conditions” that contribute to achieving and promoting international peace and – security.

By enabling conditions, we refer to a series of measures of protection, certainty, predictability and trust (Brauch, 2009, p. 275), which increase confidence and reliability. To be more specific, there are certain elements which favour the promotion, maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. Some examples are: solid domestic institutions, socio-economic conditions that are conducive to stability, the rule of law and instruments for the reestablishment of peace and security, conflict prevention mechanisms, early warning systems, and crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. These enabling conditions benefit the first dimension of our GPG by lowering the probability that a conflict may occur, and the second dimension by increasing confidence in societies and thus, reducing fear (Wolfers, 1952, pp. 484–486). A very broad set of global governance actors work to provide these goods; as stated, they fall outside the scope of this exercise.

<table>
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<th>Whose security matters?</th>
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<td>From the perspective of feminist theory, defining the GPG in terms of international peace and security is problematic because reducing or eradicating war between states, or organized violence between human collectivities more broadly, does not necessarily make the women within those collectivities more secure. While international peace and security in the abstract could in principle be enjoyed by everyone, the concrete mechanisms that constitute the provision of this GPG – for example, peacekeeping and national defence – secure some at the expense of others (Long &amp; Woolley, 2009). Both the contributions to, and the consequences of, efforts to achieve international peace and security are inherently gendered. Some of the earliest work of feminist security theorists argued that a focus on military threats to the nation state precludes acknowledgement of the gendered nature of security, implies a focus on men’s security and men’s priorities, and both depends on and reinforces women’s subjugation (Elshtain, 1987; Enloe, 1989; Tickner, 1992). Conversely, taking gendered experiences seriously forces acknowledgement of how, for many women, as well as many minorities and vulnerable groups, the greatest threats come from within the nation state, and frequently from the state apparatus itself. Even if the state does not pose a direct threat, it is implicated in gendered physical and structural violence (Blanchard, 2003, p. 1297, citing Peterson, 1992).</td>
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9 Specific actors in the security field, like the World Economic Forum (WEF), have even identified the “failure of national governance” (e.g. failure of rule of law, corruption, political deadlock, etc.) as a geopolitical threat. That is to say, the lack of one enabling condition is seen by some as a threat itself: “the inability to govern a nation of geopolitical importance as a result of weak rule of law, corruption or political deadlock” (World Economic Forum, 2019). The “failure of diplomatic conflict resolution” has been recognized as a threat as well, proving that it may facilitate the escalation of international disputes to armed conflicts (World Economic Forum, 2013, p. 46).
The human security agenda, with its focus on the individual as the object of security, shares with feminist security theory a critique of state-centric notions of security. However, mainstream human security approaches have not centred the gender dimension, instead problematizing the universalizing ‘human’ in human security (Hudson, 2005; Marhia, 2013). Threats to physical integrity are often different for men and women, and those threats which disproportionately affect women, and especially those which affect women because they are women (e.g. wartime sexual violence, domestic violence) are sidelined when the human is treated as an abstract individual (Caprioli, 2004). Worse, because the ungendered, universal category ‘human’ is implicitly masculine, the pursuit of human security may make women less secure.

The emphasis on freedom from fear and the exclusion of freedom from want from narrow approaches to human security also reflects a masculinist standpoint. If everything valued by individuals is subsumed under the category of ‘human security’ then it lacks both analytical rigour and practical value, unable to prioritise among different objectives, distinguish the causes of different problems, or identify the appropriate governance arrangements and policies with which to pursue priority objectives (Krause, 2004; MacFarlane, 2004). To remedy this problem, narrow conceptions of human security – including the one adopted in the main text of this mapping paper – have focused on ‘freedom from organized violence’ (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006). The decision to narrow it in this way, as opposed to identifying some subset of both kinds of freedom, reflects the valorisation and prioritisation of the masculine over the feminine. Thus, organized collective violence in the public sphere is included while interpersonal violence in the private sphere (which in much of the world poses a greater threat to women than collective violence) is excluded, and physical violence is included while a lack of healthcare is excluded.

For feminist security theorists, the compartmentalization of security in a single level of analysis – whether that be the individual, state or global level – is problematic because violence at the family, national and international levels is interlinked, and cannot be addressed solely by reference to actors at one level (Blanchard, 2003, p. 1296, discussing Tickner, 1992, pp. 28, 193 and Brown, 1988, p. 473). A focus on the individual downplays the collective nature of security, and feminist perspectives emphasize the importance of understanding security as constituted through interlinked levels of analysis (Hansen & Olsson, 2004; Rothschild, 1995). For example, sexual and gender-based violence in war cannot be explained through reference to a single level of analysis, but rather as a product of multiple levels of gender construction, including the individual, social/cultural and structural levels (Meger, 2016).

The very process of securing the nation state can render women more, rather than less, insecure. There is an opportunity cost of securing the state, with resources spent on “masculine” military preparation not available for the provision of “feminine” health, education and social services. When we consider that more than half of deaths in low income countries are the consequence of communicable, maternal, neonatal and nutritional conditions (WHO, 2018), it becomes apparent that the prioritisation of the “masculine” poses an existential threat not only to women but also to men. Masculine definitions of appropriate behaviours in military organizations further leave women – both
within and outside of those organizations – vulnerable to abuse and rape, and often limit the socially accepted roles they can perform (Enloe, 2000). Moreover, women may be more not less insecure after conflict, because of the re-establishment of patriarchal structures of control (Handrahan, 2004).

2.2 Identifying threats to the global public good

Thus far, we have provided an overview of international peace and security as a global public good, we have briefly outlined its conceptual challenges and historical evolution, and explained our approach towards defining the concept. It is noteworthy that despite the lack of consensus on the exact meaning of security, strong consensus can exist among states and international organizations when it comes to the identification and inclusion of threats and referent objects on the global security agenda. For instance, during the first decade of this millennium, the international community took serious steps towards a deeper security concept by accepting that there is a universal responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Likewise, this evolution widened the scope of security by taking into account emerging threats like cybercrime and climate change.

In the present section, we will zoom in on the specific threats to our GPG. This approach will allow us to map the global security architecture at a later stage, because any actors who participate in the governance of our GPG have emerged (or expanded their mandate) in response to specific threats, and have clustered around them. This approach – analysing the institutional security architecture by studying challenges and threats to international peace and security – is standard practice in international security studies (Cavelty & Balzacq, 2017; Collins, 2018; Hough, Stokes, Andrew, & Pilbeam, 2015; Williams, 2008).

**Feminist theorising**

Just as what ‘being a feminist’ means for women (and men) can differ from person to person; what feminist theorising seeks to understand about the world, identify reasons why the world is like that, and propose ways forward differ considerably, too. For the sake of brevity, and in relation to the specific issue of international peace and security, two quite different versions of feminist theory are sketched. One, ‘liberal feminism’, seeks to identify absence of opportunities and roles played by women in society, map the consequences and propose solutions to future gender equality and female emancipation. The other, ‘poststructural feminism’, traces the dualism of male/female throughout society as a pervasive and oftentimes taken-for-granted binary that makes the world ‘the way it is’. This can range from establishing what constitutes proper scientific research, (evidence-based, rational, progressive and in pursuit of new knowledge) to the way in which humanitarian relief operations seek to distribute food in refugee camps (through the use of iris-scanning

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10 For the definition of threats we have adopted the United Nations General Assembly’s perspective: “any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system” can be labelled as a threat to international peace and security (United Nations General Assembly, 2004, p. 25).
technology and blockchain ledgers). In the first example, that which is masculine can be juxtaposed against that which is feminine, while in the second example, for all of the good intention of donors, women are cast as the home-makers charged with the collection of foodstuff and the use of technology over them, while intended to prevent fiat money or vouchers creating opportunities for abuse or attack, nonetheless lead to gender roles being reconfirmed and women are infantilized through the denial of trust with cash.

The two positions are in some important respects irreconcilable. Treating gender as a variable (Jones, 1996) implies assuming it can explain why certain things happen, or why some outcomes are unjust, and can apply equally to women and men. Variation has causal significance. Responding to the question ‘where are the women?’, answers often assume that their absence can be compensated and policy outcomes improved. By contrast, poststructural feminism sees gendered relations as constitutive of the social world and cannot be compartmentalised into a discretely operating, objectively knowable, variables (Weber, 2014). In this mapping paper, we draw on ideas from both sides, although we recognise that liberal feminist theories that do not question the fundamentals of security policies are likely to be the more accessible.

2.2.1 Methodology

In order to identify the main challenges to our GPG, we analysed the threat perceptions and strategic priorities of 14 of the most relevant states in global security governance (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Germany, Italy, Canada, Brazil, India, South Africa, Mexico and Indonesia), representing all permanent members (P5) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),\(^\text{11}\) the G7,\(^\text{12}\) E7,\(^\text{13}\) and BRICS\(^\text{14}\) (except Turkey, whose national security document was unavailable in the languages used for this study).\(^\text{15}\) Although these states are not the only relevant actors for international peace and security, their economic and military weight and their membership (which is in some cases privileged – e.g. the P5 members of the UNSC) of important international organizations implies that they retain a key role in the agenda-setting of global security governance.

For this exercise, we examined the unclassified versions of each state’s most recent national security strategy or similar document (e.g. White Papers, Defence Reviews). Together with these sources, we considered the EU’s Global Strategy for its Foreign and Security Policy. Finally, we studied the evolution of the perceptions of the threats\(^\text{16}\) identified in the national security strategies by comparing them with the Munich Security Reports produced between

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\(^{11}\) The so-called P5: US, China, Russia, France, UK.

\(^{12}\) US, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, Canada.

\(^{13}\) China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Indonesia, Turkey.

\(^{14}\) Brazil, India, China, Russia, South Africa.

\(^{15}\) For this exercise, we consulted documents that were available in English or Spanish only. In the case of Turkey, we were unable to locate any National Security Strategies covering the past decade, nor a complete English version of Turkey’s Defence Plan 2017-2021.

\(^{16}\) Some actors, authors and forums often avoid any reference to the term “security threat” due to its heavy semantic baggage, and prefer more general terms instead, such as issues, challenges, risks or concerns.
2015 and 2019. See table 1 for a representation of the threats discussed by each actor under analysis.

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17 We chose to look into the annual Munich Security Conference because it is to geopolitics and security policy what Davos and the World Economic Forum are for global economics: a forum in which heads of states, military and security experts, diplomats and senior politicians from over 70 countries gather to discuss international security policy, challenges and trends. What is more, it provides a venue for out-of-protocol informal meetings that allow for the discussion of more controversial and non-traditional topics (Doctorow, 2018).
### Table 1: National security threat perceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type of Document</th>
<th>Use of force</th>
<th>Terrorism</th>
<th>Proliferation</th>
<th>Migration</th>
<th>Health-related threats</th>
<th>Cyberthreats</th>
<th>Economic Threats</th>
<th>Transnational Organized Crime</th>
<th>Climate Change</th>
<th>Resources and Infrastructure</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Defence White Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Canada's Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>China’s National Defence in the New Era</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Defence and National Security Strategy Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of Bundeswehr</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Defence White Paper</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>White Paper for International Security and Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>National Public Security Strategy (Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad Pública)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Defence Review</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td>No National Security Strategy publicly available in English or Spanish</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU - ESS</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Security Report</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Security Report</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Security Report</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Security Report</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The following issues were identified by certain states/documents as security threats but not included in the table above, for the reasons we outline below.

[1] **Instruments.** Some states/documents identified instruments of foreign policy as security threats. The instances of this included: diplomatic miscommunication; espionage (traditional) and the erosion of national culture by external actors and cultural influence. While poor usage or management of these (licit or illicit) foreign policy instruments by the state making the analysis – or, to the contrary, effective use of these tools by other states – may give rise to security issues, they generally do not form a direct or immediate threat to national or human security. For this reason, these factors have not been added to our table, but have been included below for transparency purposes.

[2] **Enabling conditions.** Various states/documents identified a lack or weakness of certain enabling conditions of international peace and security (e.g. the presence of strong institutions, rule of law and a more economically thriving and equal society) as security threats proper. These include: weak institutions, the erosion of domestic manufacturing capabilities, the lack of a skilled workforce, poverty, unemployment, corruption, income inequality, debt, authoritarianism, a lack of trust within the government, state failure and natural disasters (non-climate change related). As stated in section 2.1.2, these enabling conditions (or lack thereof) fall outside the scope of the present mapping exercise.

[3] **Systemic concerns.** A number of states/documents identified grievances, issues or concerns related to the (state of the) international system, relations between allies, or the global governance architecture as security threats. The instances of this included: insecure regional neighbourhoods, weak allies and/or the lack of burden sharing, competing values, challenge to rules based international system, a lack of US commitment/leadership, concerns over a lack of international support, interdependency, the risk of containment and a biased international system or unsuitable/outdated international system. These ‘meta’ concerns on the governance of international security have been excluded from our table given that each state has a very different and often contrasting view on these issues, to the point that consensus is fully elusive. Each individual state has a unique perception on how the international systems is functioning and how this might adversely effect, or benefit them. These systemic, ‘meta’ issues will nevertheless be addressed across this Work Package, both in the analysis of security architectures in section 4 of the present document, and in the case studies later on in the Work Package.

**Methodological notes:**
- A research assistant who was unfamiliar with the objectives of the exercise and our definition of the GPG performed the coding.
- The coder initially applied a fine-grained coding scheme, compiling a list of all threats identified in each document.
  - While progressing through the documents, he snowballed the list of potential threats to a total of 101, while also recording synonyms as he progressed.
  - When the first scan of all documents had been completed, the coder rechecked all documents to search for the now complete list of threats and key words.
  - Random cross-checks on the coding were performed by the rest of the research team, and where classification doubts arose, they were discussed among the team.
  - For a threat to be included in the table, it had to be mentioned in the respective document at least once.
- Once all threats had been identified, the team collapsed the fine-grained results into larger categories for analysis.
- For this exercise, we consulted documents that were available in English or Spanish only.
  - The main coder performed the coding of the English-language documents.
  - In the case of the Spanish language document (Mexico), another member of team executed the same procedure as the research assistant, using multiple possible translations of key words.
2.2.2 Main threats identified

Three observations stand out from table 1. First, ten concrete threat categories emerged: the use of force, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (mainly nuclear arms), terrorism, cyberthreats, transnational organized crime, health, environmental degradation and climate change, migration, economic threats, and resources and infrastructure. Second, certain states signalled the lack of or weak enabling conditions, systemic concerns, and certain instruments of foreign policy as security threats. We will not consider root causes or more systemic or ‘meta’ considerations in our mapping of global governance actors (section 3); however, many of these concerns will be addressed in our discussion of the global governance architecture of international peace and security (section 4). Third, full consensus among the studied actors exists only for the first three threats – the use of force, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (mainly nuclear arms) and terrorism, which were singled out in all documents. For the other seven threats, there was often a high degree of consensus, but no unanimity.

It is furthermore interesting to see that the use of force, WMD proliferation and terrorism are also consistently discussed as threats at the Munich Security Conference, as are cyberthreats. The latter category, which we will study in depth in task 4.3 of this Work Package, is clearly rising on the agenda and has been discussed every year since 2015. The other threats are discussed in waves. Migration (which will be the object of study of task 4.4 of this Work Package) has also been a topic of interest in the last five years, and was only missing in 2019. Other threats are discussed on a more ad hoc basis, which is likely related to acute crises that come and go – e.g. health-related threats were prominent on the agenda in 2016-2017, after outbreaks of Ebola and Zika.

2.2.3 Categorization and brief discussion of threats

While all of the identified threats can, directly or indirectly, affect international peace and security, they do not consistently share the same characteristics nor are they necessarily covered by the definition of international peace and security we are applying in this paper. We have therefore classified the aforementioned threats according to the following criteria: first, we examine whether they constitute man-made physical violence and/or a direct threat to a state or an individual’s integrity and, second, we take into account whether these threats have been explicitly identified by the UNSC through the creation of specialized committees (the existence of these bodies signals that the security threats they deal with have achieved priority, as determined by the oldest and most important global security institution).

Threats which meet both conditions – i.e., they constitute man-made physical violence and/or pose a direct threat to the integrity of states or individuals and are recognized as threats by the UNSC through the creation of a specialized committee – are included in the first group. Those threats that are not discussed in specialized UNSC committees but do meet the first condition are included in the second group. Threats that do not match the two requirements fall into a third and final group. This classification (represented graphically below) reveals the degree of consensus and (potentially) awareness that exists for each threat: moving from the inside (group 1 threats) out, the level of consensus gradually diminishes.

Figure 1: Threat classification
Some of the identified challenges are security threats in a strict sense; consequently, they are addressed primarily by international actors in the global security governance architecture. Other threats, however, stand at the intersection between security and other fields, and their impact on international peace and security is arguably more indirect. As a result, they are habitually tackled by international actors alien to the traditional security architecture. Such is the case of migration, climate change or finance, which can be seen as causes or contributing factors to the materialization of other security threats, rather than direct security threats in a strict sense. Below, we will discuss each group of threats and each individual threat in turn.

**First group of threats**

In this first group, we include threats that enjoy full consensus among the analysed states and that have been identified as security threats by the United Nations Security Council: the UNSC created committees dedicated to those threats that, according to its members, are the main threats to international peace and security. This criterion is admittedly UN-centric, yet the interest shown by the UNSC constitutes a good barometer to measure the weight of a given threat in the international security agenda and the acceptance of its nature as a threat. The threats in this group are not new: they represent some of the longest-standing menaces

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18 Counter-Terrorism Committee, Non-Proliferation Committee, United Nations Military Staff Committee and Sanctions Committees (United Nations Security Council, 2019).
19 About the critics regarding the legitimacy issues related to the functioning of the UNSC P5, see: section 3.2.
according to the international community. We are referring to the use of force, nuclear proliferation and – more recently – international terrorism. These threats, which are both man-made and can cause direct harm to the integrity of states and individuals, are mainly addressed by *stricto sensu* security actors.

I. **The use of force**: this is the quintessential and most transversal threat to international peace and security. The UNSC was explicitly created to regulate the use of force between states, but after the end of the Cold War, the concept was widened to include the use of force within states. References to the use of force as a threat abound in all of the documents examined: sometimes it is implied under synonymous terms such as aggression, external attack (European Union, 2016, p. 19) or geopolitical competition (Raik, Aaltola, Kallio, & Pynnöniemi, 2018).

II. **WMD proliferation**: the second threat we include in this first group is the production, spread, and use of weapons of mass destruction (a wide category which covers nuclear, biological and chemical arms). Nuclear proliferation is traditionally the central issue in this category, occupying what has historically been a main place in the international security agenda. The pursuit of nuclear armament by states outside the current non-proliferation regime, the ever-present theory of the potential collapse of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the challenge posed by non-state actors, including but not limited to terrorist groups, are some of the main threats to peace and security repeatedly pointed out by the international community. The consensus on this threat is ratified by the work of the UNSC 1540 Committee, dedicated to the prevention of the proliferation of WMDs since its creation in 2004.

III. **International terrorism**: the phenomenon of “international terrorism” has been perceived as a global threat since the Bush Administration declared a “War on Terror” in the aftermath of 9/11 and the UNSC unanimously adopted its Resolution 1373 in late September 2001 (United Nations Security Council, 2001). Around the world, the use of terrorist tactics is feared, although its actual occurrence – until now – does not match the public perceptions of such danger (Booth & Wheeler, 2008). Preventing and combatting large-scale attacks which could have a direct impact on the international peace and security ranks highly in all studied data.

**Second group of threats**

In the second group we have included those threats which fall within the scope of our definition of the GPG, given that they are man-made and/or have a direct impact on the integrity of individuals and states. What differentiates them from the threats included in the first group is that they do not enjoy the explicit acknowledgement of the Security Council (through the existence of specialized committees). Other important actors involved in global security governance, however, are actively engaged in their prevention (e.g. UNODC, Interpol, OSCE or Europol).

I. **Cyberthreats**: increasingly sophisticated cybernetic tools allow attacks on computer systems and critical infrastructures, posing a threat to peace and security. In spite of its relatively recent emergence, cybercrime has already gathered widespread (though not universal) consensus in its consideration as a threat to our GPG. The evolution of
cyberattacks and state-sponsored intrusions throughout the last 20 years (Hang, 2014) has laid bare varying opinions on how hacking and cybersecurity measures could and should be used. Still, cyberattacks are not necessarily considered as “use of force” in the terms of Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter,20 even though any cyberoperation could constitute an internationally wrongful act (Melzer, 2011, p. 7). Violations of international law or state sovereignty committed through cyber means may easily amount to “threat” to international peace and security even if they do not cause direct death, injury or destruction. Given the increasing attention to cybersecurity, a case study within this Work Package (task 4.3) will be specifically dedicated to this threat and the international actors addressing it.

II. **Transnational organized crime**: this broad label includes a multitude of problems, challenges and risks which, in extreme circumstances, can become a threat to international peace and security. Problems such as human trafficking, smuggling, illicit arms trade or drug trafficking (referred to as “the big three: drugs, people and arms” by Picarelli (2008, pp. 457–458) are so widespread and have such far-reaching consequences that they are considered threats to the GPG under study, despite the fact that they have traditionally been national problems tackled by the domestic law-enforcement mechanisms of each state (with the coordination of international institutions, when needed). The ultimate aim of this type of action is usually personal gain and the accumulation of power by those who are part of an organized crime network (Williams, 2008, p. 165), i.e. its *ultima ratio* is not to cause harm to the international peace and security or to force the circumstances that may change the political *status quo* of a region. One could argue, nonetheless, that in countries that experience a level of violence so high that it affects and endemically corrupts the structures of a state while posing grave physical danger to its inhabitants, organized transnational crime does become a major threat to international peace and security (Strange, 1996, p. 121).

*Third group of threats*

Under the third group, we have included those issues that are usually referred to as international threats but that do not fall under the definition employed in this exercise. In spite of relatively recurrent references to migration, climate change and economic factors in the documents consulted, these issues arguably do not constitute a threat to our GPG *per se*. Rather, they are causes or contributing elements to the realization of other *direct* security threats. In addition, these issues are addressed from specific legal frameworks and by specialized global governance actors outside of the security field. Given that the actors involved in the governance of these threats are not specifically focused on delivering our GPG, we will not study them in depth in this paper. In this section, however, we will briefly touch on the main players involved, and in section 4, we will briefly reflect on how the regime complexes governing these issues overlap with the regime complex of international peace and security.

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20 According to the International Court of Justice, however, the prohibition of interstate force applies “to any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed. The Charter neither expressly prohibits, nor permits, the use of any specific weapon” (International Court of Justice, 1996, para. 39).
I. **Migration**: over the last decade, population movements and their implications in terms of security have been widely debated. Migration is usually studied in the context of societal security because, under certain conditions, it has the potential to directly alter the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic composition of the host country (Buzan, 1991, p. 447). However, understanding the link between migratory movements and international security is “particularly challenging and problematic because migration, security and the linkage between the two are inherently subjective topics” (Choucri, 2002, p. 97). So much so, that migration can either be perceived as a threat or a contribution to international security depending on whether the spotlight is on the country of origin or on the host country. For example, a society which receives massive numbers of migrants may perceive them as a threat to its culture and identity and demand migratory restrictions. However, in the country of origin, where “institutional weaknesses and unpredictable access to natural resources have the potential to represent major drivers of conflict and civil war, migration can be said to represent a safety valve to absorb the demand of employment of a quickly expanding youth often trained in little but fighting. Taking the road (of migration) thus represents an alternative to taking up arms, and can significantly contribute to regional stability and global security” (Raineri and Rossi, 2017, p. 26). Nevertheless, a massive exodus of young people can also lead to brain-drain and dissolve the socio-cultural fabric of communities, thus provoking long-term consequences and creating social vulnerabilities with possible security implications. To sum up, migration can be seen as an indirect threat to security, or, more precisely, as a potential driving force behind other security threats. Thus, it is not surprising that most international actors that deal with the prevention and elimination of potential problems related to migration are not strictly security-oriented.

II. **Climate change**: the UNSC started to debate the nexus between climate change and security in 2007, on UK’s initiative, and then in 2011, thanks to Germany’s insistence. At first, both Council members and non-members regarded this effort as “provocative or irrelevant or both” (Smith et al., 2019, p. 12). However, as climate-related stresses started to pose a serious threat to international peace and security, the UNSC started to take the issue in earnest. In March 2017, it adopted Resolution 2349 on the need to address climate-related risks to tackle conflict in the Lake Chad basin (Schaller and Pohl, 2019), and a year later, it held a debate on “understanding and addressing climate-related security risks”. During the latest open debate, in January 2019, it was recognized that climate change is a “threat multiplier” and that its security implications should be seen as a collective problem in need of collective responses (DiCarlo, 2019). What is more, the UN established a pilot coordination mechanism for climate and security: the Climate Security Mechanism, which provides integrated climate risk assessments to the Security Council and other UN bodies by synthesizing insights from UN agencies and external experts. An independent Expert Working Group on Climate-related Security Risks has also been set up in order to provide assessments of climate-related security risks and risk management strategies relevant to the UNSC agenda (D. Smith et al., 2019, p. 15). Still, for all the progress made, the UNSC is far from establishing a committee for climate change, as it has done for other threats. This is in part due to certain states’ reluctance to treat climate-related security risks as a thematic question (Russia, and the US at present) as well as to the fact that there are already other global governance actors tackling climate change.

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21 According to Barry Buzan, societal security focuses on “threats and vulnerabilities that affect patterns of communal identity and culture” (Buzan, 1991, p. 447).
related issues. Even so, the current trends suggest that the UNSC will continue to debate the nexus between climate and security and discuss cases where climate change is a factor among the drivers of conflict and insecurity in a country (Smith et al., 2019, pp. 13–14). The issue area of climate change is dealt with more deeply in Work Package 5 of this project.

III. **Infectious diseases**: the rapid and massive spread of diseases, vulnerability to pandemics and exposure to epidemics appear repeatedly in many of the security strategies analysed. Considering that lapses in health infrastructure can threaten human health, economies, and the stability of states as a whole, an uncontrolled disease outbreak ranks very highly on the scale of security threats as it causes fear, distress and a general sense of insecurity (*Munich Security Report 2016*, 2016, p.42). Moreover, the steady increase in rapid international travel has significantly increased the risk of the rapid spread of infectious diseases (Kaner and Schaack, 2016, p. 5). This nexus was particularly evident during the outbreaks of Ebola and Zika from 2014 to 2016, when international attention was strongly focused on this threat, there was a broad consensus regarding its consideration as such and a multibillion-dollar response was deployed by the international community (Garrett, 2019, p. 4).

While these threats do not result in man-made physical violence, one could argue that since they directly affect the physical integrity of individuals, they could be considered as a threat to our GPG. However, global governance actors that deal with threats such as pandemics and epidemics do so from a public health perspective, whose *ultima ratio* is health protection and disease contention. The current health-related global governance mechanisms, with World Health Organization (WHO) at the forefront, focus on the conditions “that give rise to new diseases, including poor sanitation, hygiene, public health systems, farming practices and communication networks” (Zedillo et al., 2006, p. 33). Since the main global measures adopted to control infectious diseases find themselves in the health realm (distribution of vaccines and other preparedness strategies; prevention and medical treatments; WHO surveillance; government reporting; strengthening of national medical capacities; knowledge management; etc.), we will not be analysing them in relation to our GPG. It goes without saying that any *intentional* use of illness or diseases as weapons falls within the proliferation of WMD framework, which is included in the first group of threats.

IV. **Economic crises**: Economic issues permeate all aspects of social life, not less international peace and security. A financial crisis can reduce security by undermining institutions and worsening socio-economic problems like poverty, unemployment, social injustice and inequality. These factors can bring grievances to the surface and lead to the emergence of radical groups, violent movements or religious extremists who may become a source of instability. However, it is difficult to establish a direct causal relationship between financial crises and insecurity, much less to argue that such crises are security threats themselves (Thomas, 2008, pp. 247–248). Consensus on this issue is lacking among states, as shown in the national threat perception mapping exercise.\(^{22}\) Additionally,  

\(^{22}\) Nevertheless, certain scholars have pointed out that the US believed the Great Depression was a strong contributing factor to the outbreak of WWII (Kennedy, 2006). Following this argument, the US contributed to setting up organizations such as the UNSC, WB and IMF based on the belief that they would help to prevent a new war – and given their importance, the US gave itself (*de facto or de jure*) veto powers in each.
there is a global governance architecture in place that seeks to address structural financial instability from a purely economic and development perspective. While economic crises do not fall squarely under our definition of international peace and security, the governance of the two root issues is under study in this project, in the Work Packages (WP) dedicated to the study of finance and trade (WP3 and 6, respectively).

V. **Resources and infrastructure:** In a globalized world, states are increasingly interdependent on each other and on international markets to meet their domestic needs. As such, states and their populations are ever more vulnerable to potential disruptions in their supply networks or routes – both of raw materials and traded goods. The best-researched disruptions are arguably those to energy supplies and other key natural resources needed for manufacturing and industry. However, supply disruptions can occur across a wide range of required assets: from food and water supplies to medicine and military equipment produced abroad. The global governance of disruptions to the supply of resources or to infrastructure generally takes place through actors whose agendas are broader than pure international security. As such, security as defined in this exercise is typically not their main focus.

The global governance mechanisms that address this category of threats tend to be specific to each individual resource. To provide an example, the global governance of energy developed late, in the 1970s. National energy markets were largely autarkic before this point (Van de Graaf, 2017), which explains the paucity of structured cooperation on energy. This changed when oil took over coal’s leading role in energy generation; yet it was not until the first oil shock (1973-1974) – a supply shock of the type dealt with in this exercise, with far-reaching economic consequences – that the International Energy Agency was created (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2010, p. 188). The type of organizations governing energy are generally designed to correct for market failures, lower transaction costs, and set rules and standards for market exchanges (Goldthau & Witte, 2010); in other words, security of supply is dealt with chiefly through markets. This is often the case in the global governance of commodities and resources.

International trade, on the other hand, has been subject to more and institutionalization. The World Trade Organization (and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade before it) have sought to regulate (and in the case of disputes, arbitrate) global trade in an attempt to provide both stability and access to global markets and avoid large scale economic disputes between nations. For more on the global governance of trade and development, we refer to Work Package 3 in this project.

**Identifying threats and research programs**

Identifying the major security threats on the global politics agenda requires firstly deciding whose agenda to study, and secondly consider the which actors have the power to set that agenda. The phrase ‘global politics’ is used intentionally - feminist theorists stress ‘the personal is political’ and thus what constitutes a threat to security is determined by the physical reality of one’s existence, the structured forms of power and discourse pervasive within the security institutions, and also disciplinary power relations within the field of security studies and International Relations. The proponents of retaining a ‘traditional’
definition of security as state-centric and focused on military strategy are very often the academics who have most to lose from a ‘paradigm shift’ within the field (c.f. Kuhn) which occurs when new ideas become the hard core of the security research program (c.f. Lakatos).

The threats identified in this mapping paper are presented in levels, regarding the extent to which there is consensus between academic literature, national policy documentation and institutional action in recognizing its importance. Using this method there is very high certainty that the three issues of use of force, WMD proliferation and international terrorism belong to what one might refer to as the old, established hard core of the research program. The ‘double-lock’, that an issue is found in the national security strategies of the Permanent Five members of the UNSC, and that they have passed a resolution to form a committee on that issue gives a very high degree of confidence about their agreement.

The group 2 threats imply movement out from the center because of the double-lock is absent insofar as states see cyberattacks and organized crime as threatening their societal integrity, but not as an existential threat. One might also comment that organized crime is not the purview of the UNSC, while cyberattacks are essentially the methods by which the P5 are engaging in conflict amongst each other, which makes it highly unlikely that a UN committee would be formed to shed light on their offensive operations.

The group 3 threats constitute issues that are furthest from the center because they are either seen as non-traditional (scholarly ‘gatekeeping’), not found in national security strategies (c.f. climate change refusion by major powers), or handled outside of the UNSC and therefore beyond the methodological framework of the mapping exercise. It is not uncoincidental that migration, climate change, infectious diseases and economic crisis (which one could extent to ‘prevalence of poverty’) are all areas in which critical security studies, gender and feminist scholars and the human security agenda have significant contributions to make. Contributions come from both sides of epistemological debate; gender as a ‘variable’ for example in the way migration policies have to consider the different impact on women and men (family reunion and repatriation), or gender as a ‘binary in social relations’ for example in the invisibility of household work in national income accounting.

The threats in the outer circle could be considered as the central elements of a new paradigm of security studies – one that is challenging Lakatos’ ‘hard core’ of the current research program but for the structural reasons mentioned above remains outside. New research programs are inherently future-orientated and seek to challenge the prevailing views of status-quo supporting actors.
3 ACTORS INVOLVED IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

3.1 Introduction

Now that we have defined the global public good that should ideally be delivered, we will in this section identify and discuss the actors and institutions actively involved in attempting to provide it. The regime complex of international peace and security is of an extremely wide scope, and in this section, we will focus on those actors that are working to mitigate the three threats for which universal consensus exists: the use of force, the proliferation of WMDs, and international terrorism. In the following section (section 4), we will offer some broader reflections on the governance of the threats without full consensus, namely those described in the second and third groups of the classification above.

This section is structured through four categories of global governance actors: formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs), informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs), international courts and tribunals, and the catch-all category of non-state actors (NSAs). In each category, the identified actors are discussed in no particular order; hence the section on each actor can be read as a standalone text. We discuss, for each actor, how they promote the provision of the global public good at hand, what recent evolutions they have experienced, and their achievements and challenges.

### Gendering security: the Women, Peace and Security agenda

As explained in the previous box, a feminist perspective challenges the traditional approach taken in this mapping paper, in part by identifying and prioritizing a different set of threats. Corresponding to this different set of threats, a feminist perspective would also highlight the importance of a very different set of global governance actors from those discussed in the main text of the present section, including the International Organization for Migration, the UN Environment Program, and the World Health Organization. Rather than introducing a whole new set of actors, the boxes in this section discuss from a liberal feminist standpoint how some of the actors prioritized in the mapping document have adopted the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda.

In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted its first resolution on WPS (UNSC Resolution 1325) which sought to introduce a gender perspective to international peace and security, not only to tackle the protection of women as victims of conflict, but also to promote women as peacemakers in the post-conflict stage (Willett, 2010). It introduced for the first time a

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23 In the study of international relations, each theoretical approach would emphasize a different set of actors as being more or less relevant in providing international peace and security. In this paper, as in the GLOBE project, we adopt the lens of ‘global governance’, which embraces the idea that a plurality of actors typically engages in global governance and which is interested in the interplay between these actors. The categories of actors included here are based loosely on those contained in the GLOBE working document “Mapping Global Governance: guidelines for sector exercises and further developments”. Further reflection on these categories can be found in the GLOBE working paper on conceptual framework for WP3-8 (D2.1).

24 As mentioned in section 1, this document aims to provide an overview of the current global governance of international peace and security – that is, focusing on the past 10-15 years at most. A more historical perspective is taken occasionally, when necessary for the analysis.
gender perspective into the UNSC, and was considered a milestone in that it sought to address the gender-specific impacts of conflicts on women and girls and also recognized the roles women can and must play in advancing international peace and security. WPS brings together knowledge and social transformation to prevent conflicts, protect human rights, and promote recovery from conflict and insecurity. Jansson and Eduards identify two WPS approaches to the gender/security nexus – that of ‘gendering security’ related to mainstreaming and ‘securitizing gender’ regarding specific practices of war (Jansson & Eduards, 2016).

The making of the UNSC 1325 is found in the IV World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development, and Peace that took place in 1995 in Beijing and the adopted Platform of Action, which listed the role of women in armed conflict. Moreover, this agenda-setting incorporates a security-development nexus as its foundations are also based in the 1979 Convention for the Elimination of Violence Against Women (CEDAW) and the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo.

The drafting process also increased the legitimacy of the institution as the WPS acts as a bridge-builder between the Global North and the Global South (Basu, 2016), and empowers non-permanent member states, one of whom is usually the penholder of the resolution (i.e. they initiate and chair the informal drafting process) under the auspices of a P-5 member. The adoption of the UNSC resolutions on Women, Peace and Security can be identified as a mechanism for opening up and democratizing the UNSC. This is the aim of the follow-up Open Debate after the adoption of any WPS resolution: states and non-state actors, such as regional organizations with a security agenda and civil society share their concerns and further issues in need of response.

Concerning the UN and regional organizations with a security agenda, few have developed organization-wide policies and actions plans to integrate gender perspectives into their deliberations processes and operations on the ground. This is the case for the EU, NATO, AU or OSCE. More than sixty UN member states, including the United States, have developed National Action Plans which acknowledge the importance of the participation of women in advancing peace and security and translating the principles of Resolution 1325 in national policies and programs.

Nine subsequent resolutions have contributed to the WPS agenda: 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019) and 2493 (2019). The objective of these resolutions is to strengthen the protection of women with regard to conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, and reaffirm the important roles of women in restoring and maintaining peace (for assessment see George & Shepard, 2016; Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011). WPS also considers cross-cutting issues such as terrorism, global health, violent extremism, and climate change induced displacement. Moreover, the 2008 economic crisis led to the broadening of the WPS normative spectrum to address gender-balanced norms in the economic governance. Along these lines, there are currently actors such as the EU that refers to WPS as necessary but not sufficient step. They seek to reframe the WPS into a WPS and Gender, Peace and Security agenda focusing also on the power structures that define and defy international peace and security. That is, gendering the agenda and institutions.
3.2 Formal Intergovernmental Organizations (FIGOs)

In this first section, we identify and describe the most relevant formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs) involved in the governance of the three main security threats under study in this paper: the use of force, WMD proliferation, and terrorism. According to the most widely accepted definition, a FIGO has the following attributes: (1) it is a formal entity created by an internationally recognized treaty, (2) it is composed of at least three states as members, and (3) it possesses a permanent secretariat or other indication of institutionalization such as headquarters and/or permanent staff (Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke, 2004, p. 103).

The FIGOs discussed below were identified based on triangulation across academic literature and selected based on their relevance – i.e., their relative contributions to the global governance of the three threats under study. Exhaustively mapping and analysing the actions of all FIGOs that contribute to the mitigation of these three threats, even if only tangentially, was not possible within the scope of this project. However, a short section is dedicated to describing some of the actions that certain FIGOs undertake in our three threats despite (a) this not being a priority issue area for them or (b) their contribution being relatively minor.

In this section, we will discuss global, intercontinental and regional FIGOs in turn. Global FIGOs have member states across all continents. Intercontinental FIGOs are those “whose membership spans more than a single region, but that nonetheless have geographically restricted membership” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2018). Regional FIGOs, meanwhile, have members “from at least three countries within one continent or sub-continental location” (Weiss, 2013, p. 17). For each FIGO, we outline its contribution to addressing these threats to the GPG. Note that some FIGOs are active in the management of all three threats, while others focus on only one or two of them.

This section will reveal FIGOs’ critical role in providing international peace and security. These organizations fulfil a host of functions: establishing norms, acting as a forum for member states, information-sharing, standard-setting, monitoring, verification and reporting, capacity-building, and direct coercive measures including the use of force. Drawing from strong legal bases (their constitutive treaties, among others), FIGOs can affect state behaviour by adopting resolutions, using diplomatic pressure or stronger coercive measures and developing norms and regulations. Importantly, with regard to international peace and security, one FIGO in particular – the UN – has the capacity to authorize the use of force.

However, FIGOs are also slow-moving bodies with clear shortcomings, including dependency on states for funding, issues of legitimacy and representativeness, politicization and ineffectiveness. The failure to address certain unfolding security threats has widened the gap

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25 The FIGOs described in this section are almost all included in the Correlates of War database (version 3 - 2019), which applies this definition. There are a few exceptions to this rule – where that is the case, we provide specific explanation as to the divergence.

26 Note that we discuss formal and informal intergovernmental organizations separately: FIGOs are dealt with in section 3.2; informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) are studied in section 3.3. This separation follows the approach taken in the GLOBE project and mirrors the growing scholarly interest in the development of IIGOs. It will also allow us to draw some conclusions on the roles of each of these two actor types in the provision of international peace and security. See section 3.3 for an in-depth discussion of IIGOs and their differentiating characteristics.
between their legality and legitimacy (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2006, p. 229). See also section 4 for a more comprehensive assessment of the role of FIGOs in providing the global public good under study.

3.2.1 Global FIGOs

[A] United Nations

*Use of force, WMDs, terrorism*

The UN Charter/UN Security Council and the use of force

The Charter of the United Nations (UN) entered into force almost immediately after the end of WWII. In view of the conscience-shocking mass atrocities committed between 1939 and 1945, the founders of the UN decided to create a treaty-based system of collective security requiring states to accept limits to their use of force and to depend on a collective response for protection. According to Christine Gray, “the aim was, first, to prohibit the unilateral use of force by states other than in self-defence […] Secondly, the system aimed to centralize the use of force under the control of the Security Council” (Gray, 2008, pp. 86–87).

To achieve the first objective, Article 2.4 of the Charter prohibited the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. There are only two exceptions to this prohibition: the right to use force under Article 51 in individual or collective self-defence, and the use of force under the explicit authorization of the UN Security Council (UNSC), in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In this way, the UN Charter conferred upon the UNSC the primary – though not exclusive – responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 24.1). To uphold this responsibility, the Council was given the power to determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and to make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security (Article 39). The constructive ambiguity in this wording is indicative of the flexibility that the Charter’s creators wanted to grant to the Security Council. Unconstrained by strict definitions or other limits on its discretion, the UN body progressively expanded its mandate to new threats and actors, especially after the end of the Cold War (Lowe, Roberts, Welsh & Zaum, 2008, p. 35).

Importantly, the Charter also contains some significant departures from the system of collective security. The most important of them is Article 27.3, which gives each of the five permanent members of the Council (the UK, US, France, China and Russia) veto power. In practice, this provision ensures that the system of collective security cannot be used against the P5 or their closest allies. As a consequence, the UNSC system may be better described as one of “selective security” rather than “collective security” (Roberts, 2016, pp. 349, 353–354).

Over the years, the Council’s methods of addressing urgent security threats have taken two forms: on the one hand, peacekeeping, and on the other, authorizing states, coalitions and regional bodies to use force. Although peacekeeping operations have been an internationally recognized practice for many decades, they are not explicitly contemplated under the Charter. Peacekeeping was invented in the context of the Suez Crisis by the second UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, who referred to it as belonging to “Chapter VI and a half” of the
Charter, halfway between the methods of resolving disputes peacefully and more forceful action (Durall, 2013, p. 5; Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck, & Dijkstra, 2019, pp. 132–133). The absence of formal regulations at the level of the UN Charter has given peacekeeping the required plasticity to adapt and be used in a range of situations, from maintaining peace in volatile post-conflict situations, to protecting threatened civilians and implementing the terms of peace agreements (Roberts, 2016, p. 355). The second approach, namely authorizing states, coalitions and regional organizations to use force, has been used in situations that require more than classic UN peacekeeping. At this point, we should note that the authorization to use force does not necessarily amount to full-blown military attacks. Limited use of force is quite commonly authorized as a method to enforce sanctions, air exclusion zones and other restrictions.

**The Responsibility to Protect**

Although the Security Council’s approach to the use of force is still very state-centric and its responses are often conditioned by the logic of inviolable state sovereignty, a doctrine called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Chesterman, forthcoming) has sought to challenge this practice, redefine state responsibilities and prioritize human security over the sanctity of sovereignty. In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty published a report (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001) which put forward the humanization of sovereignty, namely the idea that sovereignty should no longer be seen as absolute or inviolable or as a “license to kill” (Evans, 2015, p. 5), but rather as a state’s obligation to protect its own citizens from mass atrocities.

This bold proposition was finally endorsed in 2005 by more than 150 Heads of State and Government (including those of the UNSC permanent members) and was included in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (A/RES/60/1). In this way, states explicitly assumed a double responsibility: to protect their own people from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and if they manifestly fail in that responsibility, the wider international community can take whatever action is appropriate, including military action, if the Security Council agrees (Evans, 2008, p. 2014; Kaldor, 2007).

Even though the responsibility to protect managed to generate a high degree of consensus on a conceptual level, this has not been the case on a practical level. As such, R2P has not necessarily transformed state behaviour (Chesterman, forthcoming). Its practical implementation in the Libyan case in 2011, in particular, revealed its limits. During the first stages of the conflict, R2P was implemented: the UNSC exhausted all non-coercive diplomatic measures of prevention and resorted to a multilateral reactive approach to prevent mass killings only when Gaddafi’s stance made clear that a pacific solution was not on the table. However, what seemed to be “a textbook example of how the Responsibility to Protect is supposed to work in the face of a rapidly unfolding mass atrocity situation” became highly controversial when NATO’s actions were perceived as exceeding – or even violating – the terms of Resolution 1973 (Bellamy, 2015, p. 97).

Overall, the implementation of the responsibility to protect attracted a lot of criticism from Council members. As a result, when the Syrian conflict broke out in the context of the Arab Spring, Russia – and to a lesser extent China – vetoed and blocked any meaningful action meant to prevent mass atrocities against the Syrian population. The underlying excuse was
that they could not allow the R2P to become a Trojan horse for Western interventionism. Be
that as it may, the example of the implementation of the responsibility to protect shows that a
high level of consensus during the identification of threats and appropriate solutions does not
guarantee the implementation of commensurate policies and actions.

The UNSC and non-proliferation of WMDs
Over the past two decades, international concern has grown regarding the possibility of
terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by procuring biological, chemical,
or nuclear materials. A number of high-profile cases edged up the urgency dial, including the
9/11 attacks and the early-2000s revelation regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program, which had
been clandestinely established by A.Q. Khan.

The UN Security Council considered that the possibility that terrorists could seek to proliferate
WMDs and easily obtain strategic knowledge and equipment was sufficient reason to act
(Tobey, 2018, pp. 17, 24). Thus, in April 2004, and following the model of Resolution 137327
 – that is, invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1540. This
text, which establishes a committee bearing the same name (the “1540 Committee”), decides
that states shall undertake action (instead of “calling upon them to do so”) aimed at preventing
non-state actors from acquiring WMDs (Asada, 2007, p. 11). This Resolution – which
addresses WMDs and counter-terrorism simultaneously, insofar as it “addresses both threats
individually as well as the potential of their combined effects” (Boulden, 2008, pp. 612–613) –
was originally met with some scepticism, as some saw the UNSC overstepping its role (D. H.
Joyner, 2007).

Nowadays, however, both the Resolution and the Committee 1540 are regarded as admissible
multilateral tools to prevent WMD proliferation by non-state actors, share information and
exchange assistance. At present, the Resolution and Committee constitute the broadest
legally binding instruments in the non-proliferation field (Myjer & Herbach, 2018, pp. 208–209;
Tobey, 2018, pp. 27–29). Moreover, Committee 1540 is supported by several formal and
informal intergovernmental organizations that contribute to the universalization efforts of the
Resolution. Since it was created in 2004, the Committee relies on technical assistance
between states and joint outreach efforts with organizations such as the European Union,
Interpol, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Organization of American
States, G8 and Australia Group, which provide support to achieve the universal and proper
compliance with the Resolution.

Mention must also be made here of the Conference on Disarmament, the current heir to the
First Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly (1978) and
the main multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. Although this Geneva-based forum
focuses its efforts on disarmament and does not depend on the UNSC,28 it is highly significant
in this context, as the locus of the negotiations of the NPT, the Biological and Toxin Weapons

27 Adopted unanimously on September 28, 2011, UNSC Resolution 1373 is a counter-terrorism measure
28 It does have a special relationship with the UN, however: its budget stems from that of the UN, its
staff is UN personnel and it meets in the premises of the UN. The Conference on Disarmament reports
annually to the General Assembly, which is where its permanent agenda was agreed in 1978 (NTI,
2019a).
Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the more recent and still ongoing negotiations of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). The latter instrument\(^{29}\) is a proposed international agreement that seeks to prohibit the production of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium, the two main components needed to build a nuclear weapon (Podvig & Rodgers, 2017, pp. 9–15). This prohibition would essentially impose new restrictions on all recognized nuclear weapon states both inside and outside the NPT. While the relative stagnation of the negotiations has been criticized (Schaper, 2018, pp. 86–91), the Conference on Disarmament is pushing for tangible outcomes. In this regard, the most recent development is the Expert Preparatory Group's final report adopted in June 2018, which included key recommendations for the future treaty (United Nations General Assembly, 2018).

The UN and counter-terrorism

The signatories of the UN Charter wasted a historic opportunity to emphasize the international dimension of terrorism when creating the UN. While the League of Nations, the UN's predecessor, had established a Committee for the International Repression of Terrorism and had put forward two relevant conventions,\(^{30}\) the UN and its Security Council showed little interest in placing terrorism on the Organization's agenda (Romaniuk, 2016, pp. 278–279). During the Cold War, the UNSC rarely referred to terrorism by name and only in response to grave events, such as the assassination of UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948 or the hijacking of four planes by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 1970. However, highly visible terrorist acts during the 1970s, such as the attack on Israeli athletes during the summer Olympic Games in Munich, became “a vivid symbol of the arrival of terrorism as an issue of international attention” (Boulden, 2008, p. 609).

Undoubtedly, the biggest turning point for the consideration of terrorism as a threat to international peace and security was the end of the Cold War and the subsequent unblocking of the UNSC (Romaniuk, 2016). The 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie and the bombing of UTA Flight 772 over Niger a year later prompted a more active approach against terrorism. During the 1990s, the Council imposed sanctions on Libya, Sudan and the Taliban in order to condemn their actions and to delegitimize state support for terrorist activities. In short, sanctions formed the basis of the Council’s response to terrorism and gave it the necessary impetus to shift from a case-specific approach to a broader understanding of terrorism as a threat (Boulden, 2008, pp. 610–611).

While the use of sanctions to combat terrorism was an important stepping stone, it was only after 9/11 that the Council truly embraced counter-terrorism as an integral part of its activities (Dhanapala, 2005, p. 17). The multiple attacks against the US triggered action of unprecedented rapidity, unanimity and decisiveness. Within six days after the attacks, the UNSC had passed two landmark resolutions: Resolution 1368, which condemned terrorist acts and recognized “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter”, and Resolution 1373, which required all member states to “refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts” (Luck, 2004, p. 85).

\(^{29}\) Sometimes also written “FM(C)T”, to indicate that the proposed treaty may not necessarily be limited to reducing future production, but also existing production.

\(^{30}\) The Convention for Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism and the Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court.
Another major innovation in the aftermath of 9/11 was the establishment of the UNSC’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor the implementation of Resolution 1373. This is by no means an easy task: the Resolution established wide-ranging obligations for states, which include freezing assets, prohibiting the raising or transferring of funds and denying safe haven and passage to arms or any other supporting material. Moreover, states have to share information about possible terrorist activities and submit reports with the CTC about the steps they take in order to comply with their obligations. In practice, the generic character of these obligations, as well as the fact that the underfunded and understaffed CTC cannot impose any sanctions or coercive measures to bring states into compliance, has allowed a handful of states to ignore their responsibilities (Luck, 2004, pp. 95–97; Messmer & Yordan, 2010, p. 174; Uddin & Ahamed, 2012, pp. 45–46).

While the CTC’s mandate was reinforced in 2004 and a Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate was set up to assist its work, the leading role of the CTC has since eroded. Two factors in particular played a role in this evolution: the creation of a Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) by the UN Secretary General in order to coordinate UN counter-terrorism efforts and the birth of the informal Global Counterterrorism Forum (2011) (Hinojosa-Martinez, 2014). Still, for all its limitations and shortcomings, the UNSC counter-terrorism framework has forcefully put the fight against the threat of terrorism on the global agenda and has created a conducive environment for major initiatives like the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2006.

**Criticism of the UNSC**

Among international security actors, no other embodies as many dreams and delivers as many frustrations as the UNSC (Thakur, 2006, p. xi). Some of the criticism the Council receives is due to a widespread incomprehension of its nature. While many regard it as a court, a legislature, a police force or a police committee, it is none of the above. In reality, the UNSC is a pragmatic forum in which a limited number of states represents the international community in order to discuss and decide how best to address serious threats to international peace and security (Lowe et al., 2008, p. 34). The basic critiques of the UNSC revolve around three main axes: its legitimacy, its effectiveness, and its accountability.

Today, the Council’s legitimacy arguably remains its most controversial issue. After analysing the statements of UN members in the General Assembly concerning the legitimacy of the UNSC for the period from 1991 to 2009, Martin Binder and Monika Heupel found that the Council is perceived as suffering from a serious legitimacy deficit, especially with regards to its transparency, accountability, fulfilment of its legal mandate and the participation of non-permanent members in decision-making (Binder and Heupel, 2015).

Since the founding of the UN, its membership has almost quintupled, but the composition of the overly politicized UNSC has not adjusted accordingly. To be sure, assigning veto power to the five permanent members was arguably a reasonable measure inasmuch as it allowed the birth of the UN. But the fact that these permanent members have been resistant to

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31 CTC depends on countries that are sympathetic to the global counter-terrorism agenda such Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the USA. Neither its funding nor its staff are integrated in the UN regular budget.
proposals for major changes has taken a toll on the whole organization. Most observers today concur that the UNSC fails to adequately represent the UN membership and this damages the body’s legitimacy (Morris and Wheeler, 2007, p. 216). Its consideration as unrepresentative and undemocratic also draws accusations against the Council’s legislative actions. Past initiatives like the creation of ad hoc war crimes tribunals and resolutions on counter-terrorism are sometimes frowned upon by those who believe that the UNSC’s prolonged crisis of legitimacy makes it unsuitable for law-making (Talmon, 2005, p. 179).

Regarding the Council’s effectiveness in managing the use of force and addressing the problem of conflict, its record is often seen as unflattering. The Council has been criticized both in cases where it has acted and in cases where it has failed to act. Difficulties in accessing robust intelligence and reliable assessments of situations have in some cases led to reticence on the use of military force or to the adoption of “lowest common denominator” policies. Inadequate responses to certain conflicts are often compounded by the UNSC’s inability to control realities on the ground and by its often uneasy relationship with the US. Examples of the previous include when coalitions of the willing exceed their mandate or corrupt officials and peacekeepers act against the organization’s will and principles (Rodriguez and Kinne, 2019). Past instances of inactivity such as during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and the mass killings in Rwanda (1994) have also stained the body’s image and fed its legitimacy crisis (Lowe et al., 2008, pp. 50–52).

Finally, the UNSC’s power gives rise to questions about its accountability, understood either as the duty to give an account about its conduct or as the liability to be held to account for its conduct. Holding a UN body accountable is very challenging both normatively and practically: in reality, the Council’s accountability is essentially political in nature and very hard to separate from other operational constraints (Gray, 2008, pp. 39–43).

Even though the decision-making capacity of the UNSC has been plagued by conflicting national interests and great power politics, its contribution to international peace and security has not been trivial. For starters, increased activity in the Council coincided with the reduction of human casualties owed to wars and with a reduction in interstate conflict (Wallensteen & Johansson, 2016, p. 19). What is more, the UNSC has provided a framework for facilitating major changes in the structure of international relations (such as decolonization and the end of the Cold War), it has contributed to the diffusion of key norms (such as the principle of self-determination), and has helped re-establish governance in war-torn and failed states (Lowe et al., 2008, pp. 53–54).

Other relevant UN humanitarian agencies and programs
Apart from the Security Council, which tries to manage the use of force by preventing or resolving conflicts, the UN has a strong humanitarian pillar that brings together humanitarian agencies to assist conflict-affected civilians, refugees, internally displaced communities and stateless people. The most important humanitarian actors within the UN system are the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program and UNICEF. Although these actors have complementary functions and they are in constant communication, coordination on the ground can be a daunting task, which is often further compounded by the overwhelming influx of humanitarian NGOs, aid and international staff. For this reason, the UN has created the Office for the Coordination of International Affairs (OCHA) to ensure “the
circulation and exchange of information within the United Nations system and also between various external actors such as NGOs and the ICRC” (Zeebroek, 2006, p. 48).

**UN and gender equality:** shaping the security architecture

The UN system has nominated different actors to provide leadership on the coordination of gender mainstreaming into peace and security. These are the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PSO), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). For instance, DPA and DPKO are revising directives, guidance and training to emphasize gender mainstreaming, including in peacekeeping and political processes. Moreover, UN Women is active in providing technical leadership in conflict and post-conflict situations to ensure that gender considerations are incorporated across peace and security work (for a detailed overview of many perspectives, see the Special Issue of *International Peacekeeping* of 2010 – Vol. 17 Issue 2).

As the WPS agenda is constantly expanding the norm, in 2009 UNSC Resolution 1888 called on the Secretary General to appoint a dedicated Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. The European Union and its member states (with the Nordic countries at the forefront) have always been willing to expand and advance the WPS agenda. Recognizing the crucial role played by EU, the first appointed Special Representative was the Swedish politician and former European Commissioner Margot Wallström. She developed the Rule of Law Team of Experts focusing on investigation and prosecution of Sexual Violence in Conflict. Zaiban Hawa from Sierra Leone took the lead in 2012. Her work focused on implementing accountability mechanisms at the national level and strengthened the role of the Special Representative within the UN system: improvement of inter-agency relations, and working across silos. As a result, the Special Representative has become the permanent chair of UN Action (an internal body within the UN system that unites the work of 13 UN entities with the goal of ending sexual violence in conflict): the DPKO, DPA, UNICEF, UNFPA WHO, UN Women, UNHCR, UN OCHA, UNODC, UN PBSO, UNAIDS, OHCHR, and UNDP. In other words, WPS is shaping across-the-board the organizational structure of the UN system.

[B] International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)

*Use of force, WMDs, terrorism*

The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) was created in 1923 by law enforcement delegates from 20 countries. Interestingly, since it lacked a foundational treaty, it had to “backdoor itself into recognition by persuading the League of Nation to name it as the official "agency of fulfilment" for the 1929 Convention on Currency Counterfeiting”. Later on, it was granted the status of Non-Governmental Organization by the UN in 1948, until it took its final shape in 1971 after it made a special arrangement with the UN to be treated as if it were an Intergovernmental Organization (Stalcup, 2013, p. 236). Today, it is considered a FIGO (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, McManus, & Jamison, 2018).
Contrary to popular belief, Interpol is not a police force and it does not enforce national or international law. Most of its work focuses on processing and exchanging knowledge about crime and insecurity rather than on directly protecting people and property. Of course, this “knowledge work” is vital for policing and supporting units like media liaison offices, quality assurance teams, community involvement teams and criminal intelligence specialists play an increasingly important role (Sheptycki, 1998, p. 59).

Interpol’s contribution to international peace and security is multifaceted. By providing frontline officers with access to its databases, it facilitates the location and arrest of fugitives wanted for serious international crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In fact, Interpol’s engagement in this field dates back to 1994, when it established an active cooperation with the UN International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Its involvement in the investigation of international crimes during the 1990s opened the path to further cooperation with the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the International Criminal Court. Interpol furthermore participates in capacity-building activities: banking on its considerable expertise, it trains investigators in order to enhance their capabilities in the collection and processing of evidence related to mass atrocities, with special emphasis on sexual and gender-based violence (Interpol War Crimes and Genocide Sub-Directorate, 2015).

In the field of terrorism, the organization created a Public Safety and Terrorism subdirectorate in October 2001 to direct its counter-terrorism activities. Gradually, “Interpol focused more of its crime-fighting resources on counter-terrorism and assumed a proactive role in fighting transnational terrorism by bolstering international cooperative linkages among law enforcement agencies, Interpol, and its member countries’ national central bureaus” (Sandler, Arce, & Enders, 2011, p. 80). Currently, Interpol experts collect, store and analyse information on terror suspects, groups and their activities, and exchange data with member countries and other international organizations. By sharing intelligence and circulating alerts and warnings known as Notices and Diffusions, the Counter-Terrorism Directorate contributes to the prevention of terrorist transborder movement and to the interception of the trafficking of weapons that can be used for terrorist activities. Moreover, by monitoring suspicious digital activity, Interpol can facilitate the tracking and identification of terrorists and their affiliates, and sometimes even disrupt financial streams connected to terrorist activities (Interpol, 2017).

Through the prism of counter-terrorism, Interpol has also managed to expand its activities to the field of non-proliferation.32 In 2010, the organization established a subdirectorate specializing in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) materials within the Interpol Counter-Terrorism, Public Safety, and Maritime Security Directorate. The objective of this subdirectorate is to strengthen coordination among all relevant stakeholders and assist Interpol member states in their efforts to implement UNSC Resolution 1540 by deploying an intelligence-driven, prevention-oriented methodology bound by an interagency approach. While Interpol puts more emphasis on WMD proliferation by terrorist networks, its definition of non-state actors also includes so-called “lone wolves” and other criminals as end-users, as well as suppliers, middlemen, buyers and smuggling networks. Through a number of programs, the organization has been trying to reach a double goal: to develop and maintain

32 Interpol focuses on proliferation attempts by non-state actors, but not on state-sponsored proliferation.
Effective physical protection measures and strengthen law-enforcement efforts in conducting effective border controls in order to detect, deter, prevent and combat the illicit trafficking of CBRNE material. To this end, Interpol often organizes awareness-raising and capacity-building workshops among law-enforcement and public-health officials, biosafety professionals and academics (Rached, 2015, pp. 17–22).

In general, Interpol faces an important obstacle in its functioning: its outdated and ineffective legal basis. Currently, the organization’s Constitution lacks clear provisions concerning its relations with external entities (such as other international organizations and non-member states) and its powers to conclude agreements with its member states concerning the national office, privileges and immunities. Moreover, Interpol’s large membership and the diversity of legal regimes under which the police authorities of the member states act detract from its ability to respond quickly and adapt to new security threats. Finally, there is a major risk that certain authoritarian countries may use the search instruments of Interpol for political purposes, namely for the prosecution of political opponents, independent journalists and civil society activists (Safjański, 2017, pp. 91–94).

[C] International Atomic Energy Agency

WMDs

For over 60 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been the global FIGO of reference in both nuclear non-proliferation and the promotion of nuclear energy for peaceful uses. In this section, we will focus on the goal of nuclear non-proliferation. The IAEA’s main instrument towards this objective are its technical verification measures – referred to as safeguards – which it uses to check that states are not developing nuclear weapons. Established by its Statute in 1957 and headquartered in Vienna, the IAEA currently implements safeguards agreements in 182 states.

Safeguards consist of country declarations, monitoring and evaluation reports, and on-site inspections by IAEA personnel. These measures aim at discouraging diversion and preventing proliferation (Rockwood, 2013, pp. 13–19). In other words, in order to prevent and mitigate the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons, the IAEA verifies whether states’ declarations regarding nuclear materials and facilities in their property are correct and whether they are being exclusively used for peaceful purposes, according to their legal commitments. Moreover, since it became evident (during the 1990s and 2000s) that undeclared material also poses a major risk, further technical measures have been designed to detect prohibited activities in nuclear facilities as well as any diversion of both declared and undeclared nuclear material towards non-peaceful uses.

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[33] The IAEA made an agreement with the General Assembly and not with ECOSOC, so in spite of its close relation to the UN family, it does not technically fulfil the conditions for becoming a specialized agency (Balekjian, 1965, pp. 76–100). The Agency is today considered a FIGO by (Pevehouse et al., 2018).

[34] IAEA’s INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 - Safeguard System, Vienna: September 16, 1988 offers a definition of safeguard agreement: “an agreement between the Agency and one or more Member States which contains an undertaking by one of more of those States not to use certain items in such a way as to further any military purpose and which gives the Agency the right to observe compliance with such undertaking. (…)” par. 82
Nevertheless, for all prevention efforts, history has shown that proliferation may occur – as has been the case in Iraq and North Korea (DPRK), which violated their full-scope safeguards agreements in the 1990s (Shaker, 2007, Chapter III). These events triggered the negotiations that led to the adoption of the so-called Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) in 1997. This Protocol establishes a model that goes beyond the existing safeguards system to introduce a “full inspection” mechanism. The Additional Protocol is thus the most intrusive type of safeguard agreement. However, it is not compulsory, and its implementation is currently still far from universal among IAEA members.

When states violate their non-proliferation obligations or safeguards, the IAEA responds through a series of measures. The initial steps involve diplomatic measures towards the disobedient state. First, the member state is called upon to provide explanations and correct its own behaviour. If the behaviour persists, the Agency’s Board of Governors refers the case to the UNSC, which adopts measures to see whether the state can go back to complying with its obligations or be forced into reasoning again. Such was the case of Iran: after being found in breach of its comprehensive safeguards agreement in 2005, the UNSC adopted up to six resolutions (2006-2010) demanding that Tehran halt its enrichment and reprocessing activities and imposing sanctions on the country. If the UNSC were to consider that the conduct of an IAEA member state poses a threat to international peace and security, it could take action in accordance with the Charter.

Although the IAEA’s mandate and ultimate functions have not evolved since the Agency was created, in the last 10-15 years there has been an increased focus on its technical cooperation program. Through this program, the IAEA transfers nuclear technology to member states to help them with priorities such as: health, agriculture, water, the environment, and industry. Moreover, these projects are increasingly including a gender perspective, which transversally affects not only the way in which projects are carried out, but also the functioning of the IAEA itself. This perspective contributes to the diversification of the debate on nuclear weapons, while challenging the established pattern of power relations (ILPI & UNIDIR, 2016, p. 30).

In the non-proliferation field, the nuclear deal struck with Iran has captured international attention over the last few years. Since the IAEA was entrusted with verifying Iran’s compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) adopted by the P5+1 (the permanent members of the UNSC plus Germany), the European Union and Iran in 2015, it continues to inform the UNSC on Iran's compliance on a quarterly basis. This is considered to be one of the main recent achievements of the Agency: contributing to avoiding a military intervention in Iran after it was discovered to be in breach of its non-proliferation obligations. By collaborating with other international actors (the UN, the EU and certain states), it was possible to conduct peaceful negotiations towards the lifting of sanctions and towards the assurance of a peaceful-only Iranian nuclear program (Amano, 2019). This achievement, however, is currently under pressure after the US ceased implementation of the Iran deal, leading to increasing tensions.

35 It is noteworthy that DPRK never recovered its member state condition after it decided to withdraw from the IAEA in 1994.
The challenges the IAEA addresses have remained quite unchanged throughout the years. The strengthening of the safeguards regime and the financing of the Agency are issues the IAEA has been facing since the Cold War (Goldschmidt, 2010, pp. 1–9). Nonetheless, there are certain current priority issues which were acknowledged by all the candidates who ran recently for Director General of the IAEA, after the passing of Yukiya Amano in the summer of 2019 (IAEA, 2019). In addition to the work oriented to reach universalization of the Additional Protocol, the need to work more effectively with member states and the need to find an adequate funding system, the IAEA must also face the challenges rapid technology advances pose to the verification mandate of the Agency. Ever newer techniques are combined with easily accessible sensitive information, which forces the IAEA to keep up to date with technological evolution and to constantly improve its knowledge and detection capabilities.

[D] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

WMDs

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established under Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force in 1997. The OPCW is self-sufficient in terms of its program and budget. It works closely with the UN and, although it is not a specialized agency, it reports regularly on its activities and achievements to the First Committee of the UNGA. The organization is one of the most universal, with 193 member states. In addition to a Technical Secretariat, based in The Hague, the OPCW is composed of the Conference of States Parties and the Executive Council. A large group of inspectors completes the structure.

The OPCW is a forum in which states parties meet, consult, decide on practical aspects of the management of the Convention and cooperate to reach their purpose – namely, the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. Disarmament is one of the organization’s chief objectives, but the organization also seeks to prevent the emergence of new stockpiles, given that the acquisition, proliferation and use of chemical weapons by any actor (whether state or non-state) is always qualified as a threat to international peace and security, as was pointed out by the UNSC when these weapons were used during the Syrian civil war (United Nations Security Council, 2013).

Regarding its disarmament objective, the OPCW has succeeded in dismantling most of the declared stockpiles of chemical weapons, which was the main ambition during the Convention negotiations during the 1980s by both NATO and Warsaw Pact states. However, while complete disarmament by the US and Russia should have been achieved by 2012, Russia did not complete its destruction operations until 2017, and the US has confirmed for now the elimination of just 90% of its stockpiles. The US currently expects to complete the destruction of its arsenals by 2023 (Hart, 2017). This delay has prevented the OPCW from changing focus to its other objectives: the non-proliferation of chemical weapons and cooperation for the promotion of the peaceful use of toxic chemicals.

36 Pevehouse et al. do not include OPCW in the COW IGO data set, but Felicity Vabulas and Duncan Snidal argue that the organization clearly meets the three key FIGO characteristics and Barbara Koremenos includes it in her COIL data set (Koremenos, 2016, pp. 89–90; Vabulas & Snidal, 2013, p. 215).
Nevertheless, without losing sight of the objective of disarmament (which cannot be taken for granted, as the recent use of chemical weapons in the Middle East demonstrates), the OPCW has increasingly started to focus on non-proliferation and the peaceful use of toxic chemicals. This gradual shift implies that the OPCW must seek a new deal with the global chemical industry on verification, including modifications to reporting modalities and on-site inspection routines (Zanders, 2013). Verification, under the OPCW, is based on declarations by the parties and compliance management by the organization’s personnel, which aims at preventing the establishment of clandestine chemical weapons programs. Indeed, verification is arguably the most detailed and developed part of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which includes a whole Annex on the way such measures shall be implemented.

It is noteworthy that the OPCW is highly reliant on a network of National Authorities. Creating these authorities – which collect all relevant information from civilian (and military, if applicable) facilities and provide the OPCW with national reports – is an obligation for states parties to the CWC (Article VII.4); and much of the effectiveness of the OPCW’s international verification system depends on the effectiveness of the national system. In case any undeclared or misdeclared activity is detected, this constitutes a violation of the Convention. If these infractions were involuntary, they are generally easy to remedy; however, in the case of more serious violations, the CWC foresees that the state in question responds to the Director General of the OPCW or to other state parties. States are asked, in these cases, to clarify all needed information, and so-called challenge inspections may also be carried out.

In recent years, the exceptional situation of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war in 2013 has been at the heart of the Organization’s concerns (Chapman, Elbahtimy, & Martin, 2018). Other challenges include the emergence of new security actors (such as non-state actors); debates on whether to include new types of weaponry that may emerge at the outer edges of the Convention’s scope; or how to bring the CWC closer to the professional communities of civil society. It is also worth highlighting the innovation taking place in the chemical industry: its current production methods are quite different from the ones of the early 1990s, when the Convention was concluded. Nowadays factories are rarely in charge of the entire production line for certain chemical products, and the increasing diversification can complicate verification tasks. Therefore, the OPCW can be expected to intensify its efforts to monitor ongoing scientific developments, as well as all technological innovations which may affect production methodologies. All these challenges are, from now on, also part of the mission of the OPCW (Trapp, 2013, pp. 23-24).

### 3.2.2 Intercontinental and regional FIGOs

In this subsection, we will discuss intercontinental and regional FIGOs’ contributions to international peace and security. The intercontinental FIGOs under study are: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, with members from North America and Europe), the

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37 These are short-notice inspections designed to resolve any doubts concerning possible non-compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.
38 Intercontinental FIGOs are those “whose membership spans more than a single region, but that nonetheless have geographically restricted membership” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2018).
39 Regional FIGOs have members “from at least three countries within one continent or sub-continental location” (Weiss, 2013, p.17).
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, with members from North America, Europe and Asia), and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC, whose members are mostly African and Asian but also European (Albania) and South American (Guyana and Suriname)). In the case of regional FIGOs, the most relevant organisations are discussed per continent.

The role of intercontinental/regional FIGOs in the maintenance of international peace and security has been significant over the last decades, but their interaction with the UNSC remains a highly contentious issue – both in theory and in practice. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter regulates the relations between ‘regional arrangements’ and the UN body, but, as a product of political compromise, the chapter vividly reflects the strong controversies among negotiators during the drafting process and does not provide clear answers. First, Article 52(2) appears to establish the primary nature of regional FIGOs in settling local disputes through pacific means before the case is referred to the Security Council. However, Articles 52(4) and 53 turn the previous provision on its head by establishing that direct recourse to the UNSC is possible and that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council” (Stagno Ugarte, 2016, pp. 475–476).

In practice, a literal interpretation of Article 52.2 prevailed during the Cold War due the deadlock within the Security Council. During the 1990s, however, the UN asserted its primacy in maintaining peace and security, while recognizing that regional FIGOs had an important – even if subsidiary – role to play. In his 1992 Agenda for Peace, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali suggested that “the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, para. 64). Nowadays, all of the Council’s responses to security threats are designed on an ad hoc basis and its interactions with intercontinental/regional FIGOs are neither structured nor predictable. Rather, the UNSC prefers a case-by-case approach, which gives it the flexibility to “opt for hybrid, parallel, or sequential peace settlement efforts or peacekeeping deployment” (Stagno Ugarte, 2016, p. 486).

### 3.2.2.1 Intercontinental FIGOs

[A] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

*Use of force, WMDs, terrorism*

The intergovernmental military alliance NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), founded in 1949, was the main bulwark of the Western block during the Cold War. The question of whether or not NATO is considered a regional arrangement under the UN Charter (chapter VIII) is a bone of contention that has had far-reaching practical implications. It is noteworthy that the drafters of the 1949 Washington Treaty were very careful not to define NATO as a

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40 In UN Charter terminology, regional IGOs appear as “regional arrangements or agencies” (Article 51.1)
regional organization in order to avoid the obligation to seek prior permission from the UNSC before it could act (UN Charter Article 53.1) (Sarooshi, 2008, p. 230). By characterizing itself as a collective self-defence pact, NATO is able to activate the mutual commitment of the allies to come to each other’s aid in case of an armed attack (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty), even in the absence of UNSC authorization. However, after the end of the Cold War, the UNSC started to treat NATO as a regional arrangement by delegating tasks to it in the area of peace and security (Sarooshi, 2008, pp. 230–231).

Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s, NATO reinvented itself to some extent, and it currently specializes in crisis-management operations. Today, NATO’s efforts to promote international peace and security are multifaceted, especially when it comes to preventing the use of force or responding to it. The Alliance has taken action on behalf of the UN in several cases, with varying degrees of success, e.g. by contributing to peace enforcement operations in Bosnia (the Implementation Force, followed by the Stabilization Force), Kosovo (the Kosovo Force) and Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Force), or by intervening militarily under UNSC authorization to save civilians from mass atrocities, like in the Libyan case. However, NATO has also acted unilaterally in the past, deploying forces without explicit authorization from the UNSC. The use of force in the case of Kosovo in 1999, which was justified as a humanitarian intervention, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 with the alleged goal of averting the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction have been heavily criticized for disregarding the UNSC (Franck, 2003, pp. 619–620; Kaldor, 2018).

Apart from its peace enforcement operations, NATO is also active in the area of non-proliferation. In the 2010 Strategic Concept, the Alliance reaffirmed that its members are “resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all” (NATO, 2010, p. 23). Currently, several bodies41 within NATO support and facilitate dialogue among its members, partners and other countries to facilitate full implementation of their international non-proliferation obligations.

Regarding terrorism, after the 9/11 attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time. Initially, the Alliance had no official expertise or doctrine to draw from, but over the next two years, the allies put in place the Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism and took counter-terrorism measures by enhancing intelligence-sharing and efforts in the field of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence. Moreover, they reached out to partners to cooperate on terrorism, established a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit and established a budget to promote capability-building against asymmetric threats. While NATO’s counter-terrorism coordination measures between 2001 and 2011 were significant, it was the adoption of the 2012 Counter-Terrorism Policy Guidelines that systematized the Alliance’s efforts against the threat of international terrorism. Based on the UN’s 2006 Global Counter-Terrorism

41 There is a High Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control, the Special Advisory and Consultative Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group High Level Group, the Verification Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Proliferation in politico-military and defence format.
Strategy (GCTS), NATO showed determination to leverage its strengths and add value to two of the UN framework’s four main pillars\(^{42}\): the prevention and fight against terrorism, and the capacity-building measures (Bird, 2015, pp. 62–63).

All in all, NATO has arguably been successful at reinventing itself by assuming out-of-area operations and moving into the peacekeeping business, but it has also exposed itself to criticism. Its detractors routinely argue that the Alliance has outlived its purpose and accuse NATO of ignoring the UNSC either by undertaking unauthorized missions or by exceeding its mandate – as in the case of Libya. What is more, during the last five years internal divisions within NATO have become more pronounced, with the US complaining frequently about the uneven distribution of economic burdens and the failure of many members to live up to their 2% commitment,\(^{43}\) while other members lament the dwindling US commitment to the Alliance. At this point, we will not go into further detail on NATO’s successes and shortcomings, as task 4.2 of the GLOBE project will delve deeper into the European security architecture through a full case study.

### NATO and the Women, Peace and Security agenda

NATO has integrated the UNSC Resolution 1325 vocabulary into Summit declarations, the Secretary-General’s annual reports, and key official documents. In 2018 the NATO Summit adopted a new WPS policy and action plan, and created a permanent position to advise the Secretary General: the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the International Staff (IS), together with the International Military Staff (IMS) address how to integrate gender-based concepts. The work of the NAC and the IS is supported by a Women, Peace, and Security Office and Gender Advisors. However, there is significant variation across NATO Member States. To build a common approach to on how to integrate gender in their military and civilian structure, an annual questionnaire is compiled by Member States at the request of the IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. In a similar vein, there is a learning-by-doing culture in the form of joint participation in operations and missions, which serves to develop common practices when it comes to integrate gender in their operational plans.

### [B] Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

*Use of force, WMDs, terrorism*

The OSCE was formed by the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, but it does not have a legally binding constitutive treaty. During the 1994 Budapest Summit, its members decided to upgrade the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, as it was named until then) to an Organization, but only by name and functions – not by legal status. Even today, the OSCE lacks international legal personality and in a technical, international law sense it appears as a highly institutionalized informal IGO (Platise and Peters, 2018, p. 1).\(^{44}\)

\(^{42}\) The four pillars of the UN GCTS are: 1) Addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, 2) Preventing and combatting terrorism, 3) Building states’ capacity and strengthening the role of the United Nations, 4) Ensuring human rights and the rule of law.

\(^{43}\) In the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration, NATO members committed “to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence” (Point 14).

\(^{44}\) Even so, Pevehouse et al. (2018) include OSCE in their database; we have therefore chosen to include it here.
Unlike NATO, the OSCE is not a military alliance, but rather a human rights-oriented institution (J. Wright, 2006, p. 291). Unsurprisingly, its approach to security is wider and more comprehensive, closely related to the so-called “conflict cycle”. That is to say, it prioritizes early warning, conflict prevention measures, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation measures, instead of coercive action. Currently, the organization has the capacity to “intervene for the mediation and resolution of violent and non-violent conflicts and to adopt mandates for civilian or military peace observation, verification, and peacekeeping missions” (Hill, 2013, p. 1). To be sure, although the OSCE has participated in various missions that have engaged in a wide variety of conflict resolution and unarmed peace operations, it has never led a peacekeeping operation mounted and run under its flag. Rather, its officers work in civilian attire and perform “functions of liaison with the conflict parties, monitoring, observation, and verification of the ceasefires in place” (Hill, 2013, pp. 2–4).

Apart from its conflict prevention and crisis management efforts, the OSCE is also active in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. More concretely, it helps implement UNSC Resolution 1540 – which compelled states to undertake action aimed at preventing non-state actors from acquiring WMDs – by assisting its member states to produce national action plans and organizing awareness-raising workshops and training courses. Furthermore, it helps states improve legislation and promote best practices while strengthening cooperation with other international organizations (NTI, 2019b).

When it comes to terrorism, the OSCE has chosen to approach the threat more as a policing problem than a military issue. Under this perspective, it has sought to strengthen the capacity of its member states to police themselves and to participate in international intelligence gathering and sharing regimes. Through the development of its police training centres, the OSCE has not only accelerated its efforts to promote respect for human rights, foster democratic rule and prevent conflict, but also to eradicate violent extremism and terrorism. The OSCE’s emphasis on effective policing and border control has been its most important contribution to international counter-terrorism efforts (J. Wright, 2006, pp. 291–292).

The OSCE’s uncommon legal status, combined with the fact that it relies upon the persuasive powers of its member states and the diplomatic skills of its officials rather than on its coercive capacity, has led many to consider it as a “soft” security organization (Hopmann, 2005, p. 200). However, as a platform for political dialogue, the OSCE enjoys certain comparative advantages over other regional and international IGOs concerned with security issues: the non-binding nature of political commitments that are adopted within the OSCE often facilitates negotiations and compromises between opposing sides (Platise & Peters, 2018, p. 2).

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45 For instance, the OSCE has participated in the Minsk process to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in The Transdniestrian settlement process and the Geneva International Discussions initiated after the 2008 conflict in Georgia.
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)

Use of force, WMDs, terrorism

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation, formerly known as Organization of the Islamic Conference, was created in 1969 by the kings and heads of state of Islamic countries to express their solidarity to the Palestinian people after a criminal arson perpetrated against the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem (Gutiérrez Castillo, 2014, p. 4). Currently, the organization has 57 members and presents itself as the collective voice of the Muslim world that safeguards and protects their interests in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony.

Since the organization was created, its members in Africa, Middle East and Southeast Asia have been involved in several interstate or intrastate conflicts, but the OIC’s role in conflict resolution is still ambiguous and its record is mixed (Orakzai, 2010, p. 85). The OIC’s Charter puts great emphasis on solidarity and fraternity among its members and hence favours the peaceful settlement of disputes through mediation on a voluntary basis, rather than the threat or use of force. This approach has reinforced the OIC’s reputation as a neutral mediator and has given it a key role in managing certain conflicts in the Philippines, in Thailand or more recently in Libya (Sharqieh, 2012, pp. 220–224, 229). However, in other cases, including the Iran-Iraq war, the Libya-Chad conflict and the Algerian Civil war, the OIC was confined by the reluctance of Iran, Libya and Algeria to accept mediation and remained on the sidelines (Orakzai, 2010). Apart from its most common contribution as a mediator, the OIC has also coordinated relief efforts in Somalia and has even opened an Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Mogadishu to mitigate the effects of food shortage caused by the protracted civil conflict (Gutiérrez Castillo, 2014).

Another major field of action for the OIC is counter-terrorism. The organization’s Charter call its members to “cooperate in combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations” (Article 18), and towards this end, the OIC has adopted the 1999 Convention on Combating Terrorism and two ten-year programs of action to strengthen its implementation. At the same time, the OIC is concerned with two corollaries of the increased attention to terrorism: first, Islamophobia and efforts to link terrorism and Islam have “subjected Muslims to racial profiling and discrimination, negative stereotyping and stigmatization” (The OIC - 2025: Programme of action, 2016, p. 6); and second, the OIC often expresses concern about the lack of clear distinctions between the crime of terrorism and the right of resistance of the Palestinian people towards pursuing their legitimate rights, including self-determination.

It is worth noting that OIC’s Council of Foreign Ministers adopts a number of resolutions on political affairs every year. Among these resolutions, many refer repeatedly to issues associated with the proliferation of WMDs and support the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, disarmament, non-proliferation and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In other resolutions, OIC strongly condemns the Israeli regime for possessing the nuclear capability to develop nuclear arsenals and for not acceding to the NPT (Organization of Islamic Cooperation, 2019). Notwithstanding these resolutions, the organization has not developed any concrete functions in order to promote non-proliferation efforts.

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46 See, for example, No. 24/46-POL, No. 25/46-POL, No. 29/46-POL, No. 30/46-POL, No. 31/46-POL
3.2.2.2 Regional FIGOs

In this subsection, we will map not only regional FIGOs with a purely security-related mandate, but also the most relevant regional economic organizations that have expanded their mandate beyond economic issues into security territory. According to Haftel & Hofmann (2017, p. 495), we have witnessed, since the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of regional economic organizations expanding their activities to the security policy domain, despite the existence of specialized regional security organizations. For instance, the Economic Community of West African States overlaps with the security-oriented African Union, the Union of South American States encroaches on the turf of the Organization of American States, and the Gulf Cooperation Council’s security agenda can overlap with the League of Arab States (Haftel & Hofmann, 2019, p. 2181).

[A] Europe

Under WP4 of the GLOBE project, an entire task (T4.2) will be dedicated to analysing the European security architecture. This section, therefore, merely offers a first, descriptive look at the regional security actors in Europe. Task 4.2 will provide an in-depth analysis.

The European Union (+ Europol/Eurojust + Euratom)

Use of force, WMDs, terrorism

Although the European Coal and Steel Community and European Economic Communities were originally established to foster economic integration and thereby avoid national rivalries that had led to two major world wars in the first half of the 20th century, security as a policy was only timidly present in the European integration process until the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was formally established under the Maastricht Treaty (Karns & Mingst, 2010, p. 160). Today, the structure of the European Union related to the threat of the use of force or conflicts is based on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which was formulated in the Treaty of Lisbon. An integral part of CFSP, CSDP is the successor to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which had been created at the end of the 1990s, when it became evident that the EU was unable to deal with the Balkan conflicts taking place at its doorstep (Álvarez Verdugo, 2004; Baqués Quesada, 2002).

With the establishment of CSDP, the EU added to its traditional political and economic instruments the capacity for autonomous action in the field of security and defence (Major & Mölling, 2013; M. Smith, 2012; Zwolski, 2013). The CSDP implied the establishment of a complex institutional structure, which has been built throughout the years: the Political and Security Committee; the Military Committee; the EU Military Staff; the 2003 European Security Strategy, its 2008 update, and the 2016 Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy; the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR); and the European Defence Agency (EDA); among others. Both the HR and the EDA saw their competences strengthened by the Treaty of Lisbon, which injected new impetus into the CSDP.

47Specifically, in the reform of the Single European Act on the political and economic aspects of security within the framework of European Political Cooperation.
The EDA was granted a solid legal basis and the means needed to carry out this common policy (Martí Sempere, 2008); the HR was given two further roles: Vice-President of the European Commission and President of the Foreign Affairs Council (Larik, 2018). Moreover, at the instigation of member states that supported a more active role for the EU on defence matters, a mutual defence clause was introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union derives from Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty, which created the Western European Union, and establishes an obligation for all member states to aid and assist “by all the means in their power” any member state that falls victim of armed aggression on its territory (ECFR, 2015).

The development of EU defence capability outside of NATO has been fundamental for the EU’s more prominent role in global conflicts. Given the “effective multilateralism” principle underlying the Union’s foreign policy, the EU tends to engage in partnerships with other organizations, both international and regional (Karns & Mingst, 2010, p. 174), in order to prevent or resolve conflicts. EU-UN joint missions have been especially relevant in Africa (for instance, EUFOR RD Congo assisted MONUC during the election process, and EUFOR in Central African Republic assisted MINUSCA), but the EU has also worked with the African Union (in the frame of the AMIS mission in Darfur, for example). In these missions, the EU helps to establish minimum security conditions that would allow the arrival of humanitarian aid. CSDP military missions have always been authorized by the UNSC, but this type of EU missions has not been the most common.

The EU’s involvement has usually taken place in post-conflict phases, when the direct violence had already been controlled by other actors (e.g. EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Concordia in Macedonia, which essentially continued previous NATO interventions) (Usanmaz, 2018, p. 390). In this context, it should not be surprising that the EU has been very active in civilian missions to strengthen the rule of law (Iraq, Kosovo or Georgia) and provide border assistance (Rafah); police missions and capacity building in the security sector (Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Congo, Palestine or Guinea Bissau); and observation missions (Georgia, Moldova or Ukraine) (De Castro Ruano, 2015, p. 21). Since 2003, the EU has deployed around 30 military and civilian missions and operations around the globe. Currently, it has six ongoing military operations, ten ongoing civilian missions and an approximate total of 5000 people deployed (European External Action Service, 2019).

Since the EU approved its Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) in 2016, the Union’s security framework has been guided by this document, entitled Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A much longer text than that of its predecessor (the European Security Strategy that was born in 2003), the EUGS does not delve into the definition of “a secure Europe in a better world”, which was the title of the 2003 Strategy. Rather, it focuses on the need to create a stronger Europe, in circumstances where the union “is under threat” (European Union, 2016, p. 13). The issues it identifies, although not new, provide a realistic approach based on EU interests, and not only on its values (Tocci, 2017).

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48 This was a mutual defence organization that was incorporated in the EU in 2011.
49 France invoked the clause in September 2015 after the Paris terrorist attacks. This was a political act meant to call on European solidarity and confront the EU partners with their military responsibilities against ISIS.
50 More on this in Section 2.
According to the EUGS, one of the main sources of instability for the internal security of EU states is the expansion of terrorism, which has been “internalized as a European threat” (Argomaniz, Bureš, & Kaunert, 2014, p. 198), even if it has only affected some countries so far. Soon after the 9/11 attacks, the EU introduced the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism to align the legislation of its members on terrorist offences and activities. In the wake of the 2004 Madrid attacks and the 2005 London attacks, the EU also adopted a Declaration on Combating Terrorism (2004), a Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism (2004) and a Counter-terrorism Strategy (2005). Yet after the birth of ISIS in 2014, European countries faced the threat of second-generation radical Islamist terrorists and foreign fighters attacking their cities, causing casualties, terror and a general sense of insecurity (Monar, 2015, p. 336).

The new approach offered by the EUGS should, therefore, be understood against this backdrop: Article 42.7 of the TEU, was invoked for the first time in 2015 due to security concerns resulting from terrorist attacks in European territory. Although the Union plans to take joint action to address the expansion of terrorist groups within and beyond its borders, terrorism has not been explicitly addressed by any of the CSDP missions yet. Some of the civilian CSDP operations could arguably contribute to counter-terrorism objectives (i.e. EUJUST LEX in Iraq or EUPOL in Afghanistan), yet none of the corresponding decisions explicitly mention it as a goal.

The EU's third pillar, of police and judicial cooperation, also has a role to play in counter-terrorism. Europol, its law enforcement agency, specializes in information exchange, intelligence sharing and coordination among national police forces. It works with all member states, as well as with non-EU partners and international organizations, in the fight against terrorism and transnational organized crime (Bureš, 2016, p. 59; Fijnaut, 2016, pp. 859–860). Europol's role in counter-terrorism could be condensed into three functions: (1) providing secure and standardized channels for various forms of cooperation, (2) disseminating best practices, and (3) developing typologies of terrorist activity and outlining general trends. Overall however, its mandate in the area of counter-terrorism remains relatively weak and security authorities in the member states are often unwilling to share quality intelligence with and through it. Inevitably, the combination of these factors limits Europol's role in the fight against terrorism (Occchipinti, 2015, pp. 240–241).

Eurojust, the EU’s Judicial Cooperation Unit, also contributes to counter-terrorism efforts by convening meetings at three levels. At the operational level, the national counter-terrorism

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51 In this Declaration, border controls were identified as a priority in the fight against terrorism for the first time, whereas in the subsequent Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism they were identified as a strategic objective. Eventually, the EU set five objectives regarding the use of border controls for counter-terrorism purposes: (1) strengthening external border controls, (2) enhancing capacities for identifying terrorists at borders, (3) improving identity document security, (4) strengthening the exchange of information relating to border controls, and (5) coordinating the reintroduction of internal border controls. While Frontex has achieved a significant part of these objectives, the exchange of border-related information has stumbled upon technical and financial hurdles, while the development of terrorist profiles and the re-introduction of internal border controls have hardly progressed (Léonard, 2015, pp. 312, 331–332). Other relevant EU agencies and bodies concerned with terrorism include the EU Police Chiefs Operational Task Force, the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator, the European Maritime Safety Agency and the EU Agency for Network and Information Security.

52 This may be due to the fact that both missions were approved in 2010, before this threat reached the peak of concern it later achieved. See Council Decisions 2010/279/CFSP (OJ L 123 of 19 May 2010) and 2010/330/CFSP (OJ L 149 of 15 June 2010).
magistrates concentrate on ongoing criminal investigations. At the tactical level, Eurojust pushes EU member states towards sharing best practices according to their national counter-terrorism experiences and mapping the potential linkages between nationally-based terrorist groups. At the strategic level, Eurojust presents its counter-terrorist achievements to member states in order to convince them of the added value it offers in the fight against terrorism. Still, Eurojust’s potential has not been fully exploited to date, mainly due to the varying levels of commitment to judicial cooperation at the EU level among member states and the lack of inter-agency cooperation with Europol. In short, considering the lack of interest by newer member states to utilize Eurojust, even the most elaborate and innovative counter-terrorism mechanisms will arguably remain limited in their usefulness (Bureš, 2010, pp. 240–241, 252–254).

Regarding the proliferation of WMD, the European Council adopted in 2003 its “Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, a text whose ultimate objective was “to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programs of concern worldwide”. Constant technology advances led to the 2008 update on “The New Lines for Action by the EU in Combatting the Proliferation of WMD and their Delivery Systems”. While the European Security Strategy already indicated that WMD are “potentially the greatest threat to our security”, the current Global Strategy goes beyond that and delineates a common EU approach to non-proliferation. Especially noteworthy is the EU’s active participation in all multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation instruments (including export control regimes) (Kienzle & Vestergaard, 2013, pp. 8–24) and the role it has played in the negotiation and implementation of the Iran deal (Davenport, 2019; Shirvani & Vuković, 2015, p. 80). Furthermore, EURATOM – one of the original European Communities – also works in the field of non-proliferation by guaranteeing the correct implementation of nuclear safeguards, while seeking to avoid any frictions with the IAEA (Kienzle & Vestergaard, 2013, p. 8).

After the 2019 European Parliament elections, a new High Representative is set to take charge. Some of challenges ahead may include: standing united in the face of big power competition, finding a joint strategic mindset and defining Europe’s role in the international arena (European Parliament, 2019), as well as further integrating and maximizing the effectiveness of security and other external action instruments. These challenges will be explored further in the second task of this Work Package.

The European Union and the Women Peace and Security agenda

The EU projects itself as a normative leader externalising its internal values and commitments by uploading them into multilateral institutions in areas such as human rights (Manners, 2002). It seeks to do so by promoting a rules-based global order. The EU states in article 8 of the TFEU that ‘in all its activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women’. Reducing gender disparities has been seen as a fundamental norm since the 1995 Council Resolution on Integration Gender Issues in Development Cooperation. This was due to the perception shared by the DG VII and Nordic EU member states that the EU should have a gender policy to present to the 1995 Women’s Conference in Beijing. The DG renamed the women in development desk (focusing on projects for women) a gender and development desk (focusing on analysis of gender roles in all development aid).
Along these lines, the EU welcomed resolution 1325 as it fit into the EU’s normative framework, based on a triple approach to women in conflict (protection, participation and prevention): respectively, women as victims; women as active actors in the peace processes, based on equality between men and women; and women as taking part in conflict prevention. However, gender was not initially a guiding principle in the 2001 Programme of Action for the Prevention of Violent Conflict and the 2003 European Security Strategy.

During this period the EU changed its framing of gender and conflicts from a development/humanitarian perspective to a security issue. This permitted mainstreaming the gender dimension in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, and the EU adopted a series of guidelines and elaborated a methodology to supervise the implementation of resolution 1325. A milestone in this process was the adoption by the Council of two broad policy frameworks: a Comprehensive Approach to the EU Implementation of Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on WPS; and the Revised Guidelines on the Protection of Civilians in CSDP Missions and Operations. Despite these efforts, empirical research reveals gaps remain in the implementation (Deiana & McDonagh, 2018).

Today, the EU Strategy on WPS emphasises the need to expand the WPS umbrella into future UNSC resolutions on WPS as well as pushing to move from the WPS agenda to become a Gender, Peace and Security agenda. Moreover, the EU Gender Action Plans specify the areas where gender norms need to be diffuse, and identify the UN institutions that are key for its expansion: the UN General Assembly, the UN Human Rights Council, and in the field of security advancements, the UN Security Council. Concerning the latter, the European External Action Service has a dedicated Principal Advisor on Gender and on the implementation of UNSCR 1325, Ambassador Mara Marinaki. Critical feminism research has challenged the extent to which these efforts have address structural causes of insecurity experienced by women, and instead the EU ‘constitutes women as neoliberal subjects, meaning self-responsible individuals with “resources” for economic development or security’ (Muehlenhoff, 2017, p. 163).

[8] Asia

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Use of force, WMDs, terrorism

ASEAN was created in 1967 to promote political, economic and security cooperation among its members. In the security domain, ASEAN’s most commonly cited key accomplishment is the absence of war between its members. Although this may seem like a low-hanging fruit, maintaining peace in a region with historical enmities, bilateral tensions and unresolved territorial and maritime disputes is no small feat. ASEAN has socialized its members in principles such as non-interference, respect for sovereignty and the renunciation of the use of force (1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation) via the “ASEAN way”: holding regular consultations, building consensus and relying on non-binding rules (Merced, 2017, p. 1).
Unlike hierarchical military alliances which practice collective defence when one of their members is under attack, ASEAN can be better described as a security community whose members prioritize confidence-building and diplomacy rather than the use of force in conflict resolution. The organization has important achievements to showcase in that respect, including the successful post-conflict reconciliation between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore after “Confrontation” (a violent conflict that occurred in the 1960s) and between the capitalist and communist parts of Southeast Asia after the Cold War. ASEAN is also working closely with Beijing on a regional code of conduct in the South China Sea in order to prevent the escalation of tensions between some of its members and China caused by overlapping claims over maritime borders. Progress on this issue, however, has been sluggish.

ASEAN has also shown vivid interest in nuclear non-proliferation efforts. In 1995, ASEAN members signed the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ, also known as Bangkok Treaty), which obliges all parties “not to develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons; station nuclear weapons; or test or use nuclear weapons anywhere inside or outside the treaty zone.” The treaty came into force two years later and it has been signed by all ASEAN countries. Unfortunately, the organization has not managed to enlist the support of the five nuclear weapon states for the sanctity of the SEANWFZ: none of them has signed the Bangkok Treaty protocol, which would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons against any SEANWFZ member (Oba, 2015, p. 280).

Last but not least, after 9/11 and the 2002 Bali attacks, terrorism became one of the top priorities in ASEAN’s political agenda. The organization declared the need to fight terrorism in the region and to strengthen counter-terrorism efforts with a legal treaty (Gunaratna, 2018, p. 127). The ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT), a legal framework for regional cooperation to and to deepen cooperation among the law enforcement agencies of ASEAN member states, was ultimately adopted in January 2007 (Nasu, McLaughlin, Rothwell, & Tan, 2019, p. 78). As a legally binding instrument, ACCT has been praised as a “significant milestone in ASEAN counter-terrorism cooperation with much potential in the areas of information-sharing and capacity-building” (Nasu et al., 2019). In practice, some cooperation does exist, but multilateral intelligence-sharing is rare because governments prefer to exchange threat information bilaterally and national security agencies are reluctant to share collected intelligence. Unless ASEAN countries move from lax cooperation to meaningful collaboration, their counter-terrorism efforts will likely remain deficient and the threats of insurgency and terrorism will persist (Gunaratna, 2018).

## ASEAN and the Women, Peace and Security agenda

ASEAN as an institution has no or scarce instruments to address the WPS agenda. It is mostly the responsibility of individual ASEAN member states to implement and advance a WPS agenda through National Action Plans. To date, the Philippines, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Indonesia are the only ASEAN members that have developed and implemented a WPS agenda. One of the few tools adopted by member states collectively is the 2013 ASEAN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women and Violence Against Children that acknowledges the importance of promoting the rights of women and children, and the need to prevent gender-based violence during armed conflict situations.
In recent times, the 2017 ASEAN Summit heads of state and government adopted the Joint Statement on Promoting Women, Peace and Security in ASEAN. It was a proposal coming from the ASEAN Commission on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Women and Children and led by the Philippines. The Joint Statement referred to the CEDAW and UNSCR 1325 (and subsequent WPS resolutions) and framed the approach of the ASEAN to WPS as willing to ‘protect women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence’ as well as to ‘create greater and wider spaces for participation in peacebuilding and post-reconstruction processes’. This advance is part of a broader cooperation between the UN and ASEAN as agreed by the 2011 Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership between ASEAN and the UN during the 4th ASEAN-UN Summit as well as the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership between ASEAN and the United Nations (2016-2020).

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

Terrorism

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a regional security organization that was set up in 2001, when the “Shanghai Five” (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan) identified three major sources of concern in the Central Asia region – terrorism, extremism and separatism – and decided to coordinate in order to address these “three evils” (Alimov, 2018; Lanteigne, 2018). Although the SCO is evidently a security organization in nature, it is still in search of its full identity. On the one hand, Moscow views it as a security regime with a strong military dimension that could eventually turn into a formal alliance. On the other hand, Beijing is less enthusiastic about this militaristic interpretation and favours a more holistic and varied approach. While China recognizes the organization’s security benefits, it seeks to develop a more expansive economic and diplomatic identity for the SCO (Lanteigne, 2018, p. 120).

With regard to the SCO’s contribution to our GPG, it is important to stress that the organization’s core mandate is to protect its members from non-state security threats, especially terrorist groups. Before the creation of the SCO, the “Shanghai Five” had shown interest in addressing regional border issues in order to reduce tensions and improve their strategic relationships. However, after its creation, the SCO has remained largely inactive in the face of interstate conflict related to territorial disputes in the region. The SCO has neither condemned nor endorsed Russia’s unilateral interventions in Georgia and then in Crimea/Eastern Ukraine. Rather, it simply called for the restoration of peace through diplomacy (Lanteigne, 2018, pp. 129–131).

As stated above, the SCO’s chief focus is on counter-terrorism. Since 2001, its members have signed a series of pivotal documents on counter-terrorism cooperation – most notably the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism – and they have agreed on the definition of such key concepts as “terrorism”, “terrorist groups”, “secessionism” and “extremism.” (Jin & Dehang, 2019, pp. 71–72). On the operational side, the SCO regularly coordinates joint military operations to improve confidence between its members and tactical readiness to take on potential threats. These anti-terror exercises, called “Peace Missions”, often involve the deployment of heavy weaponry and practice drills with air-
to-air missiles (Lanteigne, 2018, p. 127). What is more, the SCO has been fairly successful in restraining terrorist access to financial resources by dismantling drug trafficking networks between Afghanistan and Central Asian states. In order to facilitate counter-terrorism activities on the ground, the organization has also set up a counter-terrorism office in Tashkent that focuses on information-sharing and intelligence cooperation (Jin & Dehang, 2019, pp. 72–74).

In its two decades of existence, the organization has been met with considerable scepticism. Some argue that the SCO is “nothing but a type of club for its various heads of state or a conference hosting their annual meetings that does not pursue any specific objectives” (Alimov, 2018, p. 115), while others emphasize the sluggishness and ineffectiveness of its consensual decision-making process. The organization also faces a number of challenges, including the aforementioned internal disagreements between Russia and China about the organization’s future direction and the acceptance of India and Pakistan as full members. Nevertheless, the SCO remains young, and through its counter-terrorism activities, it has arguably contributed to regional peace and security.

[C] Africa

African Union (AU)

Use of force, terrorism

The African Union (AU) was founded in 2001 to replace the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which had been created in 1963 after several triumphant independence movements in the continent. Although the OAU had succeeded in adopting the African Charter on Human Rights in 1981, it was unable to achieve its integration objectives or contain the emergence of conflicts in the region due to division among its members (Møller, 2009, pp. 6–7). The gradual decay of the OAU led to the creation of the AU, which integrated three proposals: a Libyan proposal of a pan-African unity, the South African project for an African Renaissance and the Nigerian quest for a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (Tieku, 2004, pp. 261–264).

Although the AU is one of the main security actors in the continent, the organization also pursues other objectives such as accelerating regional integration, improving economic performance and solving other common problems. The AU’s Constitutive Act recognizes already in the preamble that “the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent” and that “the need to promote peace, security and stability” is a prerequisite for the implementation of Africa’s development and integration agenda (African Union, 2001). Unsurprisingly, the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent (Article 3.f) is identified as the organization’s core objective.

The AU seeks to be a neutral actor for the discussion and resolution of disputes within the region. Its taskforce to promote regional peace and security is the Peace and Security Council (PSC). As one of the main organs of the Union, the PSC is also a key pillar of the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The PSC Protocol (adopted in Durban and in force since 2003) outlined the contours of the APSA, which encapsulates, among

53 Created by decision AHG/Dec 160 (xxxvii) of the Lusaka Summit in 2001
others, the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the African Peace Fund and the African Standby Force (ASF). This final component – the ASF – was declared operationally ready in 2016 and is currently composed by 25,000 staff members, organized in five regional brigades. With the support of the African regional economic communities (ECOWAS, FOMAC, NASBRIG, etc.), the ASF constitutes a multidisciplinary peacekeeping force with both military police and civilian contingents. Apart from ASF’s "boots on the ground" approach, the APSA also includes diplomatic efforts aimed at prevention and post-conflict reconstruction (Karock, 2014, p. 5).

The PSC has 15 member states with equal voting powers representing all regions of Africa. They are elected by the AU Executive Council and endorsed by the Assembly at its sessions. The AU’s PSC and the UN Security Council, which meet twice per year in New York, have an agreement that aims to improve cooperation in peace and security through joint visits or even joint missions on the ground. In 2007, the AU deployed AMISOM, its mission in Somalia, in which the PSC acted jointly with the UNSC. Its mandate was to support dialogue and reconciliation in Somali territory, to provide protection for federal institutions and the civilian population, as well as to provide security for key national infrastructures (Møller, 2009, p. 14). Previous peacekeeping operations took place in Burundi (2003-2004) and in Sudan, particularly in Darfur (2004-2007). In the first case, the AU was replaced by a UN mission, while in the second case, the AU mission had to coordinate with a UN mission.

The PSC deals with all types of aggressions, confrontations and crises between states or by non-state actors. Overall, interstate wars have gradually lost relevance in the regional landscape, whereas internal conflicts and terrorism are currently the main threats to African peace and security. The fragility of states and the lack of national security structures create a space for domestic conflict and terrorism, which end up causing widespread instability (African Union, 2016, p. 19). While the drivers for criminality, terrorism and conflict in Africa are varied, the use of small arms has been a common characteristic in all scenarios (Murithi, 2012, p. 664). Stopping the widespread use of weapons has been the main goal of the AU's flagship project "Silencing the guns" since 2016. This all-encompassing project engages the PSC, as well as the AU Commission and organs from all levels to fight against transnational organized crime, violence, and terrorism.

In terms of terrorism, already in 1999, a terminal OAU considered this transnational phenomenon a serious threat to international security and stability (Gambari, 2012, p. 179). Since then, the threat has spread throughout the region, as exemplified by the emergence and spread of groups such as Boko Haram, ISIS and Al-Shabaab in North and Central Africa. Although the OAU was based on the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of its member states, the AU has a growing mandate to be more interventionist in issues of continental concern, including terrorism and international crimes. The main instrument against terrorism is still the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which requires member states to criminalize terrorist acts in conformity with their national law. Striving for improved cooperation mechanisms, the AU Assembly adopted a Resolution in 2010 (Assembly/AU/Dec.311(XV)) appointing an AU Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, and created a research and analysis centre to manage information and capacity-building activities: the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism.
Together with the increasingly pressing challenge of combatting terrorism in the region, the AU faces an urgent need to promote strategies and policies that contribute to the socio-economic development of the continent. Making an impact in the construction of enabling conditions for peace and security is a key security strategy on the continent. This requires, however, real political will from the heads of state and government of the member states – yet many of these states have institutionally weak governments with legitimacy and governance deficits. Thus, for many of its members, helping the AU to become the common voice of the continent is not among their most urgent priorities.

Another challenge for the future of the AU has to do with its financing. On the one hand, it suffers from limited financing by its member states. On the other hand, it is highly dependent on donor funding, which imposes a strong burden on the general planning and functioning of the Union. Since each donor operates differently, timings, project implementation, accountancy and general management become harder tasks due to the potential unpredictability and the lack of long-term planning (Pharatlhatlhe & Vanheukelom, 2019, pp. 3-6).

A final challenge for the AU are the recurrent discrepancies over possible approaches to certain conflicts or whether the Union should even get involved in specific issues. As long as there are such heterogeneous and sometimes opposing interests among the continent’s leaders, the AU will remain a platform to try to bring opinions closer together (Pharatlhatlhe & Vanheukelom, 2019). In addition, the excessive broadness of the organization’s scope in terms of security objectives may be counterproductive to the efficient functioning of the AU.

The African Union (AU) and the Women, Peace and Security agenda

The AU Constitutive Act recognizes in article 4.1 that member states are tasked with the promotion of gender equality. In this vein, the AU issued its first ever implementation report of the WPS agenda in 2016 under the auspices of the AU Office of the Special Envoy on Women, Peace, and Security, which is a dedicated organ to ensure AU compliance with the WPS agenda. Moreover, the African Peace and Security Architecture includes the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs). The RECs and RMs are working with the AU Women and Gender Directorate to integrate, support, implement and develop mechanisms to mainstream gender awareness. The creation of the PSC was based on the recognition of the negative impact of militarized conflict, especially on women and children. African civil society, especially Bineta Diop and Femmes Afrique Solidarité, has played a major role in driving the regional WPS agenda, and Bineta Diop is now the AU Special Envoy on WPS.
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Use of force, terrorism

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional organization of fifteen states created in 1975, was initially formed to promote regional economic and trade cooperation agreements. However, since its establishment, ECOWAS has extended its functions to the military realm, becoming a territorial force with a regional army oriented at defusing conflicts in the western part of the African continent through military deployments (Wulf & Debiel, 2009, p. 16).

Currently, ECOWAS is an integral component (together with the other four regional economic communities) of the African Union’s African Standby Force. Its work in peace and security is thereby linked directly to the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture. ECOWAS, which is generally considered to be the most advanced regional economic community in these matters, plays an important role in providing our GPG both in the West African region and on the African continent as a whole (Elowson & Macdermott, 2010, p. 14).

Regional instability awakened the organization’s focus on security early on: ECOWAS member states adopted a Protocol on Non-Aggression in 1978 and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance Defence, which would be activated in the event that any of the members was to be threatened or attacked, in 1981 (ECOWAS, 1981). The organization was outfitted with a Defence Committee and Council and Allied Armed Force of the Community, which allowed the first missions with ECOWAS’ military personnel to take place in the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

In the 1993 ECOWAS Treaty revision, the maintenance of regional peace, security and stability via the promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness was included in the document. The consolidation of ECOWAS’ peacekeeping division took place in various phases. First, the Protocol to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Peace- Keeping and Security – the most comprehensive protocol relating to peace and security in the region – was adopted in 1999 (Holt & Shanahan, 2005, p. 8). Later on, in 2010, a Conflict Prevention Framework was created, which allowed for the peacekeeping division to act whenever needed.

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55 A functionalist vision and the concept of spillover can help to understand the rationale behind regional trade agreements shifting towards issues of international security (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001; Katzenstein, Keohane, & Krasner, 1998, pp. 654–655).
56 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) and North Africa Regional Capability (NARC).
57 Against the Charles Taylor government in 1989.
58 When Ahmed Tejjan Kabah’s government was deposed in 1991.
59 A set of conditions were established for ECOWAS to be able to take action to promote peace and security; at least one of them must be met: 1) an external aggression or threat to a member state; 2) a conflict between two or more member states; 3) internal conflicts that could lead to humanitarian disasters that threaten regional peace and security; 4) violations of human rights or the rule of law; 5) a democratically elected government is overthrown (or threatened); or 6) any other situation in which the Mediation and Security Council decides to intervene.
Today, ECOWAS is a fundamental actor in security issues in West Africa. As the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire show, ECOWAS is a noteworthy actor in exerting pressure on the parties involved in African conflicts. Nevertheless, ECOWAS’ record is far from impeccable. In fact, its delayed intervention in the Malian issue arguably led to the involvement of extra-continental forces, specifically from France, casting some doubts on its efficacy and compromising its otherwise positive reputation. It was not until the UNSC adopted its Resolution 2085, which authorized an African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), that ECOWAS took action in the conflict, eventually taking the lead in the military mission. ECOWAS furthermore faces a host of other security-related challenges, including governance crises, low legitimacy of national institutions, a general lack of capacities and terrorism.

The resurgence of Boko Haram in 2009 and the occupation of Northern Mali by terrorist groups in 2012 shook the region and prompted a response by West African leaders. At its 66th ordinary session in Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire in 2013, ECOWAS adopted a Political Declaration on a Common Position against Terrorism, which included a Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan. The main purpose of the Declaration and the Strategy is to prevent and eradicate terrorism in West Africa in order to create the foundations for sustainable economic development in the region and increase the living standards of all ECOWAS citizens. Moreover, the plans “seek to give effect to regional, continental and international counter-terrorism instruments and to provide a common operational framework for action” (Adigbue, 2014, pp. 49–50).

**ECOWAS and the Women, Peace and Security agenda**

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is pursuing a WPS agenda to integrate gender perspectives into the peace and security architecture. So far, it has adopted the 2004 ECOWAS Gender Policy, the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), the ECOWAS Regional Plan of Action for the Implementation of Resolutions 1325 and 1820, the 2015 Supplementary Act Relating to Equality of Rights between Women and Men for Sustainable Development in the ECOWAS Region, and the 2016 Supplementary Act on Security Sector Reform and Governance. For a discussion of how the WPS national action plans have been implemented in two ECOWAS member states – Sierra Leone and Liberia, see Basini & Ryan (2016).

At the Regional Forum “Women Count for Peace”, ECOWAS adopted the 2010 Dakar Declaration on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the ECOWAS Plan of Action for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 in West Africa. These documents seek to promote women’s participation in mediation, to localise the WPS agenda, to develop measures to combat sexual and gender-based violence, and to establish gendered early warning indicators to prevent conflicts.

Moreover, the ECOWAS Gender Development Centre is tasked with mainstreaming gender in ECOWAS and its member states and coordinating the implementation of the Regional Plan of Action. The Centre has been crucial in the creation of three platforms for supporting community gender programs and coordinating civil society activities under the Regional Plan of Action: the West African Network of Young Women Leaders (which is a
forum for enhancing cooperation with UN Office for West African and the Sahel); the Association of ECOWAS Female Parliamentarians; and the Network on Peace and Security for Women in the ECOWAS Region.

[D] Americas

Organization of American States (OAS)

Use of force, WMDs, terrorism

The Organization of American States (OAS) was created in 1948, and it still stands as the main governmental, political, legal and social forum of the Americas’ security complex (Buzan, 1983, p. 106), despite being criticized as “inefficient, an instrument of the foreign policy of the United States, or just irrelevant” (Herz, 2011, p. 1). When discussing this organization, it is important to point out the considerable imbalance between the US and other OAS member states, as well as the divergence in their security interests. For example, the US is mostly interested in cooperation in intelligence operations, counter-terrorism activities and dealing with new threats, while the concerns of Latin American states are mainly related to the social and economic problems facing the region. Yet for all these discrepancies and the hegemonic position of the US within the OAS, the organization has managed to develop important mechanisms of preventive diplomacy that have averted at least 18 interstate and intrastate conflicts (Herz, 2008a, pp. 23–26).

Apart from managing the use of force, the 2003 OAS Declaration on Security in the Americas acknowledged the emergence of new security threats and led to the creation of the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security in 2005. Since then, the Secretariat has been seeking to become the organ responsible for assessing, preventing, confronting, and responding to security threats, and thus, the primary point of reference in the region for the development of security cooperation and capacity-building. Moreover, it has been dealing with newer security threats through the following organs: the Executive Secretariat of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, the Secretariat of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), the Department of Public Security, and the Department against Transnational Organized Crime.

The work of these departments shares a common trait: a focus on institutional capacity-building, which can be seen as a preventive security measure. The lack of effective sovereignty of the state, together with some aspects of the aforementioned threats, has created increasingly problematic areas and so-called "no-go zones", where power and authority are in the hands of maras, gangs or guerrilla movements (e.g., several shantytowns in Central America or Ciudad Juarez, on the Mexican-US border). The growing importance of...
non-state actors in the security problems in the Americas\textsuperscript{62} in fact led to the proclamation of the “multidimensional” concept of security at the 2003 OAS Special Conference on Security. This conceptualization provides a comprehensive approach to the issues, but it can also make it easier for the terms and limits of the notion of security to become too diffuse (Weiffen and Villa, 2017, p. 12).

Regarding the threat of terrorism, the OAS encouraged pro-active counter-terrorism measures even before the 9/11 attacks. Specifically, it created the CICTE to facilitate the prevention, opposition and elimination of terrorism (Lewis, 2015). These efforts intensified when OAS members adopted the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism in 2002 to strengthen their counter-terrorism cooperation, accelerate the ratification of all UN counter-terrorism instruments, abide by the recommendations of the G7’s Financial Action Task Force, implement UNSC Resolution 1373 and exchange information, experiences and training. Relatedly, OAS members recently developed an Inter-American Network on Counterterrorism to facilitate immediate exchange of information on terrorist threats.

Furthermore, mindful of the role of non-state actors in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the OAS has established a 1540 implementation program to assist countries in the region with compliance with their obligations under UN Resolution 1540, particularly the “creation of the proper domestic legislation and efficient enforcement measures” (Herz, 2008b, p. 29). In addition, following an agreement between the CICTE and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in 2017, the OAS created the position of hemispheric coordinator for the implementation of 1540 within the CICTE. The coordinator’s objectives are to support member states to comply with and enforce Resolution 1540, promote a regional framework for the implementation of Resolution 1540 in the hemisphere, and strengthen the network of contact points on Resolution 1540 in the region (Organization of American States, 2019).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\textbf{The Organization of American States (OAS) and the Women, Peace and Security agenda} \\
\hline
The OAS has not developed a Regional Action Plan for implementing UNSC Resolution 1325. Only eight OAS states have developed a National Action Plan: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and the United States. Of these, Brazil, Chile and Guatemala have participated in UN peacekeeping missions (e.g. in Haiti). \\
\hline
\textbf{Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)} \\
\textit{Use of force, WMDs, terrorism} \\
\hline
The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), a FIGO which currently looks likely to ‘die’\textsuperscript{63} in the near future, was born as a regional organization in 2008 with the goal of promoting the integration of all 12 South American countries in the areas of energy, education, health, \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Regional Security Initiatives}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{62} Drug and arms trafficking involving cross-border problems that lead to urban and rural violence, organized crime and guerrilla movements, which end up delegitimizing the institutions that, when weakened, facilitate smuggling and illicit trafficking of the aforementioned products.

\textsuperscript{63} Formally, a likely path for its extinction is “desuetude” i.e. inactivity despite no official dissolution, see (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2018).
environment, infrastructure, security and democracy. In the security field, the goal was for UNASUR to become an alternative to the OAS, strengthening South America’s autonomy vis-à-vis the United States (Sanahuja, 2012, p. 42). The organization was to be the only regional institution in South America with a clear security mandate (Weiffen & Villa, 2017, p. 10), which would have been operationalized through the South American Defence Council.

From the start, conflict management became the most significant area of political cooperation and the organization soon showed it could contribute to this area, by preventing conflict and the risk of secession in Bolivia in 2008. Another success story was UNASUR’s mediation efforts in the 2010 border dispute between Venezuela and Colombia (Kersffeld, 2013, pp. 194-195). In 2010, UNASUR added capabilities to match its security objectives: “the UNASUR Treaty added a democratic clause and a sanctions mechanism including enhanced prevention and crisis management capabilities” (Sanahuja, 2017, p. 109). Overall, UNASUR’s stated objectives were very ambitious and far-reaching, including the coordination of member states’ specialized bodies in the fight against terrorism and the non-proliferation of WMDs (Article 2.rr of UNASUR’s Constitutive Treaty).

However, the initial ambition and action of the organization have since ebbed. UNASUR was created in a context where progressive governments were in place in many of its member states (Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Cristina Fernández Kirchner in Argentina, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Lula da Silva in Brazil, Michele Bachelet in Chile, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay). This ideological alignment paved the way for a high-ambition project: UNASUR’s members conceived of the organization as a sort of European Union on the South American continent, and the latest attempt to group the Andean Community and MERCOSUR under a single regional cooperation entity. Nevertheless, funding was an issue from the very start, and when governments with different ideologies came to power in multiple member states, the project went into a nosedive. Consensus disappeared, and when the member states were unable to nominate a Secretary-General to succeed the Colombian Ernesto Samper due to the rejection of all candidates by Venezuela and Bolivia, six member states – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru – temporarily withdrew from UNASUR (in April 2018). Since then, the project has stalled and would appear to be moribund.

64 These objectives were set up in Article 2. Although broadly general in itself, this Article gave some guidance on what was expected of UNASUR and was a first step towards slowly building the South American -even Latin American- Union, as its treaty considered the possibility of expanding the Union by integrating new full members from Central America and the Caribbean once they had been continuously associated with UNASUR for more than 5 years.

65 UNASUR’s commitment to non-proliferation was reiterated in the Statute of the UNASUR South American Defence Council (Article 3.f), where the preservation of South America as an area free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction was included as a common principle.

66 The lack of will to allocate funding for UNASUR was noticeable since its origin. In fact, the construction of the general secretariat in Quito cost 45 million dollars which were paid by the government of Ecuador. The same happened with the seat of the Parliament in Cochabamba: its cost (65 million dollars) was paid by the Bolivian state. Today both buildings are empty and being dismantled.
Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

League of Arab States (LAS)

Use of force, WMDs, terrorism

The League of Arab States was created in 1945 to resist colonialism, deter the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine and embody pan-Arabism. In theory, the League’s constitutive treaty empowers the organization to play an important role in the preservation of peace and security among its members (Article 3 of LAS charter). Specifically, the Council of the League was entrusted with the tasks of mediating disputes among member states and deciding on the measures to be adopted in case of aggression towards any of its members (Isaac, 2015, p. 153).

In practice, however, the LAS has almost always failed to carry out its conflict management and peacekeeping mandate and to mediate inter-Arab conflicts. LAS members have traditionally bypassed the League and resorted to the UN or other world powers for mediation – either because they lacked confidence in the organization’s capacity to resolve disputes or due to Egypt’s hegemonic role in the Arab world, which pushed for the externalization of mediation. This mistrust, along with the lack of mechanisms to ensure member compliance with LAS’s resolutions, has turned the organization into what some term a “glorified debating society” (Isaac, 2015; Masters & Sergie, 2014).

In this context, the League’s quick reaction in the Libyan and Syrian conflicts in the beginning of this decade was surprising. As soon as the Libyan conflict broke out (February 2011), the League convened to condemn the violent practices of the Gaddafi regime and suspend Libya’s participation in the Council. A month later, the League called on the UNSC to immediately impose a no-fly zone over Libya and expressed its support for the rebel movement in the country before announcing that it recognized it as Libya’s legitimate government. Four members of the League (Qatar, UAE, Morocco, Jordan) even participated in NATO’s operations, contributing both forces and funds. In the Syrian conflict, the League was more reluctant to act at first but, eventually, it imposed economic sanctions on Damascus. Further mediation efforts included plans for a political transition in Syria, an Arab monitoring mission and collaboration with the UN to send a joint special envoy. Despite the failure of these efforts, it is noteworthy that the organization strived to resolve the Syrian crisis within an Arab context (Isaac, 2015).

The League’s efforts on non-proliferation, meanwhile, have been few and far between. The idea of establishing a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East has been floating around since 1974, but progress has been excruciatingly slow. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the NPT parties tried to revive the idea and push forward the broader agenda of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (MEWMDFZ) by prompting regional states to take “practical steps” aimed at making progress on such a zone. For all the international support and the resolutions endorsing the effort, practical progress has been stymied by disagreements between countries in the region over the terms and specific steps.

67Interestingly, the idea was first put forward by the Shah of Iran and later formalized by a UN General Assembly resolution.
Israel has tried to link discussions on the MEWMDFZ with durable peace and compliance with international obligations by states in the region, while the Arab League member states insist that the two issues are unrelated (Davenport, 2018c). Instead of exploring paths for a mutually acceptable solution, some Arab League states have sought to increase “external pressure through multilateral means to compel progress on a regional ‘Zone’ – and, more specifically, to compel Israel to accept the Arab League’s approach to this issue” (Ford, 2019).

Regarding the threat of terrorism, the LAS has been more active, consistently condemning terrorist activities carried out by groups such as ISIS, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. To fight against this regional scourge, all LAS members have signed the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. This document defines terrorism and terrorist offences and imposes obligations on member states not to commit, finance or aid any form of terrorist actions. All signatories are also required to take preventive and suppressive measures and cooperate towards eradicating terrorism by exchanging information (Article 4.I), assisting in investigations (Article 4.II), exchanging expertise (Article 4.III) and coordinating their judicial efforts (Articles 9-18) (Dragan, 2015, pp. 7–8, 10).

**Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)**

*Use of force, WMDs, terrorism*

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a regional intergovernmental political and economic organization, was established in 1981 in response to the deteriorating security environment in the region. Although security concerns were rife at the time the organization was created (e.g. the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan during the same year and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq in 1980), the six member states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) did not give the organization a clear mandate for greater security and defence cooperation (Koch, 2010). Even though GCC members decided to highlight the economic and civilian aspects of their cooperation and downplay the security and military aspects of the organization, their tacit quest for regional security and stability became apparent in 1984, with the establishment of the Peninsula Shield Force, the military arm of the organization. Defence cooperation between GCC states further intensified when they signed the Joint Defence Agreement in 2000, a framework for collective defence (Pasha, 2012, p. 92).

Notwithstanding these efforts to coordinate security and defence initiatives, GCC members rarely move beyond limited consultation and lax cooperation. In major regional crises like Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the GCC was a marginal actor that had to depend on external powers to intervene and end interstate conflict. This track record made the decisiveness and promptness in GCC’s strategies and actions in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings largely unexpected. The organization acted collectively in sending the Peninsula Shield Force to suppress revolts in Bahrain, it endorsed the Gulf Initiative for a smooth transfer of power in Yemen and it came up with proposals for the political stabilization of the region (Isaac, 2015).

While the GCC has traditionally considered interstate conflict and regional instability as the primary regional security threats, nuclear proliferation has also been a major concern. Gulf states have repeatedly called for the unconditional nuclear disarmament of Israel and have favoured diplomatic and economic measures to compel Iran to cease its clandestine nuclear
program. Most GCC states have had an uneasy relationship with Tehran and, should the latter acquire nuclear military capabilities, they would most likely see themselves compelled to enter a nuclear arms race (Stracke, 2008, pp. 2–3). To prevent proliferation, the GCC has supported the ambitious idea of a Middle East Nuclear Free Zone. Due to the sluggish progress on such a zone for the whole Middle East (and North Africa), the GCC has in parallel proposed a step-by-step regional security arrangement for non-proliferation that could start with the establishment of a Gulf Weapon of Mass Destruction Free Zone and progressively expand to the rest of the region (Stracke, 2008, p. 4). However, little progress has been made with regard to this proposal.

Another great source of instability in the region is, undoubtedly, terrorism. In the face of this great challenge, individual GCC states have adopted sophisticated counter-terrorism approaches, based both on soft and hard power strategies. Qatar, for example, focuses more on prevention and tackles the root causes of terrorism by generating employment and promoting economic empowerment. Other GCC members prefer to target individual extremists and terrorists by curbing their sources of income through anti-money-laundering laws or by prosecuting those who spread hate and extremism on the internet in order to radicalize populations and recruit new fighters (Al-Otaibi, 2018, p. 35). To complement and reinforce the individual domestic measures taken by its members, the GCC adopted a Counter-Terrorism Agreement in 2004 and founded a permanent committee on terrorism in 2006.

In a nutshell, the GCC is a fairly cohesive group of states with similar political, economic and social systems and security interests. However, its newfound activism in regional security issues has been in jeopardy since Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain imposed an embargo in 2017 against fellow GCC member Qatar. Unsurprisingly, this has complicated efforts to develop security cooperation, especially "in sensitive areas like counter-terrorism and intelligence-sharing that beyond the existence of shared external threats, require mutual trust born out of common values and beliefs, deep societal bonds, and agreement over common long-term interests" (Miller, 2019, p. 40).

### 3.2.3 Other FIGOs in global security governance

In the previous section we focused on global, intercontinental and regional FIGOs with a clear security mandate and on regional economic FIGOs that have expanded their activities to the security domain. However, there are also FIGOs whose main mandate may not necessarily be the maintenance of international peace and security, but their activities contribute – sometimes only tangentially, but often also meaningfully – to the promotion of our GPG.

The World Bank, for example, considers conflict-prevention and post-conflict reconstruction as critical for its poverty reduction mission. It has therefore created a Post-Conflict Fund and a Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, which designs targeted development efforts to prevent conflict or ease transition out of conflict in affected countries (The World Bank, 2011). In the case of the OECD, the Development Assistance Committee Network on Development Evaluation works closely with the organization’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility in order to improve development results and peace-building activities in situations of conflict.
and fragility. While these FIGOs are chiefly concerned with development and poverty reduction, their activities may effectively prevent conflict and promote peace.

The same is true in the field of counter-terrorism, where FIGOs with other main purposes contribute in various ways. Table 2, below, contains examples of these contributions:

Table 2: Non-security focused FIGOs executing counterterrorism tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGO</th>
<th>Counter-terrorist functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>Gathers, analyses and shares information on terrorist financing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>The Financial Market Integrity Group of the World Bank strengthens the effectiveness of its members in the area of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financial Terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAO</td>
<td>Prevents terrorist acts and hijackings by developing international conventions, security standards and resolutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>IMO has developed and regularly updates conventions that provide a basis for legal action against acts of terrorism committed against ships as well as the use of ships in acts of terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBSEC</td>
<td>The Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (OBSEC) actively promotes capacity-building measures and intelligence-sharing among its members in order to prevent and suppress terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>The Southern African Development Community (SADC) condemns terrorism and its members strive to incorporate international counter-terrorism instruments into domestic law and strengthen their domestic capacities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Mercosur has created a Working Group on Terrorism to strengthen intelligence-sharing among its members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has a sub-Committee on Terrorism, which provides legal assistance and capacity-building to support Commonwealth members’ implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and other international counter-terrorism laws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has create a program against terrorism, with special emphasis on five areas: enhancing judicial capacity, optimizing interdepartmental cooperation, enhancing border control, providing training, sharing information and best practices, and promoting strategic cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTO</td>
<td>The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) strengthens the national and collective security of its members through military-political cooperation, coordinating foreign policy, and establishing cooperation mechanisms. In counter-terrorism the CSTO is, reportedly, undertaking efforts to develop relationships with the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the UNSC and the OSCE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUAM</td>
<td>The Organization for Democracy and Economic Development-GUAM (GUAM) has a Sub-Working Group on Combating Terrorism in which its members share views on issues of national legislation and operational concerns, as well as the activities of member states relating to prevention and combating of terrorism.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Lewis, 2015)
3.2.4 Summary table

The following table provides a condensed summary of the main contributions of each of the FIGOs studied above (global, intercontinental and regional) to mitigating the threats of the use of force, WMD proliferation, and terrorism. Where a field is left blank, this FIGO does not undertake any substantive action against this threat. The FIGOs studied in section 3.1.3 (whose main mandate is not security-related) were not included in this summary table.

Table 3: FIGOs governing the use of force, WMD proliferation and terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of creation</th>
<th>No. of members</th>
<th>Use of force</th>
<th>WMD proliferation</th>
<th>Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Interpol | 1928 | 194 | - Provides access to its database to facilitate the arrest of fugitives wanted for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
- Participates in capacity-building activities (e.g. training investigators). | - Has a sub-directorate that specializes in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive materials, which seeks to strengthen coordination among all relevant stakeholders.  
- Assists Interpol member states in their efforts to implement UNSC Resolution 1540. | - Collects, stores and analyses information on terror suspects, groups and their activities, and exchanges data with member countries and other international organizations.  
- Contributes to the prevention of terrorist transborder movements and to the interception of trafficked weapons that can be used for terrorist activities (by circulating alerts and warnings). |
| UNSC | 1945 | 193 | - Article 2.4 of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, save for cases of individual or collective self-defence and the use of force under the explicit authorization of the UNSC.  
- The UNSC can address security threats through pacific (Chapter VI) or more coercive means (Chapter VII) including authorizing states, coalitions and regional bodies to use force, or deploying peacekeeping operations. | - The 1540 Committee oversees the implementation of Resolution 1540, which obliges states to refrain from supporting by any means non-state actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.  
- The Resolution also imposes binding obligations to adopt legislation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, and establish appropriate domestic controls over related materials to prevent their illicit trafficking. | - The Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) monitors the implementation of Resolution 1373 which requires all member states to “refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts”.  
- CTC is assisted by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate.  
- Other relevant UN initiatives in the fight against terrorism (beyond the Security Council proper) include the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of creation</th>
<th>No. of members</th>
<th>Use of force</th>
<th>WMD proliferation</th>
<th>Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Security Council proper) is the Conference on Disarmament and its negotiation efforts in treaties such as the NPT, BTWC, CWC and FMCT.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>- LAS’ core mission is to promote peace, security and stability in the region by preventing conflict, resolving inter-Arab disputes through mediation and acting in a spirit of solidarity and unity. - Decides on the measures to be adopted in case of aggression towards any of its members. - Supports the establishment of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone and seeks to increase external pressure through multilateral means in order to enlist Israel’s support.</td>
<td>- Adopted the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism in 1998. The Convention defines terrorism and terrorist offences and obliges member states not to commit, finance or aid any form of terrorist actions. It also requires members to take preventive and suppressive measures and cooperate towards eradicating terrorism by exchanging information, assisting in investigations, exchanging expertise and coordinating their judicial efforts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>- Takes a comprehensive approach to security threats and has mechanisms of preventive diplomacy that contribute to the resolution of interstate and intrastate regional conflicts.</td>
<td>- Has established a 1540 implementation program to ensure the compliance of its members with non-proliferation efforts by assisting them in the drafting of the proper domestic legislation and the development of efficient enforcement measures. - Has created the position of hemispheric coordinator within CICTE (2017) to promote compliance with Resolution 1540 and regional coordination.</td>
<td>- The Inter-American Committee against Terrorism facilitates the prevention, opposition and elimination of terrorism. - Has strengthened regional counter-terrorism cooperation, capacity-building efforts, and compliance with Resolution 1373 and FATF recommendations by adopting the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism (2002). - Established an Inter-American Network on Counterterrorism (2019) to facilitate the exchange of information on regional terrorist threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>- Collective self-defence pact. - Specializes in crisis management and participates in peacekeeping missions and peace enforcement operations. - Has the capacity to intervene militarily under UNSC authorization.</td>
<td>- Has a Strategic Concept (2010) that expresses support for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance to the goals of NPT. - Promotes dialogue among its members, partners and other countries to facilitate the full implementation of their international non-proliferation obligations.</td>
<td>- Enhances intelligence-sharing efforts in the field of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence. - Promotes capability-building measures against asymmetric threats and facilitates counter-terrorism coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Year of creation</td>
<td>No. of members</td>
<td>Use of force</td>
<td>WMD proliferation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>- Contributes to maintaining regional peace and security and mitigates bilateral tensions and maritime disputes by prioritizing confidence-building and diplomacy over intervention. &lt;br&gt; - Dispute resolution relies on the “ASEAN way”, which consists of regular consultations and decision-making procedures based on consensus, non-binding rules and the principles of non-interference, respect for sovereignty and the renunciation of the use of force.</td>
<td>- Has adopted the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty that obliges all parties “not to develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons; station nuclear weapons; or test or use nuclear weapons anywhere inside or outside the treaty zone.”</td>
<td>- The ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism provides the legal basis for ASEAN’s efforts to counter, prevent and suppress terrorism in all its forms and focuses mainly on capacity-building measures and information-sharing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>- Participates in conflict prevention by focusing on solidarity and fraternity among its members. Contributes to conflict resolution by promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes through mediation on a voluntary basis. &lt;br&gt; - Has adopted several resolutions in support of the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, disarmament, non-proliferation and the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and has repeatedly condemned Israel for possessing the nuclear capability to develop a nuclear arsenal and for not acceding to the NPT.</td>
<td>- Calls its members to cooperate in combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations (Article 18 of OIC Charter). &lt;br&gt; - Has adopted the 1999 Convention on Combating Terrorism and two ten-year programs of action to strengthen its implementation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>- Prioritizes prevention over coercion. Focuses on human rights, early warning and the peaceful settlement of disputes though mediation. &lt;br&gt; - Participates in peacekeeping operations and carries out functions of liaison with the conflict parties, monitoring, observation, and verification of the ceasefires in place. &lt;br&gt; - Assists member states in implementing Resolution 1540, by helping them produce national action plans and by organizing awareness-raising workshops and training courses. &lt;br&gt; - Helps member states to improve legislation and promote best practices while strengthening cooperation with other international organizations.</td>
<td>- Strengthens the capacity of its member states to police themselves and to participate in international intelligence gathering and sharing regimes. &lt;br&gt; - Contributes to terrorism prevention by promoting respect for human rights, fostering democratic rule and fighting against violent extremism and radicalization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>- Established the Peninsula Shield Force in 1984 to contribute to regional stability. &lt;br&gt; - Intensified defence cooperation in 2000 by adopting a framework for collective defence, the Joint Defence Agreement. &lt;br&gt; - Supports the establishment Gulf Weapon of Mass Destruction Free Zone as a step-by-step approach towards a Middle East Nuclear Free Zone. &lt;br&gt; - Has repeatedly called for the unconditional nuclear disarmament of Israel and has favoured diplomatic and</td>
<td>- Adopted a Counter-Terrorism Agreement in 2004 and founded a permanent committee on terrorism in 2006. &lt;br&gt; - Takes a mixed approach to counter-terrorism, with soft strategies focusing on prevention by addressing the root causes of terrorism, and the harder strategies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Year of creation</td>
<td>No. of members</td>
<td>Use of force</td>
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| EU   | 1993             | 28             | - The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy relies on a complex institutional structure, comprising the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the European Defence Agency.  
- The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a mutual defence clause.  
- The principle of “effective multilateralism” favours partnerships with global and regional FIGOs in order to prevent or resolve conflicts.  
- Direct CSDP military interventions are uncommon and always seek authorization by the UNSC.  
- Post-conflict reconstruction is a main area of involvement, with the deployment of civilian missions to strengthen the rule of law and provide border assistance, police missions and capacity building in the security sector, and observation missions.  | economic measures to compel Iran to cease its clandestine nuclear program.  
- Participates actively in all multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation instruments and export control regimes.  
- Played an important role in the negotiation and implementation of the Iran nuclear deal.  
- Euratom guarantees the correct implementation of the nuclear safeguards of all EU members.  | targeting individual extremists and terrorists by curbing their sources of income through anti-money-laundering laws or by prosecuting those who spread hate and radicalize populations to recruit new fighters.  
- Adopted the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism to align the legislation of its members against terrorist offences and activities; a Declaration on Combating Terrorism (2004); a Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism (2004); and a Counter-terrorism Strategy (2005).  
- EU agencies like Frontex, Eurojust, Europol, the European Maritime Safety Agency and the Agency for Network and Information Security, along with the EU Police Chiefs Operational Task Force reinforce counter-terrorism efforts. |
| UNASUR | 2008 | 12* (before the 2018 wave of withdrawals began) | - Strong mediation capacities and crisis management capabilities supported by a democratic clause and a sanctions mechanism. | - Non-proliferation of WMDs and disarmament were stated as objectives in Article 2.rr of UNASUR’s Constitutive Treaty.  
- The preservation of South America as an area free of WMDs and the promotion of disarmament were listed as common principles in the Statute of the UNASUR | - The coordination of member states’ specialized bodies in the fight against terrorism was listed as a main objective (Article 2.rr of UNASUR’s Constitutive Treaty). |
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<th>Use of force</th>
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<th>Terrorism</th>
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</table>
| ECOWAS        | 1975             | 15             | - Is a territorial force with a regional army oriented at defusing conflicts in the western part of the African continent through military deployments; is an integral component of the African Union’s Standby Force.  
- Contributes to regional security, peace and stability by promoting economic development and good neighbourliness.  
- The 1999 Protocol to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Peace-keeping and Security and the 2010 Conflict Prevention Framework have strengthened the organization’s peacekeeping division and enabled it to act when necessary. | South American Defence Council (Article 3.f).                                     | - Adopted a Political Declaration on a Common Position against Terrorism (2013), which includes a Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan that seek to provide a common operational framework for action in order to prevent and eradicate terrorism in the region. |
| AU            | 2001             | 55             | - The promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent (Article 3.f) is the organization’s core objective.  
- Has developed a sophisticated African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) that rests on the Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the African Peace Fund and the African Standby Force.  
- APSA takes an integrated approach to conflict management. AU can undertake diplomatic measures aimed prevention, deploy peacekeeping/peace-enforcement missions and participate in post-conflict reconstruction by promoting human rights and good governance. |                                                                                  | - Adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which requires member states to criminalize terrorist acts in conformity with their national law.  
- Appointed an AU Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, and has created the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism to manage information and capacity-building activities. |
<p>| IAEA          | 1957             | 171            |                                                                                  |                                                                                  | - Mitigates the threat of proliferation through safeguard agreements, which                                                        |</p>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of creation</th>
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<td>consist of country declarations, monitoring and evaluation reports, and on-site inspections.</td>
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<td>- Can undertake diplomatic measures against disobedient states that violate their non-proliferation obligations and refer their case to the UNSC.</td>
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<td>- Provides a forum where states meet, discuss and decide how to reach the Treaty’s objective of prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons.</td>
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<td>- Has succeeded in dismantling most of the declared stockpiles of chemical weapons, but complete disarmament has not been achieved yet.</td>
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<td>- Shifting focus on non-proliferation of chemical weapons and cooperation for the promotion of the peaceful use of toxic chemicals.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Prevents the establishment of clandestine chemical weapons programs thanks to its verification mechanisms and its collaboration with a network of National Authorities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCW</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>193</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Adopted the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Coordinates anti-terror exercises, called “Peace Missions” and joint military operations to improve confidence between its members and tactical readiness to take on potential threats.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Works to restrain terrorist access to financial resources by dismantling regional drug trafficking networks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Year of creation</td>
<td>No. of members</td>
<td>Use of force</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Created a counter-terrorism office focusing on information-sharing and intelligence cooperation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ own compilation from the section above
3.3 Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs)

In this section, we identify and describe the informal IGOs (or IIGOs) involved in the governance of the three main security threats under study in this paper (use of force, WMD proliferation, and terrorism). Before doing so, we briefly delve into the definitional debates on IIGOs in order to clarify our understanding of IIGOs. We then present a descriptive table containing all IIGOs working on the three threats before offering a set of conclusions on IIGOs’ roles and evolution in the global governance of the three threats.

3.3.1 Introduction

Before we can map informal intergovernmental organizations that deal with security, we need to understand what unifies them as a group. Given that informal arrangements can take a wide variety of forms and that they can differ importantly in terms of membership, institutionalization and scope, identifying them can be very challenging. This difficulty is reflected in the definitional choices and debates among scholars.

Felicity Vabulas and Duncan Snidal, for instance, define informal IGOs as having (1) an explicitly shared expectation about purpose – rather than a formalized agreement; and (2) explicitly associated state “members” who (3) participate in regular meetings but have no independent secretariat or other significant institutionalization such as a headquarters and/or permanent staff (Vabulas & Snidal, 2013, p. 197). This is a strict definition inasmuch as it tries to draw a sharp line between formal and informal organizations.

Building on this definition, Charles Roger has taken a more inclusive approach. Unlike Vabulas and Snidal who only contemplate IIGOs that engage top officials at the cabinet level and bodies that deal with “big” issues, he includes all IIGOs created by state-based actors without making judgements about the issues they focus on (Roger, 2020, p. 37). Moreover, while Vabulas and Snidal (2013) require the absence of an independent secretariat in order to characterize an IGO as informal, Roger argues that the existence of a small secretariat does not necessarily preclude the classification of a body as informal (Roger, 2020, pp.36-39).

Tom Sauer goes a step further and posits that literature about informal organizations should go beyond long-standing informal arrangements (e.g. intra-international organizations coalitions like G77 and Eurogroup, and more autonomous coalitions like G7/G8, G20), to include ad hoc informal organizations such as “international contact groups” (Sauer, 2019, pp. 940–942). In this section, we have followed Charles Roger’s definition of IIGOs and added international contact groups based on Tom Sauer’s conceptualization, given the importance of international contact groups in the global governance of the use of force.

---

68 According to Tom Sauer, international contact groups are ad hoc informal international organizations that are sometimes established for resolving a specific temporary conflict.

69 International contact groups are normally composed of states and are established when the Security Council is unable or unwilling to act. The Quartet is a special case: the UN is actually one of its four members.
Below, we present a table containing – to the best of our knowledge – a comprehensive list of IIGOs whose objectives are to govern the use of force, terrorism and WMD non-proliferation. For each organization, we provide information on the date of their creation, their membership and main functions. The selection process was as follows: first, we extracted, from Charles Roger’s (Roger, 2020) IIGO dataset, those working on security. We then further distilled that list to identify only those working on the use of force, WMD/nuclear proliferation, and counter-terrorism. Second, given their outsized relevance for the use of force (Sauer, 2019), we added international contact groups from four academic sources (Prantl, 2006; Qerimi, 2007; Roger, 2020; Sauer, 2019). Third, we added further IIGOs working on the three threats by triangulating across academic sources, including those identified by Harvard’s PILAC program (Lewis, 2015). Finally, we excluded from our analysis those IIGOs that had ceased to exist through ‘absorption’70 (because their functions were taken over by other formal IGOs or agencies – e.g. the TREVI group, whose functions were transferred to Europol). In the case of international contact groups, in contrast, we have included groups that are currently inactive: their inherent temporary nature as ad hoc arrangements for particular crises means they automatically become inactive at some stage; yet for the sake of this study, we have included them to showcase their importance in managing the use of force.

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70 For a fuller description of this mechanism, see (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2018).
### 3.3.2 IIGOs governing the use of force, WMD proliferation, and terrorism

#### Table 4: IIGOs governing the use of force, WMD proliferation and terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area of specialization</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Use of force, non-proliferation and terrorism. (Prevention of the propagation of WMD launch systems).</td>
<td>Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, US.</td>
<td>The MTCR coordinates the export control systems for missile technology and WMD launch vectors; it adopts guidelines and control lists for missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of carrying nuclear, chemical or biological weapons; it exchanges information and restricts certain export authorizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Wassenaar Arrangement</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Use of force, non-proliferation and terrorism.</td>
<td>42 states (all members of the EU - except Cyprus- and Argentina, Australia, Canada, India, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, US.</td>
<td>Promotes transparency and accountability in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies through information exchange among participants, homogenization of export conditions, updating of control lists for transfers and sharing of knowledge on possible destabilizing accumulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of Three + UNSG</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Conflict resolution Namibia</td>
<td>Argentina, Somalia, Yugoslavia</td>
<td>The Group of Three and the UN Secretary General formed an informal group, mandated by the UNSC to discuss with South African authorities the question of Namibian independence. Essentially, this was an escape strategy meant to accommodate the pressure of African states, without forcing the Western P5 to get involved in the conflict and potentially harm their economic interests in South Africa. The Group of Three was supposed to set the parameters for the negotiation and support the SG who was entrusted with the task of initiating the talks. Eventually, the reluctance of France and UK to support an assertive policy line of the SG vis-à-vis South Africa greatly diminished the role of the group and stalled any real progress.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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71 Colour code: red is use of force, yellow is WMD proliferation, blue is counterterrorism, green is a combination of the two previous, no colour are organizations that cover all 3 threats.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area of specialization</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Contact Group</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td></td>
<td>US, UK, France, Germany, Canada</td>
<td>The Western Contact Group was created in 1977 without an explicit mandate of the UNSC and negotiated a settlement proposal outside the UN framework, though within the objectives of the UN. The key players that comprised the group had significant leverage and WCG proposed a settlement proposal that was accepted by the UNSC and eventually led to Namibia’s independence in 1990.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contadora Group</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Conflict resolution in Central America</td>
<td>Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela</td>
<td>Contadora was an international contact group of Latin American states which came together to end armed conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. Acting as a mediator in these conflicts, the group agreed on a set of objectives that would provide a framework for a negotiated settlement. These objectives included the promotion of democracy, national reconciliation, termination of support for cross-border activities of paramilitary forces, regional arms control, and the reduction of foreign military support to the region. Eventually, the envisioned peace plan was not adopted due to American opposition, but the Contadora’s efforts set the bases for the subsequent Esquipulas Peace Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact Group on Kosovo</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Conflict resolution Kosovo</td>
<td>France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Russia and the United States</td>
<td>The Contact Group functioned between 1997 and 1999 and it the aim was to resolve diplomatically the crisis in Kosovo by pushing for an Interim Agreement for peace and self-government in Kosovo. These efforts failed and once NATO used force without explicit UNSC approval, the informal group became irrelevant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia</td>
<td>After NATO’s military intervention, the G8 was activated. While the informal group provided a flexible high-level forum for the political management of the conflict and diminished Russia’s sense of isolation, it could not deliver a high degree of legitimacy. As a result, it had to seek UNSC’s post hoc legitimation that could lend greater authority to its efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Quint</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States</td>
<td>The Quint was constituted as a device for information exchange and coordination between the United States and its key European allies. Its primary purpose was to maintain the coherence within the NATO Alliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Area of specialization</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Functions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troika</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU, US, Russia</td>
<td>The Troika consisted of Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari as EU envoy, Russian Special Envoy Victor Chernomyrdin, and US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and provided a platform for the presentation of a joint position of the Western Alliance and Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Quartet</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Israeli-Palestinian peace process</td>
<td>United Nations, United States, European Union, Russia</td>
<td>The Quartet was established after the outbreak of the Second Intifada as a multilateral framework for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its original mission of the group was to speak as one authoritative voice and become a vehicle for mediating between the warring parties. However, it has failed to achieve this goal and has been severely criticized for its ineffectiveness, for being a US dominated mechanism and for its one-sided focus on managing only the affairs of the Palestinian side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy</td>
<td>Australia, Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, The Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam</td>
<td>Ministerial meetings; Information exchanges on four different fields: (1) Development of radiation uses - industrial, environmental and healthcare; (2) Research Reactor Utilization Development, (3) Nuclear Safety Strengthening, and (4) Nuclear Infrastructure Strengthening.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Party talks on NK</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Nuclear disarmament (in DPRK)</td>
<td>China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States</td>
<td>Adopting joint statements on agreed steps toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; commitments on shutting down nuclear program in exchange for energy aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5+1/EU3+3 Talks on Iran</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran</td>
<td>China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States (P5), Germany and EU</td>
<td>Varying and volatile accomplishments regarding compromises between Iran (committed not to proliferate nuclear weapons) and the P5+1/EU3+3 (committed to facilitating Iran's peaceful nuclear cooperation and lifting sanctions). This volatile negotiation process resulted in a new round in 2013 that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This plan placed important limits on Iran's nuclear energy program to prevent it from proliferation nuclear weapons and greatly strengthened Iran's safeguards arrangements with the IAEA and its inspectors. The US's subsequent withdrawal from the deal has led the other participants to consider their position on the continuation of the agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Area of specialization</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Functions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Nuclear terrorism</td>
<td>89 member states (from all 5 continents) and 6 FIGOs (EU, IAEA, Interpol, UNICRI, UNOCT, UNODC)</td>
<td>Strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. Over 100 multilateral activities, awareness-raising, education and information-sharing, dialogue encouragement and adoption of best practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zangger Committee (aka Nuclear Exporters Committee)</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism.</td>
<td>39 member states (all of them parties in the NPT).</td>
<td>Harmonization of the export conditions for nuclear-related materials through the adoption of common guidelines and control lists. Exchange of information regarding granted or denied transfer authorizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism.</td>
<td>48 &quot;participating governments&quot;: 28 EU Members, Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, China, Iceland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Rep. of Korea, Russia, Serbia, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and US.</td>
<td>Coordination of export control conditions regarding nuclear dual-use materials to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Adoption of guidelines and control lists. Exchange of information regarding granted or denied transfer authorizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia Group</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Non-proliferation of WMD (chemical and biological weapons) and WMD terrorism.</td>
<td>43 states (all of them parties in the BTWC and CWC) and the EU as an observer.</td>
<td>Harmonization of the export conditions for biological and chemical materials through the adoption of common guidelines and control lists. Exchange of information regarding granted or denied transfer authorizations.</td>
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<td>Title</td>
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<tr>
<td>G7 - Financial Action Task Force (FATF)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Standard-setting against money laundering, terrorist financing and financing of WMD proliferation</td>
<td>37 states and 2 regional organizations</td>
<td>The FATF has developed 40 Recommendations on money laundering and 9 Recommendations on Terrorism Financing, which are recognized as the global standards for combating these crimes. Also, it promotes the implementation of all necessary measures and monitors the progress of its members in adopting and implementing its 40+9 Recommendations. While FATF itself has limited enforcement powers, international financial markets back FATF Recommendations by raising the risk premium on the sovereign debt of countries that are listed as noncompliant by the IIGO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8 - Global Partnership vs. spread of WMD</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Non-proliferation of WMD and WMD terrorism</td>
<td>30 active members (including the G7 states) and the EU (List <a href="http://www.gpwmd.com/partners">www.gpwmd.com/partners</a>)</td>
<td>Two annual meetings; implementation of activities in the realm of nuclear and radiological security, sharing information on the mitigation of biological threats, destruction of chemical weapons, support the universalization efforts for the implementation of multilateral WMD international treaties and UNSC 1540 Resolution; develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection; provide assistance to states lacking the legal and regulatory framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation Security Initiative</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Non-proliferation of WMD and WMD terrorism</td>
<td>107 &quot;endorsing states&quot; (List: <a href="http://www.psi-online.info/psi-info-en/botschaft/-/2205942">www.psi-online.info/psi-info-en/botschaft/-/2205942</a>)</td>
<td>Increased drawing of attention to the lack of WMD shipment capabilities, laws and political will; establishment of contacts, routines and national response plans for interdiction requests among participants; regular meetings to exchange information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC (Counter-Terrorism Task Force)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism cooperation / WMD non-proliferation</td>
<td>United States, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, The Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Republic of Korea, Chinese Taipei, Thailand and Viet Nam</td>
<td>APEC requires member states to provide written reports (known as counter-terrorism actions plans) to the Counter-Terrorism Task Force, outlining the counter-terrorism measures that they have undertaken, including in the area of WMD proliferation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megatonne</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism cooperation</td>
<td>France and unspecified other states</td>
<td>Information and communication network which shares intelligence on activities of radical Islamic terrorists in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Club of Berne (Counter-Terrorism Group)</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism and transnational organized crime</td>
<td>EU member states, Norway, Switzerland</td>
<td>Adequate exchange of information to ensure up-to-date knowledge about terrorism and espionage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilowatt Group</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism cooperation</td>
<td>Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States</td>
<td>Data banks on terrorist organizations, operatives, methods and links. The Group facilitates intelligence sharing on a nonreciprocal basis and enhances the counter-terrorism capabilities of both the participating countries and the group as a whole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna Group</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism cooperation</td>
<td>Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland</td>
<td>Facilitates collaboration among the Ministries of Interior and secret services. Sensitive information exchange, production of counter-terrorism brief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
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<td>Area of specialization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police Working Group on Terrorism</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism / extremism / transnational crime</td>
<td>EU member states, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland</td>
<td>Helps to prevent political violent activities. Gathers and exchanges criminal intelligence and information, and cooperates with other agencies like Europol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egmont Group</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Anti-money laundering and terrorist financing</td>
<td>The Financial Intelligence Units of 164 countries</td>
<td>Sharing of financial intelligence, improving the expertise and capabilities of personnel engaged in financial intelligence, and fostering improved communications among national financial intelligence units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum Regional Security Committee of the Pacific Islands Forum</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism cooperation / capacity building</td>
<td>Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu</td>
<td>The Forum Regional Security Committee promotes cooperation in order to address security concerns that threaten the safety, stability and economic development of the region. To combat terrorism, it encourages the coordination of regional law and identifies key priority areas to boost the capacities of its members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salzburg Forum</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Regional cooperation in many fields including terrorism</td>
<td>Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia</td>
<td>The Salzburg Forum seeks to strengthen regional coordination in Central Europe, in the fields of border management, legal and illegal migration, traffic policing, witness protection, police education and training, crisis management, travel documents, major events, DNA data exchange, and terrorism prevention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlas Network</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism police cooperation</td>
<td>EU28</td>
<td>Improves cooperation among the police units of the member states, enhances skills by training and facilitates exchange of best practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyon/Roma Group</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Transnational crime / Counter-terrorism</td>
<td>G8 members</td>
<td>Information exchange on terrorism and crime, compilation of best practices, regular meetings three times a year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
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<td>Area of specialization</td>
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<tr>
<td>G8 - Counterterrorism Action Group</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism / capacity-building and coordination</td>
<td>Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK, US, Australia, Switzerland, Spain and the European Commission</td>
<td>The Counterterrorism Action Group provides assistance for capacity-building and coordination activities in order to reduce duplication of effort. The Counterterrorism Action Group's initial goal was to offer the Counter-Terrorism Committee a forum in which to share information regarding priority assistance needs related to the implementation of Resolution 1373.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G6 group</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism / organized crime</td>
<td>France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom</td>
<td>Working to conclude a series of bilateral agreements, which should eventually form the basis of future EU-wide laws and measures. Creation of a common database of individuals suspected of connections to terrorist organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia Summit</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism cooperation / counter-terrorist financing</td>
<td>Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, US, and Russia</td>
<td>The EAS provides a forum for dialogue and cooperation on key challenges that concern East Asia. It promotes counter-terrorism cooperation, it seeks to suppress the financing and facilitation of foreign terrorist fighters and favours a more comprehensive response to terrorism by identifying the factors that support terrorism and radicalization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism cooperation / capacity building</td>
<td>Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia</td>
<td>The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership focuses on training and equipping security forces to combat terrorist threats more effectively. Also, it targets groups in isolated or neglected regions who are most vulnerable to extremist ideologies by supporting youth employment, strengthening local governance capacity to provide development infrastructure, and improving health and educational services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism cooperation / capacity building</td>
<td>Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and the United States</td>
<td>Strengthens the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement and civilian actors across East Africa by using military and development resources. Also, the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism helps enhance border security, counter the financing of terrorist activities and prevent radicalization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
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<tr>
<td>Galle Dialogue</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Maritime-related terrorism</td>
<td>Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, UK, US and Vietnam.</td>
<td>Annual multilateral discussions hosted by Sri Lanka to address regional security issues in South Asia, including maritime-related terrorism and the trafficking of narcotics, weapons, and people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Counterterrorism Forum</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism / capacity-building</td>
<td>Algeria, Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, EU, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, UAE, UK, US</td>
<td>Supports the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy by taking a strategic, long-term approach to counter terrorism and violent extremist ideologies. The Global Counterterrorism Forum develops Good Practices and tools for policymakers and practitioners to strengthen CT civilian capabilities, national strategies, action plans and training modules. Also, it provides a forum for national CT officials and practitioners to meet and share experiences, expertise, strategies, tools, capacity needs, and capacity-building programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf of Aden Regional Counterterrorism Forum</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism cooperation / capacity building</td>
<td>Somalia, Yemen, Djibouti</td>
<td>Build the capacity of Somalia, Yemen and Djibouti to counter al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula by linking law enforcement, justice, and security officials in those countries. The Forum identifies steps for further counter-terrorism efforts and promotes lasting dialogue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU 9 Group / Group 13+</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism: Foreign fighters</td>
<td>Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Great Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Spain + Austria, Poland and Italy, as well as the EU member state holding the Presidency</td>
<td>Informal exchange on the current threat situation and on measures to improve the collective capacity to combat international terrorism at European level.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Area of specialization</td>
<td>Members</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter ISIL's Finance Group (within the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL)</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism cooperation</td>
<td>52 members and observers</td>
<td>Enhances coordination among international partners on efforts to (1) prevent ISIL's use of the international financial system (2) counter ISIL’s extortion and exploitation of economic assets and resources; (3) deny ISIL funding from abroad, including from external donors, foreign terrorist fighters, and kidnapping for ransom; and (4) prevent ISIL from providing financial or material support to foreign affiliates in an effort to expand its global ambitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris Group</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism cooperation</td>
<td>Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Great Britain, Norway and Sweden</td>
<td>Brings together the national intelligence coordinators of 15 states and external intelligence agencies / All information about the Paris Group is classified as top secret.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We offer here a few words on the G7/G8, one of the most well-known IIGOs. In a recent and highly noteworthy recent development, the group went as far as to suspend Russia’s membership in 2014 due to the annexation of Crimea, thus showing how membership in an IIGO can be used as a tool of coercive diplomacy. But besides this exceptional step, the G7/G8 in its varying formations has repeatedly lent verbal support to its members’ use of economic sanctions (Iran 1980, Afghanistan 1980, Sudan 2004, North Korea 2006, Syria 2011) and military force (Iraq 1990, East Timor 1999, Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Libya 2011, Mali 2013, ISIS 2014). The organization’s approval of such interventionist measures has created vivid debates about the Group’s role in conflict prevention and conflict resolution. John Kirton and Julia Kulik have identified four lines of thinking. The first only acknowledges the Group’s role in Kosovo but generally views this forum as an illegitimate substitute for the UNSC in governing peace and security, as it lacks the UN’s “unrivalled legalized authority and multilateral legitimacy”. The second argues that the G7/G8 is a global security director with the capacity to mobilize other security actors, but that it is not and should not try to assume the role of conflict manager/preventer. The third line of thinking regards the G7/G8 as a potentially positive alternative to the UNSC when the latter is unable or unwilling to act. The fourth views the Group as an effective global governor that can and should substitute the failed UN-centred system (Kirton & Kulik, 2014, pp. 90–91).

3.3.3 Conclusions

From this brief presentation of IIGOs that actively participate in the global governance of the use of force, WMD proliferation and terrorism, we can distil some conclusions. First, the IIGOs tend to be very specialized, often focusing on a single issue or even on a single aspect of an issue. What is more, they are likely to have a limited geographical scope and, in most cases, a reasonably small membership. These characteristics allow for minimal bureaucracy and transaction costs, flexibility and prompt responses to issues of interest. On the flipside, they may help powerful states preserve their power advantages.

Second, considering the moment of their creation, we note that international contact groups are not a recent conception. They have been around for decades, created on an ad hoc basis to complement the UN Security Council and fill the operational and participatory gaps that can prevent the body from responding effectively in crisis situations. Conversely, informal IGOs that deal with terrorism were mostly set up after 9/11. Notably, any relevant terrorism-related IIGOs which were created before 2001 originally focused on anti-money laundering and intelligence sharing and expanded their scope to include counter-terrorism only after the 9/11 attacks. Finally, when it comes to IIGOs involved in non-proliferation efforts, we see that some of them were created during the 1970s and 1980s, attesting to the fact that the non-proliferation regime is mature and consolidated. Interestingly, we can see that most non-proliferation informal arrangements created after 2001 have a strong counter-terrorist component.

This second set of findings speaks to a general development in global governance: even though FIGOs continue to play a dominant role in global governance, informal bodies have become a major feature of the global system. From 1945 to 1975, the rate at which states created IIGOs (of all types – that is, addressing all types of governance issues, not just
international peace and security) was very slow, at one or two per year, but by mid-1980s, that pace doubled and their proliferation further accelerated between the 1990s and early 2000s. Strikingly, between 1975 and 2005, the cumulative number of IIGOs increased fivefold, while the rate at which FIGOs were created appeared to drop (Roger, 2020, p. 57).

In the case of international peace and security specifically, the number of IIGOs working on the threats studied in this section has also grown faster than that of FIGOs over the past decades. The literature suggests a set of reasons for this development. To begin with, IIGOs are easier to set up and they “place fewer domestic demands on governments in terms of ratification, monitoring, and resource requirements” (Roger, 2020, p. 51). Conversely, the establishment of FIGOs can be a demanding and cumbersome process domestically, raising political, legal and budgetary hurdles (Roger, 2020, p 10). Thanks to their minimal bureaucracy, informal arrangements lower the transactions costs for making deals (Stone, 2013, p. 123) and they can adjust easily to new situations, actors and demands (Bureš, 2012, p. 507). Moreover, the resulting flexibility allows informal organizations to provide quicker responses and effective management during high uncertainty (Sauer, 2019, p. 3). Last but not least, informal arrangements are able to maintain closer control of information and accumulate trust between their members (Bureš, 2012, p. 506; Vabulas & Snidal, 2013, p. 210).

Naturally, some of these advantages can also be seen as disadvantages. For example, the increased autonomy and independence from national governments allows informal arrangements to evade effective parliamentary scrutiny or other mechanisms of accountability (Bureš, 2012, p. 509). Moreover, the closer control of information may lead to excessive secrecy and lack of transparency, which can decrease the legitimacy of IIGOs. Some authors have suggested that the proliferation of informal bodies may “distract us from more serious solutions to global issues” and undermine the effectiveness of global governance (Roger, 2020, p 20). Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, powerful states may favor institutions with higher levels of informality to preserve their power advantage and free themselves from strict procedural constraints for information-sharing, agenda-setting, proposal-making and decision-making that distribute power more widely among all participating members (Westerwinter, 2017, p. 19).

A third finding from the summary of security-related IIGOs is that in terms of membership, it is eye-catching that some of the permanent members of the UNSC are active in almost all international contact groups, non-proliferation talks and delicate negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Equally noteworthy, though hardly surprising, is that EU members participate in several intelligence-sharing organizations aimed at combating terrorism, and that the US has been supporting most of the counter-terrorism arrangements from Sahara to the Asia-Pacific region.

Fourth, this overview of the main functions and contributions of IIGOs reveals that they are mostly active in conflict resolution, capacity-building, intelligence/information-sharing, harmonization of practices and coordination in order to eliminate duplication of efforts. Some additional functions include seeking to strengthen the implementation of UNSC resolutions, strategies and export controls and acting as fora where practitioners and public officials can share their experiences, knowledge and best practices.
Another interesting phenomenon is the fact that the soft-law guidelines, regulations and recommendations produced by IIGOs are sometimes adopted by states and FIGOs, making them legally binding. For example, we have seen that soft-law regulations on trade in nuclear goods have become EU law (through the EU’s dual-use Regulation) and are now binding for EU members, and FATF Recommendations have become the gold standard in anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing across the globe.

All in all, the contributions of IIGOs in conflict management are not as consistent as in other fields, but they can have a high impact. In the field of non-proliferation, IIGOs have a dual role to play: on the one hand, they seek to manage political crises related to WMDs; on the other, they bring together dual-use technology supplier states to harmonize their export control practices. Lastly, IIGOs that deal with counter-terrorism have proliferated precipitously over the past two decades and have gained great importance in combating terrorist finance and in intelligence-sharing efforts.

3.4 International Courts and Tribunals

International courts and tribunals also play an important role in international peace and security. In this section, we will analyse the roles of select courts and tribunals in the global governance of the use of force, counter-terrorism and WMD proliferation, providing a nuanced view on their contributions.

International courts and tribunals can play a role in promoting international peace and security in two main ways: by helping to shape states’ behaviour by refining, reinforcing or contesting certain international norms (e.g. International Court of Justice) or by acting as a deterrent (e.g. International Criminal Court) (J. A. Green, 2009, p. 174; Kingsbury, 2012, p. 15; Simmons & Danner, 2010, p. 234). As is well known, the lack enforcement of international law has long been regarded as “the weak link in the international legal system (...)” (Henkin, 1995, p. 41). Yet there is room for other ways of exercising power which are “less decisive and incisive” than coercive law enforcement (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p. 4; von Bogdandy & Venzke, 2012, p. 18). Exercising authority is not limited to the enforcement of decisions, but to the ability to influence the behaviour of others. Indeed, the long-standing idea that the lack of coercive enforcement reduces the effectiveness of international courts has been contested by scholars like von Bogdandy, who posits that authority should be understood as “the legal capacity to determine others and to influence their freedom” (von Bogdandy, Dann, & Goldmann, 2008, p. 1381). Therefore, it can be argued that the relevance of international courts and tribunals in global security governance architecture cannot be disregarded insofar as they continue to condition the parties to the dispute, as well as other subjects of the legal system. Oftentimes, they may be coercively irrelevant, yet normatively important.

Although FATF Recommendations are not legally binding, they enjoy a high degree of global compliance. That happens mostly because the political, economic and reputational costs for noncompliance are a lot higher than restricting the financing of terrorism.
3.4.1 The International Court of Justice (ICJ)

The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN (Article 92, UN Charter), acting as an impartial body for contentious cases (that is, it settles legal disputes between states in accordance with international law), and providing advisory opinions on legal questions asked by the General Assembly or the Security Council (Thirlway, 2016, pp. 133–142). It is composed of fifteen judges who serve nine-year terms and are elected jointly by the UNGA and the UNSC. Their decisions are taken by majority vote, utilizing as a basis the sources of law established in Article 38 of the Court’s Statute and always including the reasons upon which they base their decisions, and also their dissents (Kolb, 2013, pp. 1011–1018).

The jurisdiction of the ICJ has always been a troubling issue, in its relation to questions of efficiency and legitimacy. The jurisdiction of the ICJ is non-compulsory, which means that all states parties to a dispute must agree to submit a case to the court. However, while it is not possible to force a party to appear before the court, if a state has agreed to ICJ jurisdiction, it will be legally bound to follow its decisions (Karns & Mingst, 2010, p. 123). Article 36.2 of the ICJ’s Statute (which is part of the UN Charter) allows states to declare whether they recognize the Court’s jurisdiction as compulsory in all legal disputes, or whether they do so only in those disputes for which other states have also accepted compulsory jurisdiction. This is known as the “optional clause” (Murphy, 2008, p. 65) and it has two main limitations: first, the principle of reciprocity requires that jurisdiction be accepted only “in relation to any other Member or State accepting the same obligations” (United Nations, 1946, Article 36.2). In other words, a state will not be bound beyond the scope of its consent or that of the opposing state. Second, reservations that limit the scope of the obligation can be attached to any of states’ declarations, which even allows a state to invoke, on its own behalf, the reservations made by an opposing state (Kelly, 1987, p. 347). In other words, this makes the Court’s coercive power rather limited from an enforcement point of view.

The classic 1984 Nicaragua contentious case put this clause to the test, after the US disputed the ICJ’s jurisdiction on the grounds that the Nicaragua had not accepted its compulsory jurisdiction. The ICJ’s ultimate ruling against the US caused the Reagan Administration to terminate US acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction in the fall of 1985 (McGarry, 2017, pp. 179-211). Essentially, the US reflected the unwillingness of states to be legally judged on what they consider to be political matters. As Kelly argues, states avoid limits to their sovereignty and legal defeats simply by either not submitting to the ICJ’s jurisdiction or by declining to appear before it (Kelly, 1987, p. 344). This is one of the main limitations the ICJ has to face: states are unwilling to limit their sovereignty through participation in international adjudication because, for many, “resistance to ‘enforcement’ is the last bastion of ‘sovereignty’” (Henkin, 1995, p. 41).

Some might argue that if a dispute involves politically contentious aspects, it will be beyond the scope of legal rules and thus, of the ICJ. However, it can also be argued that the Court has demonstrated skill in political movements (J. A. Green, 2009, p. 192), as reflected in its famous

advisory opinion on the use of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{74} In concluding that the use of \textit{nuclear weapons} in general is illegal but that it may be legal under certain extreme conditions (i.e. the very survival of the state being at stake), the Court not only offered strong language to be used by the anti-nuclear movement, but allowed the nuclear powers to continue to maintain their \textit{status quo} (Murphy, 2008, p. 34). Moreover, that case offered the Court the uncommon opportunity to set forth its views on important matters related to our GPG and, more specifically, to prohibit certain behaviour related to the use of weapons of mass destruction (Tams & Sloan, 2013, p. 273).

A final challenge for the ICJ is the integration of non-state actors (NSAs) into the state-centricity of international law. In spite of the growing importance of NSAs in the international arena, the Court has not yet been able to efficiently approach any legal issues bearing upon the rights and obligations of non-state-actors (F. Green, 2008, p. 49).

\subsection*{3.4.2 The \textit{ad hoc} tribunals on war crimes and the International Criminal Court (ICC)}

The UNSC has, in recent decades, set up several \textit{ad hoc} war criminal courts to prosecute \textit{war crimes} committed in particular conflicts (Karns & Mingst, 2010, p. 538). Before this, war crimes had not been judged by an \textit{ad hoc} tribunal since Nuremberg and Tokyo. Indeed, when the UNSC adopted Resolution 827 to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, it was feared that the tribunal could lack the needed independence from that political organ (D'Amato, 1994, pp. 500–501). A similar process was nonetheless followed with the Rwanda Tribunal, which was established by UNSC Resolution 977 in 1994 and closed at the end of 2015 after having judged several international humanitarian law violations committed by Rwandan citizens.\textsuperscript{75} These tribunals (which were established as subsidiary organs of the UNSC) issued binding judgments, some of which were criticized for questions related to their independence (Koskenniemi, 1995, p. 326). In any case, these war crime tribunals, whose format has been replicated several times since,\textsuperscript{76} are considered the predecessors of the International Criminal Court (Felter, 2019, p. 1).

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a self-standing international organization established as a permanent, general court to exercise criminal jurisdiction over persons for crimes of international concern such as genocide, war crimes, the crime of aggression and crimes against humanity (Schermers & Blokker, 2018, p. 462). Its statute, which has been in force since July 2002 and is also referred to as the Rome Statute, recognizes in its preamble that "such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world". Hence, the mandate of the ICC is "to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes" (United Nations General Assembly, 1998). The

\textsuperscript{74} Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 ICJ 8 July
\textsuperscript{75} The UNSC decided to establish the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals with 2 branches: one for the Yugoslav Tribunal and one for the Rwanda tribunal in 2010. This mechanism is still operative for both tribunals (prosecuting remaining fugitives, conducting appeal proceedings for the last few cases of these tribunals, supervising enforcement of sentences…).
\textsuperscript{76} In this line, other \textit{ad hoc} international criminal tribunals were established: the Special Court for Sierra Leone; the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia; and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
functions of the ICC are carried out by its four organs: the Presidency, the Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry. A total of 18 judges (including the three that make up the Presidency) occupy their posts for a maximum of two three-year terms. Unlike that of the ICJ, the Rome Statute does not allow states parties to make reservations to its provisions (Article 120) in such a way that adherence is an all-or-nothing choice.

Since the ICC became operative in 2003, it has been claimed that its achievements have been scarce, having tried and convicted few individuals (Jo, Radtke, & Simmons, 2018, p. 193)\(^77\) and having set the focus particularly and almost exclusively on the African continent (Werle, Fernandez, & Vormbaum, 2014). However, the main accomplishment of the Court has been to act as deterrent. Accession to the ICC greatly increases the chances for political and military leaders of member states to be judged in the future. Therefore, accepting the possibility of being prosecuted by an independent international institution acts as an inherent promise by governments to refrain from heinous military actions which, among other harmful consequences, could threaten the GPG under study (Simmons & Danner, 2010, p. 234). Considering the noteworthy number of states party to the Rome Statute (122, albeit well-known absences),\(^78\) it is safe to say that the ICC has contributed to a wider culture that rejects impunity for violations of international criminal law. Nevertheless, the Court still faces many hurdles in carrying out its mandate. Obstacles in the investigation process, tense and conflictive situations in the places where the instruction takes place, or uncooperative governments are only some of the challenges the ICC has to overcome (Fry, 2013, p. 223).

### 3.4.3 Specialized and regional courts and tribunals

Specialization in litigation types has led to the emergence of new courts to resolve specific controversies, but regional FIGOs have also played an important role in the multiplication of judicial bodies. Along with their accompanying judicial mechanisms, these bodies have played an important part in the establishment of a new level of governance. Most regional courts are the result of a regional integration process (Chazournes, 2017, p. 30), and are thus generally restricted to a particular region (e.g. the African Court of Justice, ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, Court of Justice of the Andean Community, and the European Court of Justice). Furthermore, when both trends – specialization and regionalism – combine, tribunals like the European Nuclear Energy Tribunal or the European Free Trade Association Court emerge. In the field of our GPG, the most relevant regional courts and tribunals are those responsible for the protection of human rights in their respective regions: the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Human and People's Rights (Kuyper & Squatrito, 2017, pp. 175–176). Interestingly, thanks to Article 28G of the Malabo Protocol, the latter is set to become the first permanent international court to have

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\(^77\) Until 2019 there have been 27 before the ICC, seven of which resulted in acquittals or no charges, and four of which resulted in reparations or imprisonment (Felter, 2019).

\(^78\) Among the signatory states that have not ratified the Statute we find, among others, the US, Russia, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, etc. Among the non-state parties which did not sign the Statute either we find India, Indonesia, China, Pakistan, Libya, Turkey, Ethiopia or Saudi Arabia, to name a few. Last consulted in October 2019: https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx
jurisdiction over the crime of terrorism (Saul, 2019, p. 409). In any case, as long as these tribunals may be called upon to address certain threats related to our GPG, they should be acknowledged as contributors to international peace and security.

3.4.4 Conclusions

The discussion above leads to some interesting conclusions. First, courts and tribunals have the capacity to influence state behaviour indirectly, by refining, promoting and contesting international norms. Second, the threat of being prosecuted by the ICC may deter individuals from committing mass atrocities (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression). Third, the delivery of justice against perpetrators of heinous crimes may contribute to the process of reconciliation in societies recovering from conflict. Fourth, ICJ’s advisory opinions can mobilize advocacy groups and give renewed impetus to their campaigns, as we will also see below in more detail. However, international courts also face important limitations. On the one hand, their jurisdiction is limited (non-compulsory for ICJ, and complementary in the case of ICC); on the other, their enforcement capacities are limited or inexistent because states are unwilling to give courts broad competences that may limit their sovereignty.

3.5 Non-state actors (NSAs)

Unlike FIGOs and IIGOs, which are composed by states and endowed with policy and decision-making capacities, non-state actors (NSAs) – be they for-profit companies or non-profit organizations – “never get to vote on international decisions” (Oudraat & Haufler, 2008, p. 25). Yet their role in global security governance is neither redundant nor trivial. The expansion of the global security agenda after the end of the Cold War and the forces of globalization have led to the rise and proliferation of countless new actors capable of “challenging the ‘monopoly’ of the nation-state in the legitimate provision of security” (Krahmann, 2005a, p. 7). The outsourcing of inherently governmental security functions to private military and security companies (PMSCs), the increasing agenda-setting and monitoring capacities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the influential voice of epistemic communities and the involvement of multinational corporations (MNCs) in certain aspects of conflict management show that “a shift from government to governance in security” is well underway (Krahmann, 2005a, p. 10).

In the following, we will outline the contributions of various types of non-state actors to international peace and security. Commencing with non-profit actors, we study NGOs, epistemic communities and social movements, as well as configurations of these actors. The for-profit actors included are private military and security companies, as well as multinational corporations. Given the vast numbers of non-state actors that are active in this field, the mapping in this section is not exhaustive. Instead, for each category of NSAs, we provide examples of their roles in the global governance of international peace and security based on their contributions to the mitigation of the group 1 threats.
3.5.1 Non-profit NSAs

3.5.1.1 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

In contrast to other non-state actors that have proliferated and become contributors to global security governance during recent decades, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were active and influential even before the creation of the postwar international order. So much so, that the UN Charter explicitly made room for NGOs in UN debates under Article 71. Today, they enjoy official consultative status only with the Department of Public Information and with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), but in practice, some influential NGOs also meet and discuss security issues with UNSC diplomats, mostly in informal briefings under the Arria formula (Paul, 2004; T. G. Weiss, Carayannis, & Jolly, 2009, p. 127).

To be sure, until the early 1990s, the role of NGOs in international peace and security was limited. During the Cold War, governments considered security issues to be their unique remit and the two blocks systematically attacked the legitimacy of NGOs backed by the opposing side (Paul, 2004; Willetts, 2011, p. 14). However, the end of the strategic competition between the US and the Soviet Union created a more permissive environment, in which NGOs could become more involved in peace and security issues (Oudraat & Haufler, 2008, p. 13). Today, NGOs participate in global security governance and promote our GPG in many different capacities and at many different stages. In the following, we will outline a number of key NGO contributions to international peace and security.

When a conflict is imminent or active, NGOs often play important roles. First, certain NGOs, thanks to their reputation as neutral and independent actors, can play a role in diffusing tension during conflicts by facilitating dialogue between states and diplomatically unacknowledged actors such as rebel groups, militias, warlords and clan chiefs. In acute emergency situations, NGOs like the Carter Center, International Alert, Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Finnish Crisis Management Initiative can provide mediation and good offices, support dialogue and kick-start meaningful negotiations towards the resolution of conflicts (Hofmann & Schneckener, 2011, p. 3; Oudraat & Haufler, 2008, p. 23). In addition, NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Call or the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers can engage with armed NSAs (rebels, armed militia etc.) in order to persuade them to change their behavior and accept international norms on the protection of civilians or bans on certain means of warfare.

In conflict zones, the humanitarian assistance provided by NGOs like Médecins sans Frontières or ICRC is often the only lifeline for affected civilians. These actors focus on the alleviation of morbidity and mortality by engaging in direct delivery of life-saving services such as the provision of food, water, emergency healthcare, shelter and basic sanitation (Howard, 79 The consultative status allows NGOs to participate in the work of the United Nations. 80 Legally, the ICRC is a private association formed under the Swiss civil code. Internationally, however, the ICRC enjoys the status of a legal entity under international humanitarian law and is, therefore, different from conventional NGOs (Hofmann & Schneckener, 2011, p. 4)
Sondorp, & Veen, 2012, p. 35). The delivery of humanitarian assistance is in principle only possible when NGOs follow the basic principles of humanity, neutrality\textsuperscript{81}, impartiality\textsuperscript{82} and independence\textsuperscript{83} (Bizimana, 2006, p. 30).

Even after a conflict ends, the affected communities remain extremely vulnerable. To mitigate these vulnerabilities during the transition period, NGOs follow an integral approach that links short-term relief measures with longer term development programs in order to create the necessary synergies that can provide a more sustainable response to crisis situations (Cunningham, 2017, p. 1). In practice, this means that instead of implementing development programs in traditional top-down ways, NGOs promote the use of indigenous resources and technologies in development programs, and through awareness-building campaigns, they encourage grassroots institutions and local stakeholders to participate in educational, cultural and capacity-building activities (Panda, 2007, pp. 261–268).

Beyond active conflicts, NGOs also play important roles in minimizing certain security threats, based on their technical and local expertise and experience. One important issue area in which NGOs can complement the activities and capacities of states and IGOs is counterterrorism. As we have mentioned, the latter mostly focus on surveillance, information exchange and on eliminating the sources of terrorist financing in order to prevent attacks and neutralize or dismantle terrorist organizations. Conversely, NGOs generally seek to intervene in the phase before an individual can be indoctrinated or attracted by the idea of joining a terrorist group. In other words, they work towards addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of political extremism, radical ideologies and religious fanaticism. To do so, they support sustainable development, empower marginalized communities and vulnerable groups, promote dialogue and human rights, improve local governance, expand political participation and provide an outlet to redress grievances (Rosand, Millar, & Ipe, 2008, p. 9).

The range of possible activities to achieve these goals is endless. For instance, the NGO Women without Borders has come up with a model to build “the capacity of mothers to understand, recognize and mitigate early signs of vulnerability to radicalization in their children” (Holmer, 2018, p. 58). Religious NGOs sometimes organize visits to cultural and religious monuments in order to foment inter-faith dialogue and tolerance, while NGOs like the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee create training material for law enforcement officers with the aim of enhancing their understanding of the culture, religious customs, and traditions of Muslim communities (Michaelsen, 2008, p. 344). Although most contributions of this kind are localized, small-scale, invisible and hard to quantify; cumulatively, they can bring about positive changes in their respective contexts in the long run.

NGOs furthermore often make efforts to set the global governance agenda in international security. During the process of issue emergence, major NGOs like International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Pax Christi and Saferworld often take up a leading role in transnational advocacy networks, and act as gatekeepers who “have the power either to lend credibility, brand value, and resources to an emergent issue, or to block its entry

\textsuperscript{81} Neutrality prohibits taking sides and passing moral judgement to the parties of the conflict.

\textsuperscript{82} Impartiality bans any form of discrimination against those who need assistance.

\textsuperscript{83} Independence prohibits political interference in the work of humanitarian actors.
into a transnational issue pool” (Carpenter, 2010, p. 205). In these cases, NGOs often work together in transnational advocacy networks to rally international support for their causes and promote their agendas. As some of these organizations work to fill in knowledge gaps, they can also be considered part of epistemic communities.\footnote{A paradigmatic example of this is the work of the NGO International Crisis Group (ICG). Its reports and research-based results are considered as a reference by the international community before reaching some decisions. The ICG is discussed in more detail under the next section.}

According to Carpenter, the process of issue emergence typically unfolds as follows: issue entrepreneurs identify a problem and define it as an issue, namely they (re)frame it in terms that resonate with global security concerns. Then, if major gatekeepers accede to adopting the issue, they start referring to it in advocacy materials. Should a critical mass of civil society actors converge around a specific platform to support an issue, they tend to launch concerted efforts, in the form of major campaigns, to lobby for specific outcomes. If the claims of these campaigns are not dampened or cancelled out by opposing claims from other issue advocates, the issue has good chance of making it to the global security agenda (Carpenter, 2010, pp. 207–209, 236).

An example of how this mechanism works in practice is post-Cold War anti-nuclear weapon activism. Starting in 1986, a transnational advocacy network of peace activists, doctors and lawyers began to develop the World Court Project (WCP). The project was based on simple premises: chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction are outlawed by two specific conventions; yet there is no such prohibition for nuclear weapons (Dewes & Green, 1995, p. 17). In order to convert this problem into an issue of global interest, anti-nuclear actors from the civil society framed nuclear weapons as a major threat and connected it “with other security concerns, like the devastation of the environment caused by nuclear tests and the danger of war between the rival superpowers” (Dalaqua, 2013, p. 94).

After years of campaigning both in New Zealand (where the project originated) and abroad, the WCP gained the support of important gatekeepers like the International Peace Bureau, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War\footnote{This NGO, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985, is composed of doctors, medical students and healthcare workers and researchers.} and the International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms. Once the issue was adopted by influential NGOs, the WCP initiated a series of targeted campaigns and successfully persuaded the UN General Assembly to make use of Article 96 of the UN Charter: in 1992, the UNGA requested the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for its first-ever advisory opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons (Dewes & Green, 1995, pp. 17–18). Importantly, among other conclusions, the ICJ declared that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects”.\footnote{Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 ICJ 8 July.}

Equipped with this advisory opinion, experts from various organizations drafted a model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC). This legally binding convention would regulate the elimination of nuclear weapons and institutionalize the prohibition of nuclear weapons development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use. A large
transnational advocacy network of anti-nuclear activists started to campaign for international negotiations towards an NWC (Dalaqua, 2013, p. 101), but little progress was made until 2007, when nuclear abolition NGOs launched the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). This renewed impetus was reinforced by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who urged all NPT members to consider negotiating a NWC without delay. A year later, Global Zero, another major campaign that called for phased and verified reductions as necessary steps towards a binding agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons, pushed the issue even further. Later, even President Obama endorsed the “vision of zero” in his famous “Prague Speech” (Dalaqua, 2013, pp. 97–99). Although the NWC is yet to materialize, this example clearly shows how NGOs and transnational advocacy networks can give visibility to certain issues and put them on the global security agenda. Further examples of agenda-setting capacities of NGOs include the International Coalition to Ban Landmines, the International Action Network on Small Arms and the German Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management.

Last but not least, one of NGOs’ key contributions to global governance in general and international security governance in particular is that of monitoring, for example by scrutinizing corporate activity or monitoring and reporting on state compliance with international agreements and conventions. On the one hand, through sophisticated media campaigns, transnational activist groups (or “corporate accountability movements”, as Virginia Haufler has termed them) can call for boycotts and seek to mobilize consumer sentiment, with an eye to transforming company policies on key issues (Haufler, 2003). On the other hand, through monitoring and reporting, NGOs can also put considerable pressure on noncompliant states. In fact, some treaty-based IGOs allow NGOs to formally submit information on noncompliance and lodge complaints against states when they disregard human rights or violate agreements and international norms (Oudraat & Haufler, 2008, p. 25). NGOs are often highly skilled at so-called naming and shaming, namely gathering and disclosing information on public and private actors’ infringements of international norms. The reputational effect may cause actors to change their behavior (something that IGOs often are unable to achieve due to their limited enforcement capacity). These campaigns have on occasion evolved further, with NGOs becoming the driving force behind the creation of multi-stakeholder initiatives. These initiatives bring together actors from public, private and non-profit communities to establish high standards of corporate behavior, frameworks for decision-making, and transparency and accountability mechanisms that push for the respect of fundamental human rights.

As this brief overview has shown, NGOs rarely hold formal roles in the formal and intergovernmental channels of the global governance of international security. Nevertheless, their contributions to our GPG are crucial – in placing certain issues on the agenda, acting as watchdogs in monitoring compliance with treaties and conventions, raising the reputational

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87 See also the section on multinational corporations, below.
88 The Publish What You Pay campaign is an oft-cited initiative in that respect. Launched in 2002 by a consortium of NGOs, it seeks to oblige companies in the extractive industries to publicly disclose and disaggregate their payments to host governments. This measure of transparency was designed in order to “enable local civil society and donor agencies to hold host countries accountable for the use of revenues generated from natural resources” (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2005, p. 12).
costs for corporations and states, and helping to minimize certain security threats. In and around conflicts, in addition, NGOs contribute to international peace and security through mediation actions and direct interventions to help individuals in conflict areas. Finally, through their local and technical experience, NGOs hold a wealth of expertise, which often feeds into policymaking processes through various channels. For more on this, see the section on epistemic communities below.

Table 5, below, provides some examples of the NGOs active in addressing each of the three threats studied in this section. This list is by no means comprehensive, but provides a first look at the organizations and their actions in this field.

**Table 5: Examples of NGOs addressing the use of force, WMD proliferation and terrorism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Examples of NGOs active in this area</th>
<th>Description of their work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use of force</td>
<td>Carter Center, International Alert, Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, The Finnish Crisis Management Initiative</td>
<td>Can provide mediation and good offices, support dialogue and kick-start meaningful negotiations towards the resolution of conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When conflict is imminent or active</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Call, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers</td>
<td>Can engage with armed NSAs (rebels, armed militia, etc.) in order to persuade them to change their behaviour and accept international norms on the protection of civilians or bans on certain means of warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of force</td>
<td>Médécins sans Frontières, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, International Rescue Movement, Doctors of the World, Intersos, International Medical Corps</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance in war zones, direct delivery of life-saving services, support to victims of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During conflict</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
<td>Finds and destroys landmines, cluster munitions and unexploded bombs in places affected by conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of force</td>
<td>Action Aid</td>
<td>Helps women whose human rights are likely to be endangered or violated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conflict situations</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
<td>Works towards camp management and clean water provision; advocates for displaced people while defending their rights in local communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of force</td>
<td>War Child</td>
<td>Strives to rehabilitate former child soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transversal</td>
<td>Islamic Relief</td>
<td>Offers an interest-free loans system to support unemployed people in the post-conflict settings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Pax Christi, Saferworld</td>
<td>Agenda-setting. Often play a leading role in transnational advocacy networks and act as gatekeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>Examples of NGOs active in this area</td>
<td>Description of their work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD proliferation</td>
<td>The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), Fritz Haber Institute of the Max Planck Society, Green Cross International, International Centre for Chemical Safety and Security, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs</td>
<td>Technical support for safety and security, disarmament efforts of WMDs and awareness-raising on the importance of safety and security for non-proliferation to be successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Association for Supporting Victims of Chemical Weapons (PSVCW)</td>
<td>Support for victims of WMDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women without Borders</td>
<td>Helps mothers to understand, recognize and mitigate the radicalization of their children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LibForAll Foundation</td>
<td>Develops counter-radicalization strategies that can defeat the ideology of radical Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working Group on Women, Peace and Security</td>
<td>Has a specific programme for countering violent extremism and terrorism with a particular gender approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious NGOs</td>
<td>Organize visits to cultural and religious monuments in order to foment inter-faith dialogue and tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee</td>
<td>Creates training material for law enforcement officers to enhance their understanding of the culture, religious customs, and traditions of Muslim communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ own compilation

### 3.5.1.2 Epistemic communities

The term epistemic communities was first introduced by John Ruggie and later refined by Peter M. Haas to define knowledge-based networks composed of experts drawn from governments, public office, international organizations, NGOs, research institutes, and private companies (Haas, 1992; Ruggie, 1975, pp. 569–570). These experts converge in a so-called epistemic community, bringing their extensive knowledge and practical experience in the thematic field in which they specialize. Even though the members of an epistemic community often come from a wide range of academic disciplines and backgrounds (Meyer, 2015, p. 863), they share normative beliefs, an understanding of the causes of particular problems, criteria for weighing contradictory evidence, and a willingness to seek alternative policy solutions (Haas, 1992, p. 3).

An important actor embedded in epistemic communities are think tanks. Think tanks are research and analysis organizations that produce policy-oriented outputs and advice on national and international issues, thereby engaging with policymakers and the public (McGann, 2016, p. 10). These institutes or groups of experts are also part of the epistemic communities.
given that they share a body of consensual knowledge that they provide to those who must make informed policy decisions. International think tanks help to fill potential knowledge gaps and seek to reduce the uncertainty of security threats (T. Weiss & Thakur, 2010, p. 8). The research they conduct provides insights that may advance policy debates, and the conclusions reached can also be a useful tool to monitor many aspects of the international arena – from the performance of security institutions to the evolution of public opinion (Phillipps, 2018, pp. 285–286).

A clear example of the impact think tanks are capable of having is the International Crisis Group (also referred to above, in section 3.5.1.1), which excels at showing “authority, impartiality, and credibility in timely evidence-based analysis and on-the-ground reality-based prescriptions” (T. Weiss & Thakur, 2010, p. 82). Its extensive work in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Afghanistan and Sudan has enabled the ICG to present its findings to leading international officials as well as national politicians. The ICG’s successful reputation is validated by the fact that the UN has repeatedly asked it to formally address UN Peacebuilding Commission meetings to fill some knowledge gaps. However, its influence should not be overestimated. Although it is clear that its diagnoses and prognoses in the shape of briefing papers and reports are taken into account by other analysts and practitioners, it must be stressed that the potential for impact will ultimately depend on the respective context (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2014, p. 559).

Overall, it is clear that today’s globalized world calls for a provider of information that can reduce uncertainty about how to respond to ever more interdependent challenges and common problems related to international peace and security (Dunlop, 2017, p. 216). Thus, resorting to epistemic communities and expert networks has become a crucial activity to interpret and tackle many of the threats that arise in an increasingly complex international society, be it the illegitimate use of force, the proliferation of WMDs, or terrorism.

There are two lines of thought regarding the impact that information produced by epistemic communities has on decision and policymakers. The first suggests that decision-makers will turn to specialists for reliable technical assistance, whereas the second indicates that leaders only turn to experts when they allow them to pursue their pre-determined political interests (Haas, 1992, p. 14). Neither of these perspectives precludes the possibility of political leaders turning to experts in situations of uncertainty or doubt about how to act in accordance with their political interests. In this respect, the national context should not be overlooked when analysing the impact of epistemic communities in the security field; if security threats have increased in a specific region, experts specializing in that field are more likely to be consulted. Across the board, if a suggested policy change implies a high economic cost, the power of persuasion of epistemic communities will tend to decrease (Adler, 1992, p. 106; Davis Cross, 2013a, p. 148; Phillipps, 2018, p. 292).

Relatively little work has been done on the impact of epistemic expertise in the security field in general – especially when compared to the attention given to the role of epistemic communities in other areas, such as environmental policymaking (Biswas, 2014, pp. 75–108; Laucht, 2018, p. 439). Indeed, the concept of epistemic community has not been widely used to research change in critical international security institutions, although its relevance has clearly increased.
since the fall of the Berlin Wall (Faleg, 2012, p. 163). Several authors, nevertheless, have analysed how epistemic communities have affected the transformation of organizations such as NATO (Adler, 2008, p. 219; Libel, 2013, pp. 64–66) and the EU (Cross, 2013; Faleg, 2012; Phillipps, 2018). It has furthermore been asserted that epistemic communities have been influential in the context of the EU’s security strategies, by enabling outcomes beyond what would be expected by looking exclusively at member states’ preferences (Cross, 2015, p. 90).

Epistemic communities are at work in each of the three threats under study in this section – the use of force, WMD proliferation, and terrorism. See table 6, below, for some examples of the think tanks, science advocacy groups and expert groups that contribute to these epistemic communities. As is shown, many of them have broad objects of interest, covering all three threats.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use of force / international peace and security in a broad sense</td>
<td>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, International Peace Institute (IPI), International Crisis Group (or ICG, an NGO dedicated to fill the knowledge gap through research analysis), Stimson Center, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), Center of International Security Studies (CISS), Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation (UNISCI), British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, Institutum Clingendael, French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Rand Corporation, Delhi Policy Group, South Asia Analysis Group, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute; Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore, International Council on Security and Development (ICOS, at UAE), Lowy Institute for International Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD proliferation</td>
<td>Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Union of Concerned Scientist (which focuses on the technical aspects of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons programs and nuclear energy), Lawyers Alliance for World Security, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (a US-based research centre committed to the study of the causes and consequences of terrorism), International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), Centre d’analyse du terrorisme (CAT), International Institute for Counter Terrorism; Observatorio Internacional de Estudios sobre Terrorismo (OICT)</td>
</tr>
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Sources: McGann (2019), Bob (2010, p. 188), Authors’ own compilation

The field of WMD disarmament in general and nuclear non-proliferation in particular was one of the first areas where strategists and scientists reached out to decision-makers. Motivated
by common epistemic criteria regarding the risk of nuclear proliferation leading to open conflict, the effects of technological change on the arms race and the urgency of cooperation between nuclear adversaries, scientists and technical researchers managed to turn their ideas into national security policy recommendations which they transferred to policymakers (Adler, 1992, p. 102). The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) first and the Pugwash group later managed to strongly influence the discussions between Western and East European scientists about disarmament. Their meetings and conferences made them both epistemic communities of reference in the production of informed knowledge regarding disarmament and non-proliferation (Karns & Mingst, 2010, p. 358; Rotblat, 2001, pp. 50–55). Nowadays, FAS – which began its studies in 1946 – is still one of the most influential epistemic networks in the area of global security issues, particularly regarding nuclear non-proliferation. For its part, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs have had a very important historical role during crises and during the negotiation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (Biswas, 2014; Laucht, 2018, pp. 450–451).

Through workshops, high-level publications and conferences that gather scholars, activists and policy-makers, epistemic communities in the security field have become influential actors in certain situations and issues. The work of certain groups of experts has even managed to set security as an item on the agenda of organizations not directly concerned with the promotion of international security. For instance, Paul Collier’s research program at the World Bank indicated through empirical research that a country’s dependency on a small number of valuable commodities increases the likelihood of suffering from corruption or underdevelopment, which are major contributing factors to conflict and instability (Haufler, 2010, p. 119). Thus, not only do epistemic communities facilitate the understanding of relevant threats, but they also foster debate and may even propose innovative solutions.

However, epistemic communities also face challenges. One is decision-makers’ reluctance to engage with the communities. A trend that became increasingly common in the aftermath of the second Iraq war (Wolfe, 2008, pp. 43–44) was for former public policymakers to take up employment as researchers in think tanks or groups of experts. Some voices have cautioned that this trend (Abelson, 2006, Chapter 4) could undermine the very nature of epistemic communities, which are meant to be plural and heterogeneous groups of individuals who, nonetheless, manage to share beliefs, understanding criteria and consensual knowledge. If plurality is undermined, the ultimate objective of these actors – offering broad research-based knowledge – would be limited and deteriorate. Furthermore, while some think tanks may have trouble engaging with policymakers and impacting policies, there are also other policymakers who may become excessively dependent on the work of think tanks. The case of the United States is the paradigmatic example of the latter. Washington DC’s foreign security policy is said to be increasingly dependent on the work of think tanks, which entails some risks. Should this trend become more universal, some reflection would be needed to balance the role of epistemic communities in security policy development.

3.5.1.3 Social movements

Social movements are a mixture of informally associated individuals and groups that aim to change the status quo (Tilly, 2004, p. 36). This type of informal coalition is usually organized
around social causes where there are strong gaps related to class, religion, ethnicity or language, but they may also be dedicated to more specific objectives such as development, feminism, human rights and the environment. NGOs often join and support the causes promoted by social movements.

In the security field, the predecessors of these large loose mass-based associations of individuals were the peace groups, which were pioneers in pushing for the adoption of international rules and agreements limiting armaments. The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, for example, spoke out for stricter arms controls already at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 (Karns & Mingst, 2010, p. 355), making it one of the first and most relevant social movements dedicated to major change in the security field. Starting in the mid-twentieth century, certain civil society movements – which were already lobbying delegates and issuing petitions – formalized into NGOs, particularly in the disarmament field. Such is the case, for instance, of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines or the Cluster Munitions Coalition (Warkentin & Mingst, 2000, pp. 246–251).

One of the most recognizable actions in which social movements have traditionally exercised their functions in global governance is public protests. This instrument has been used as a response to the three main threats studied here but due to the different times in history in which these threats have emerged into the public opinion, the types of protest have changed slightly. While demonstrations against the use of WMDs during the 1980s occurred in the streets, the protests against the use of force during the second Iraq war in 2003 took advantage of the internet to organize an international macro-demonstration which took place simultaneously in several cities around the world at “a speed and efficiency that was not possible before” (Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010, p. 1154). Similarly, the anti-terrorism movement has triggered not only public protests in the traditional sense, that is to say, in the streets, but also online. Indeed, social media networks and digital instruments have become key instruments to make civil society’s voices heard in cyberspace (Logie & Gurak, 2003, pp. 25–46).

Regardless of their form, public protest and street demonstrations have caught the attention of several scholars, who have thoroughly analysed the ways in which protest challenged established authorities (McCarthy, Rafail, & Gromis, 2013, pp. 369–396; Soule & Earl, 2005, pp. 345–364). Yet analysts gradually became aware that public demonstrations were not the only distinctive feature of social movements: it was also their participation in conventional political processes (Goldstone, 2003, pp. 1–24), their role as advocates pushing for specific policy solutions and their focus on awareness-raising that consolidated social movements as important actors (Krause, 2014, p. 230).

In the field of the non-proliferation of WMDs, for example, social movements have mainly focused on pressing national governments against proliferation. When new normative frameworks emerge or in the case of international treaties whose ratification is still pending for certain states (e.g. the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons), civil society and social movements have urged governments to act proactively and commit themselves to such instruments. In some cases, social movements have chosen to interact with their municipal governments despite the fact that the latter do not have competence over these specific issues. The reasoning behind this action is again to raise
awareness and act as a bottom-up influence to the political levels where decisions can be made. A recent case is that of the ICAN Cities appeal launched in Madrid at the end of 2018: local social movements have managed to get city councils of important cities in the world to show support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

The success of social movements – be they peace movements or religious groups – is not exclusively measurable in terms of treaty outputs. Among others, social movements provide services, create knowledge, raise awareness or promote transparency; and while is it more difficult to measure success in these endeavours, their effects can be as important – or more so – than the adoption of new legal instruments. In any case, according to Krause, certain conditions must be in place for a social movement to thrive (Krause, 2014, p. 230). One is that the issue area in which the movement seeks change enjoys a relatively high degree of policy uncertainty. This leaves room for civil advocates to manoeuvre to guide or influence the final decision (for more on the emergence and selection of issues around which the advocacy networks decide to mobilize, see Carpenter, 2007). Another condition for "success" is that social movements must be able to reformulate policy prescriptions on a particular issue in such a way as to attract the attention of both high-level politicians and, if necessary, the general public and their opinion (Mintz & Redd, 2003, pp. 199–200).

With regard to security issues in particular, social movements should ideally be able to take the debate beyond the bounds of national security and make the issue a matter of widespread concern. Some examples are when the campaigns against antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions presented the issue as humanitarian rather than purely security-based; a good reframing exercise (Carpenter, 2007, pp. 101–104). The causes supported by social movements and NGOs often suffer from a lack of resources, a situation that sometimes improves if a national government adopts that same cause. If an issue makes it onto a national policymaking agenda, it is not uncommon for social movements and NGOs promoting that cause to receive government support, which can help propel the issue to the international level. The flipside is that it is more difficult for social movements (and NGOs) to support highly controversial or politically sensitive causes unlikely to be taken up by policymakers (Krause, 2014, p. 231).

Transnational networks of religious actors also have a key position: as non-institutionalized enablers of communicative channels, they can advance the well-being of their communities and protect peace and security (Haynes, 2001, pp. 143–145). Religion plays a very important role in today's international security context, constituting a force for both violence and peace. On the one hand, religion has been the source of conflicts even in recent history (Leheny, 2019, p. 93), and in recent years, non-state threats from religious terrorist groups have taken up a significant space in the international arena (Joshi, 2019, Chapter 10; Leheny, 2019, p. 88). On the other hand, many non-state religious actors can and do contribute to the maintenance of peace and security; their involvement in international relations continues to be an object of scholarly interest (Haynes, 2001; Philpott, 2018; S. Thomas, 2005).

Religious communities and churches can contribute to the GPG at a local level, and in certain cases, large international actors like the Roman Catholic Church and the Organization of the Islamic Conference have even provided structures and public services where other state
institutions have collapsed. In addition, though often overlooked, religious leaders may undertake vital duties in **peacebuilding and reconciliation**, from the very individual level (the case of Emeritus Archbishop Desmond Tutu as an essential pillar in the South African reconciliation after Apartheid is well-known) to the more collective level (e.g. the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative in Northern Uganda or the Bishops’ Conference in the Central African Republic). In post-conflict situations, religious institutions have often played a particularly important role in restoring stability to divided societies or fragile areas.

### 3.5.2 For-profit NSAs

Apart from the non-profit private sector, profit-seeking actors like multinational corporations (MNCs) and private military and security companies (PMSC) are also involved in global security governance, both directly and indirectly.

#### 3.5.2.1 Private military and security companies (PMSCs)

Since the late 1970s, the diffusion of neo-liberal norms into the realm of security has transformed the traditional modes and understanding of security provision. As privatization, outsourcing and public-private partnerships proliferated in order to rein in “bloated” bureaucracies, vertically-integrated, hierarchical and state-centred structures started to give way to more flexible, diverse and horizontally linked complexes of actors (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, pp. 3–4).

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) proliferated exponentially after the Cold War, because their expertise and information advantages make them a very cost-effective solution. Nowadays, they provide a wide range of specialized security services, including “combat support (logistics, intelligence, weapons maintenance), convoy, personal and facility security, advice and training (risk management, military and security training measures and weapons procurement) or even combat (field troops or weapons operation)” (Deitelhoff, 2010, p. 177). Depending on their functions, companies can be categorized as “mercenary firms” when they provide private soldiers and engage in conflicts (such was the case with Sandline International or Executive Outcomes), as “private military firms” when they offer training and strategic advice (e.g. Military Professional Resources Inc.), or as “Private Security Companies” when they provide military support, logistics, base maintenance and transportation (e.g. Halliburton) (Krahmann, 2005a, p. 8). To be sure, these are ideal-type categories. In practice, these companies are not static and usually offer so many services, that clear-cut distinctions among them can seem like an exercise in futility. We have therefore chosen to treat private military and security companies as a single category here.

Security privatization and public-private partnerships in the security field are ubiquitous these days and they are symptomatic of much greater transformations in security governance than a simple transfer of public functions to private actors. PMSCs increasingly participate in what

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89 Such was the case of the Catholic Church during the Second Sudanese Civil war, which went on for more than twenty years (1983-2005).
Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams have termed “global security assemblages”, that is, “settings where a range of different global and local, public and private security agents and normativities interact, cooperate and compete to produce new institutions, practices, and forms of security governance” (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, p. 3).

Turning from configurations to concrete roles, in conflict zones, PMSCs can either participate directly in combat to secure the territorial integrity and political authority of the state or indirectly, through “force multiplication” functions and operational support to intervention and police forces (the latter can also take place in post-conflict settings) (Deitelhoff, 2010, p. 197). Direct participation of PMSCs in conflicts has faced strong criticism. A prime example is the participation of Sandline International and Executive Outcomes in the civil wars of Angola and Sierra Leone during the 1990s, which was heavily criticized as illegitimate and led to the demise of the two companies. This created a thick veil of suspicion around PMSCs and their role in supporting “weak Third World governments who are no longer able to provide national security for their citizens” in conflict-ridden areas (Börzel & Risse, 2005, p. 202). However, it is not only governments of less developed countries that resort to PMSCs, notwithstanding their often murky role.


3.5.2.2 Multinational corporations (MNCs)

Multinational corporations (MNCs) at times operate in insecure environments where intrastate or regional conflicts may break out and endanger their material assets and personnel. In such cases, many companies would rather cease their operations and abandon the conflict zone than become embroiled in situations that pose a risk to their investments and profitability. However, for the extractive sector, the costs of withdrawing may be prohibitive “due to the long-term relationship between production cycle and return on investment” (Deitelhoff & Wolf, 2010, p. 16). Therefore, several oil and mining companies have found themselves reluctantly participating in conflict-prevention regimes in order to preserve their markets but, perhaps most importantly, to manage their reputational costs (Haufler, 2010, p. 103).

Changes in corporate behaviour towards conflict management since the 1990s have often been the result of naming and shaming campaigns, which were launched by NGOs to denounce the bad practices of business in conflict. By painting a negative picture of extractive companies as bad governors that were destabilizing, fuelling, prolonging and taking commercial advantage of conflicts, transnational advocacy networks have managed to institutionalize corporate participation in conflict management activities (Haufler, 2010, p. 103; Wolf, Deitelhoff, & Engert, 2007, p. 295).
Many MNCs today are aware of infamous cases of companies that profited from conflict diamonds and financed war by bribing repressive warlords and rebels or by paying militias to protect company assets. With this in mind, they attempt to proactively mitigate the potential negative implications of their operations by adopting “conflict-sensitive approaches”. In order to make sense of the avenues by which MNCs can contribute to global security governance, scholars have introduced two similar terms, Corporate Social Responsibility plus (CSR-plus) and Corporate Security Responsibility (CSecR). These approaches explore how companies can positively impact the environment in which they operate and their host-government partners by creating employment and education opportunities, assisting technology transfers, respecting human rights and raising living standards – by contributing, in other words to the enabling factors described in section 2. According to Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, “the main modality of promoting conflict sensitive CSR has been the development of voluntary codes and standards for improved company self-regulation, often through multi-stakeholder dialogues” (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2004, pp. 47–48). The voluntary participation of MNCs in such initiatives reveals that the self-perception of having beyond-profit responsibilities “is being incorporated into the mainstream of business practice” (Deitelhoff & Wolf, 2010, p. 10).

Often, the initiatives take the form of multi-stakeholder initiatives – which can be initiated by states, companies or NGOs, such as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to combat the trade of conflict diamonds; the Peace Diamonds Alliance, which seeks to establish transparent and just diamond production and marketing systems; the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, which were designed to ensure that the operations of extractive companies are conducted within a framework that respects fundamental human rights; the Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade, which improves due diligence and governance systems that are necessary for ethical supply chains; and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which promotes a transparent and accountable management of oil, gas and mineral resources by requiring information disclosure along the extractive industry value chain (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2005, p. 12,16; Deitelhoff & Wolf, 2010, p. 8).

As described above, MNCs appear to welcome the input of other actors and prioritize multi-stakeholder dialogue in conflict prevention-related matters. In counter-terrorism efforts, however, they seem to prefer private regulatory schemes, such as the Wolfsberg Group and the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism. The first is an initiative of thirteen global banks to combine their powers to produce principles, standards and guidelines for private banking to address financial crimes, specifically money laundering and counter-terrorist financing policies (Bureš, 2013, p. 440). The second is a forum for knowledge-sharing, technical collaboration and research set up by Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube to tackle the increasingly sophisticated efforts of terrorists to abuse digital platforms in order to spread violent extremist ideologies.

An increasingly popular way of involving private actors in the provision of security is through public-private partnerships (PPPs) – a mode of security governance that includes a hybrid mix of public and private actors, “with market actors often delegated the task of developing standards and the public sector applying sanctions for non-compliance” (Haufler, 2003, p. 238). According to Oldřich Bureš, PPPs have become especially relevant in the fight against terrorist financing given that “the first line responders are not agents of public authorities but
employees of private financial institutions” (Bureš, 2013, p. 430,433). To give an idea of how this works, banks are expected to establish customer due diligence measures, maintain adequate records and be able to identify suspicious transactions, train their staffs on that respect and create an internal audit mechanism for effective compliance. Additionally, they are obliged to report any suspicious financial activity to designated public bodies (financial intelligence units) for further analysis (Bureš, 2013, p. 435).

MNCs also play a significant role in the non-proliferation of WMDs. Strikingly, all major state-led nuclear proliferation activities of the 20th century used companies to circumvent export control regimes. These firms were sometimes aware of the activities and sometimes unwitting participants. Despite this fact, international law and the regulation of dual-use technologies have failed to stay apace (Russell, 2006, p. 650). The traditional deference to sovereignty and the fact that international obligations in the form of treaties, UNSC resolutions or informal arrangements fall upon states have created significant shortcomings that arguably need to be filled by MNCs. National authorities responsible for licensing and authorizing transfers of strategic goods increasingly encourage MNCs to adopt internal compliance programmes that facilitate the implementation of national regulations (derived from international law) related to the control of strategic trade. More private self-regulation to facilitate the implementation of national and international rules, thereby acting as a bulwark against states or individuals that seek to exploit weaknesses in non-proliferation regimes and purchase dual-use technologies in order to build up nuclear weapons (Masters, 2009, p. 349; Russell, 2006, p. 650).

The example of Leybold AG is very instructive: during the 1970s and 1980s, Leybold was a key supplier of vacuum technologies and precision machining equipment for Iraq’s nuclear program and for the A.Q. Khan network. When inspectors found Leybold equipment in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, the company faced a criminal investigation in the US and public embarrassment that affected its brand name and led to substantial business losses. The company’s response to mounting pressure was to replace the management team that had been implicated in the scandal and to issue the “Leybold Charter” – a policy statement which pledged that “Leybold attaches clear-cut and unambiguous priority to the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems over commercial interests” (Bunn, 2018, pp. 256–257).

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90 It should be noted that many exporting companies regard exhaustive export controls with scepticism because implementing such strict measures could result in a loss of market in favour of other companies or states that do not observe strategic trade control obligations with the same rigour.
Naming and shaming and the subsequent reputational costs played a critical role in leading the company to undertake such an explicit commitment to prioritize non-proliferation efforts over profit. It follows that a big challenge for non-proliferation efforts is to create a responsible and transparent corporate culture around export controls before the occurrence of company-threatening events (Bunn, 2018). Leybold, for example, has been trying to promote MNC participation in the non-proliferation regime by calling on other companies to pro-actively share information with government authorities and support the IAEA Procurement Outreach Program. In a nutshell, proliferation cannot be avoided completely without MNCs exhibiting voluntary and “self-triggered caution and restraint towards questionable business while maintaining a trusting partnership with governmental authorities and international institutions” (Widl, 2011, p. 1).

4 THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

4.1 Introduction

Following this broad overview of the actors that contribute to the mitigation of the three threats mentioned by all states in the study of security strategies in section 2 (the use of force, WMD proliferation and terrorism), this section will draw some conclusions on the shape of the global governance architecture in these areas. In the following, we will sketch the architectures for each of the three threats, discussing the relative weight and role of each category of actor; the hierarchy or organization among them, including overlaps, specialization and division of labour; and the role of hard and soft law, informal and formal rules. We will also provide a comparative look at the three architectures that were studied in depth, including some reflections on their evolution and the governance gaps they contain. We will conclude with a set of reflections on the shape and evolution of the global governance architecture of international peace and security as a whole.

4.2 Use of force architecture

The global governance architecture that has evolved around the use of force could be described as a broad and intricate web of actors ranging across the public and private spectrum who interact and often coordinate with one another in order to prevent conflict and respond to the use of armed force. The impressive number of actors working on this threat can be explained through the breadth of the threat. If the use of force is regarded comprehensively, it can include the enabling social, political and economic factors that contribute to peace and therefore prevent conflicts; structural and direct conflict prevention efforts; direct armed interventions in conflicts; mitigation of conflicts’ humanitarian consequences; and post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation efforts. Logically, the range of global governance actors contributing to the mitigation of this threat is immense.

Underlying the actions of these organizations is a large collection of formal and informal rules, principles, regulations and practices to govern the use of force; these rules guide their
behaviour of the actors in the governance architecture. The UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force and sets the parameters for conflict management, lies at the centre of these rules, as do the legally binding resolutions of the UN Security Council.

In the interest of simplicity, we will divide conflict management into three phases for this analysis (although many transversal actions may take place across the board, such as agenda-setting efforts by states and non-state actors). The first phase is the pre-conflict period, which could be described as a situation of fragile peace; this is followed by the stage of conflict, which starts with low intensity violence that may escalate to a full-blown conflict; finally, there is the post-conflict peace-building period. In each of these phases, if our map of global governance actors were to be made up of LEDs, a different configuration of actors would “light up” to contribute according to their capacities.

In the pre- and post-conflict periods, there seems to be a division of labour and the activities of different actors are largely complementary. However, during the conflict, the UN assumes a central role. The UN Charter establishes a clear hierarchy in conflict management, with the Security Council being the actor of reference and the only organization with the competence to authorize the legitimate use of force by regional FIGOs, states and coalitions of the willing. Although conflict management is a highly formalized field in which legally binding rules abound, informal IGOs may also make important contributions, particularly in conflict resolution. NSAs, in addition, have a role in every phase: NGOs, in particular, are present in all stages, and contribute transversally through cross-cutting agenda-setting efforts.

Until the early 1990s, traditional conflict management approaches generally dictated that efforts at deterrence, defines, crisis management, peacekeeping, mediation and good offices were to be undertaken once a conflict had erupted, or was on the verge of erupting and spreading (Kirton & Stefanova, 2004, p. 3). However, the post-Cold War reconceptualization of security put the spotlight on human security and highlighted the need to move from the prevailing culture of reaction to a culture of prevention. Actors working on conflict prevention thus moved into the regime complex on the use of force in a more “structural” fashion. The organizations focused, among others, on addressing the structural political and economic weaknesses of conflict-prone fragile states – that is to say, they promote the “enabling factors” for peace presented in section 2.

Among the actors contributing to this “structural conflict prevention” are formal development FIGOs with a global reach, like the World Bank and the OECD, which make formidable efforts to eliminate poverty and inequality, promote good governance and reduce the risk of armed conflict. Obviously, these FIGOs do not have unlimited resources and capacities to fight state failure and underdevelopment on their own: their work is complemented by regional FIGOs like the EU, ECOWAS and OAS, which also design and implement development strategies (often accompanied by political conditionality clauses). NGOs deserve a special mention in this context, as they are a powerful force in directly delivering aid by planning, implementing and monitoring development programs. Furthermore, as noted in section 3.4, MNCs may also contribute to conflict prevention by regulating themselves in areas such as transparency and human rights, adopting conflict-sensitive approaches and creating employment.
If conflict begins to emerge, traditional conflict management approaches and security actors take centre stage for “direct” prevention efforts. In the immediate pre-conflict phase, NGOs are often the first actors to perceive the risk of conflict escalation and they provide early warning by gathering analysing and sharing relevant information and by documenting human rights abuses. Regional IGOs can reasonably be expected to act as first responders, since they tend to have a better understanding of the underlying drivers underpinning the conflict and a direct interest in averting regional spillovers and instability. At this stage, they can undertake non-military dispute settlement measures or engage in preventive diplomacy efforts without need for UNSC authorization. In parallel with regional action, the United Nations may be activated, although the interactions between regional FIGOs and the Council are rather unstructured and unpredictable. On the one hand, the UNSC can call upon the warring parties to seek a solution to their dispute through negotiations, arbitration, mediation and other means. On the other hand, the UN Secretary General may contribute to mediation efforts by offering “good offices” or sending special envoys and special political missions to the conflict zone. Lastly, informal FIGOs such as the G7 may also promote conflict prevention efforts, if only “by creating a consensus that can then be taken to other international organizations with the mandate, resources, and legitimacy to put the consensus into effect” (Kirton & Stefanova, 2004, p. 7).

In case the conflict escalates, the UNSC can make use of the extensive powers granted by the UN Charter and decide whether to activate its conflict resolution tools, which range from coercive diplomacy and the deployment of peacekeeping missions to the authorization of the legitimate use of force. It should be noted that the UNSC may decide not to act or be blocked by its veto-wielding permanent members. When these vetoes lead to inaction and hence a lack of support of the Charter’s stated purposes, this has traditionally drawn criticism, undermining the legitimacy of the Council in many cases. Regional FIGOs may also intervene during a conflict and engage in robust peacekeeping, or even peace-enforcement, but only under UNSC approval and oversight. The fact that this kind of regional actions depend on UN authorization and should be in congruence with the UN’s purposes and principles (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2006, p. 228) suggests a clear hierarchy: any delegation of authority is a vertical process. While this model gives the UNSC ample flexibility to pursue hybrid, parallel, or sequential conflict resolution measures on an ad hoc basis, it is neither uncontested nor unproblematic. Unilateral interventions have on occasion been carried out by a single state or a group of states through regional or intercontinental organizations like NATO; the parties initiating the intervention have often labelled their actions as “humanitarian” (e.g. Iraq in 2003, Kosovo in 1999). It is notable, however, that the parties have generally felt compelled to seek legitimacy for their actions despite the lack of UNSC authorization – for example, by referring to UNSC authorization of past interventions. This trend confirms – rather than undermines – the Council’s authority as the sole legitimizer of the use of force (T. Weiss & Thakur, 2010, p. 63).

Turning to the role of NSAs in active conflict, firstly, on rare occasions, private military and security companies (PMSCs) have participated in conflict by getting directly involved in military operations, at the request of national governments. However, the companies that did so were severely criticized and eventually disappeared, indicating that the legitimate use of armed force remains strictly a public function which cannot accommodate for-profit actors. For their part, NGOs intervene in complex emergencies in two ways: on the one hand, they support dialogue,
bringing diplomatically unacknowledged actors to the negotiating table and initiating peace talks; on the other hand, humanitarian NGOs work closely with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in the provision of humanitarian relief to internally displaced persons and refugees, and coordinate their action to avoid counter-productive overlaps through the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Interestingly, informal IGOs – in the shape of international contact groups – can sometimes be instrumental in ending conflicts: this is often the case when UNSC permanent members are among the groupings’ members. International contact groups have in fact at times taken on functions similar to the UNSC (Qerimi, 2007, p. 117). and other IIGOs, like the G7/G8, have on occasion made declarations of support for their members’ use of economic sanctions or military interventions in regional conflicts (Kirton & Kulik, 2014, p. 91) in order to mobilize the political will and resources of other actors.

In the post-conflict period, when widespread violence subsides, the parties to the conflict can reach an armistice and sometimes conclude a comprehensive peace agreement, which is meant to prevent a backslide into conflict and is used as a roadmap to sustainable peace. Reconstruction of physical and social infrastructure becomes paramount, as do transitional justice and reconciliation efforts. Reconstructing a war-torn country and building lasting peace is a challenging mission, because it is a multidimensional process which encompasses military, political, economic and social aspects.

In the stage of post-conflict peace-building, the governance architecture seems to be relatively organized, with a fairly clear division of labour. Governments and military alliances like NATO have traditionally been in charge of security sector reforms, focusing mostly on training state security forces, while in recent decades, PMSCs have become important contributors to capacity-building programs through their participation in complex global security assemblages. In terms of promoting rule of law and democratic good governance, there are two distinct but complementary approaches. Governments and FIGOs generally (though not solely) provide top-down assistance, which focuses on organizing elections, strengthening judicial institutions and respect for human rights, and promoting accountability and transparency. Conversely, NGOs offer a bottom-up approach by strengthening civil society and developing local capacity (Newman, 2004, pp. 188–190). With regards to economic development, another of the clear enabling factors for peace, governments provide development aid, while global, intercontinental and regional FIGOs as well as NGOs design and implement the necessary development policies. Meanwhile, in certain situations where other state institutions have collapsed, religious communities and NGOs have been known to provide formerly public services to the population.

Lastly, the social dimension includes reconciliation and justice. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs, implemented mostly by local and international NGOs under the direction of UN and the World Bank, offer one contribution to this end. Transitional justice can be just as important, as it helps societies deal with past atrocities and heal their wounds by setting up truth commissions and bringing war criminals to justice. The International Criminal Court and ad hoc Tribunals created by the UNSC - and working in cooperation with FIGOs

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91 For example, the Contact Group for Kosovo called for the implementation of an arms embargo against Yugoslavia and for a ban on the transfer of equipment that could be used to suppress Kosovar Albanians (Qerimi, 2007, p. 135).
such as Interpol - may play a crucial role in that respect, by prosecuting individuals who have committed the most egregious crimes. Furthermore, religious leaders may also undertake vital duties in peacebuilding and reconciliation; at times, they are critical in restoring stability to divided societies and fragile areas.

While this analysis of the governance architecture of the use of force has taken an approach based on the phases of a conflict, some governance functions are more transversal, such as the agenda-setting role of NGOs. While not directly part of conflict management, when NGOs and social movements are successful in placing topics on the global agenda (e.g. highlighting the role of women and children in armed conflict, placing the prohibition of landmines and the proliferation of small arms on the global agenda), they can mobilize action and reduce the devastating effects of conflict on individuals.

**Shortcomings and challenges in the use of force architecture**

The architecture of the use of force displays a number of important shortcomings. First, global security governance is still very state-centric. In practice, this means that even though governance structures may be in place, implementation and enforcement still rest largely with states – which may not have the capacity or willingness to act. Rivalry or contestation among states or a mere lack of political will may even cause certain FIGOs to fail, as has been the case of UNASUR. Second, and relatedly, the politicization within the UN Security Council combined with the diverging values and priorities of the P5 can lead to suboptimal provision of the global public good of international peace and security. For one, abuses of veto power may lead to inconsistent implementation of commitments and inaction in the face of unfolding humanitarian catastrophes. For another, certain states and coalitions have bypassed the UNSC and engaged in unilateral military interventions without explicit authorization.

Third, there are institutional shortcomings that limit the effectiveness of some security actors. For example, the UNSC does not have a functioning Military Staff Committee, an intelligence analysis unit or an effective body for post-conflict peacebuilding, while other major security FIGOs often struggle to optimize the allocation of their limited resources. Funding issues have become particularly prominent at NATO of late. International tribunals that could play an important role in transitional justice also often suffer from structural problems. For example, Article 13.b of the Rome Statute gives the UNSC power to refer to the ICC situations in which genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression may have been committed, while Article 16 allows the Council to defer any investigation or a prosecution for one year. Considering past failures of the UNSC to refer such situations and the fact that the US, Russia and China have not ratified the ICC Statute, these powers have become very controversial and criticized for limiting the Court’s scope of action.

Fourth, coordination issues can arise: during conflicts and the post-conflict phase, a large number of actors provides humanitarian assistance and participates in peacebuilding. The influx of NGOs, aid and international staff is often overwhelming and their overlapping functions can complicate coordination and information-sharing. Fifth, abuses can also arise, for example

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92 The creation of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission in 2006 has only partially filled this gap.
during peacekeeping operations: soldiers sometimes commit atrocities and human rights abuses, especially against women, despite their mandate to protect civilians from harm.

Sixth, the post-conflict phase often receives less attention than the previous stages of conflict. Examples of successful military interventions that turn into long-term quagmires and create fragile or failed states abound (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya) and highlight that coalitions of the willing often win the war but lose the peace. Finally, this mapping exercise has not explored issues related to the use of force (like drones or autonomous weapons systems) where there is no major security actor involved in their governance. We will briefly consider these issues in the governance gap section below.

**Feminist security theory and the use of force**

In this mapping document, governance of the use of force is primarily located in the institutional architecture United Nations, and above all in the UN Security Council. The architecture provides legality and legitimacy through the use of international law to authorize force, as well as prescribing in resolutions the mandate and types of forces to be used. There is, therefore, a *performative* quality to this architecture, insofar as it determines who is in need of protection (victims) and who will intervene to protect. It relies on the threat of coercion, initially in non-lethal ways such as sanctions, but ultimately through military action. As is in keeping with the perspective taken in these boxes, feminist security scholarship points out the gendered nature of these measures, briefly discussed below.

The liberal approach to studying gender, quintessentially by treating it as a variable, studies the importance of men and women in various roles mandated by the governance security architecture. One recent example is the incorporation of more women soldiers in peacekeeping operations to ameliorate sexual violence against women perpetrated by peacekeeping forces. Evidence shows that the larger the proportion of women peacekeepers and the higher the level of gender equality in troop contributing countries, the less likely civilian populations will experience violence at the hands of their ‘protectors’ (Karim and Beardsley 2016). The focus on how to protect women in conflict situations, a public sphere par excellence given the many international institutions shaping it, stands in stark contrast to the private sphere that is much more dangerous. Worldwide, more than 35% of women murdered are killed by an intimate partner, and within the EU the proportion is even higher, with intimate partner or family-related violence accounting for 55% of lethal violence against women (Muižnieks, 2016; WHO/PAHO, 2012).

The post structural feminist studies of security would concur that the time before and the time after military action are also important considerations because ‘there is a continuum of violence – uniquely gendered violence – that precedes conflict and lingers long after ceasefire’ (Forester, 2019, p. 477). It begins, as stated above, in the performative capacity of global security architecture to legitimize masculine forms of conflict resolution, such as use of threat, and the use of violent physical coercion to ensure compliance. It would also critically engage with the gendered dualism of combatant and civilian (Kinsella, 2011), which remains masculine/feminine even when the soldiers are women. Indeed, the abuse
of prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison by women soldiers has been studied as an example of the hyper-masculinized identity that female military personnel sometimes feel obliged to assume in order to demonstrate their belonging (Kaufman-Osborn, 2005). In this way, the architecture of global security provision is neither neutral nor passive, but instead can be argued to legitimate particular actions and roles that are constitutive of the ‘hegemonic masculinity’ (Tickner, 2003, p. 278) prevalent in society.

4.3 WMD proliferation architecture

The WMD non-proliferation architecture is the result of over sixty years’ worth of efforts to fight a threat that remains current. The three types of WMDs – nuclear, chemical and biological weapons – do not form an integrated regime. However, the architectures governing these categories of weapons share certain characteristics. The range of actors involved in the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons assemble around three pillars: treaties and legally binding instruments, soft-law regulations, and the possibility to resort to the UNSC for enforcement measures. Furthermore, a remarkable aspect in the evolution of the WMD global governance architecture is the growing relevance of export control regimes. UNSC Resolution 1540 requires that states control the transfer of dual-use goods in order to prevent non-state actors from proliferating any kind of WMD, and calls for the use of guidelines and control lists by national authorities and NSAs like companies. Export control guidelines adopted by IIGOs furthermore directly affect the behaviour of states in the area of strategic trade controls. Resolution 1540 homogenizes the obligation of all states around the globe, but each WMD architecture presents its own idiosyncrasies, which are directly related to the nature of the weapons it regulates.

Since the global governance architecture for nuclear non-proliferation was the first one of the three WMD non-proliferation regimes to have specific formal actors, it is considered to be the oldest one. Thus, it also stands out as the most developed so far.93 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the architecture dealing with this threat. The NPT, which has 191 member states, provides a clear structure for the architecture of nuclear non-proliferation: on the one hand, it establishes a three-pillar system that touches upon the core nuclear issues – the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament, and on the other, it distinguishes between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states94. This feature, known as the “Grand Bargain”, requires that nuclear weapon states95 take measures towards eliminating their nuclear arsenals, while non-nuclear weapon states forgo the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons.

93 Although the prohibition of the use of poison as a method of warfare is based on a customary international norm which was first incorporated into conventional law in The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and later in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, chemical weapons were not governed by formal actors until the creation of the OPCW in 1997 (Goldblat & SIPRI, 1971).
94 Article IX.3 of the NPT considers a nuclear-weapon state is “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967”. (United Nations General Assembly, 1968).
95 China, France, United Kingdom, United States and the USSR.
in exchange for cooperation to employ nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. The fact that the nuclear weapon states have made little to no progress in nuclear disarmament has led the NPT to be regarded as a discriminatory treaty that does not guarantee the same rights and obligations for all its signatories (Lavieille, 1997, p. 151). 96

The obligation of non-nuclear weapon states to sign legally binding Safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (NPT Article III.1) grants this FIGO a central role in the nuclear governance architecture. In addition to guaranteeing states' compliance with the NPT, the IAEA promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy and has enabled the adoption of myriad instruments related to nuclear security and technical cooperation, 97 which is one of the programs on which the Agency has increasingly set more attention in the last 10 to 15 years. In its safeguarding duties, the IAEA is supported by regional organizations, 98 which cooperate to ensure that nuclear energy is used for peaceful purposes only. For instance, the IAEA signed a cooperation agreement with Euratom in 1973 to allow so-called “Joint Inspections” to take place while avoiding potential overlaps. 99 Furthermore, in the event of treaty violations, the IAEA’s Board of Governors may ask for the UNSC to step in to bring the breaching behaviour to an end by imposing sanctions.

In addition to the global, intercontinental and regional FIGOs, a significant number of IIGOs also contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of the atomic weapon. Multilateral export control regimes (MECR) are very active in setting standards to nuclear components trade, and international contact groups have been particularly active in specific situations where proliferation is suspected or actually occurring. These groups, such as the 6-Party talks and the P5+1, generally operate independently from the IAEA, but they do provide information and updates to the Agency. Due to the ongoing concern regarding the nuclear proliferation threat, some ad hoc initiatives are undertaken in order to newly address the issue. Such is the case of the 2010-2016 Nuclear Security Summits, a US initiative which resulted in four biannual large gatherings of heads of state addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism by reducing and securing weapons-usable civilian nuclear materials, enhancing international cooperation to prevent their illicit acquisition by non-state actors, and strengthening the global non-proliferation system without hampering the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 100

96 Furthermore, the NPT has been overtaken by events in recent decades, so that, third states not party to the treaty are, in practice, “nuclear powers” (i.e. DPRK, India, Israel and Pakistan).


98 Examples include AFCONE (African Commission on Nuclear Energy), OPANAL (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) and SEANWFZ (the Commission for the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, which is part of ASEAN).

99 International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/193 - The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Euratom and the Agency with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Vienna: 1973).

100 53 states from all continents, together with the EU, IAEA, Interpol and UN representatives met in Washington DC, Seoul, The Hague and Washington D.C. again to adopt five action plans for
As opposed to the situation in the other two WMD architectures, a complete ban of nuclear weapons is not yet a reality. The commitments to Regional Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaties (in Africa, Antarctica, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean)\(^{101}\) are noteworthy insofar as they prohibit whole regions from acquiring, possessing, developing, testing or using nuclear weapons; and treaties banning nuclear tests – like the Partial Test Ban Treaty and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty – are important steps forward (even though the latter has yet to come into force yet). A universal prohibition of the atomic weapon, however, is contingent on the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The slow yet steady progress of this treaty, which was adopted in 2017, lays the foundation for future legal developments and illustrates the relevance of civil society in the agenda-setting of international disarmament. Indeed, efforts by the civil society to outlaw nuclear weapons date back to the beginning of the atomic age, but the work by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) as the promoter of the TPNW can be considered one of its biggest milestones. Together with NGOs, epistemic communities have also contributed not only to the awareness-raising but also to knowledge-management of nuclear non-proliferation in a notably technical field. States, FIGOs and IIGOs have all resorted to experts and technicians when deemed necessary, granting them varying levels of power to contribute to public policies.

Nevertheless, the nuclear framework is not exclusively governed by legally binding rules. Guidelines adopted by IIGOs such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) set the standards that guide states in relation to the trade in nuclear goods, making them an essential factor in the workings of the nuclear non-proliferation architecture. It is worth underlining that these soft-law regulations adopted by these MECR have become legally binding for all EU member states over the last ten years, through the Union’s dual-use Regulation. The regulations developed by IIGOs have thus become formalized in this case, which demonstrates their significant impact in the global governance architecture. Turning to the role of MNCs, before transferring certain dual-use goods, companies must perform user and end-use checks to comply with the licensing requirements. Hence, it is not surprising that ever more MNCs are adopting internal compliance programs to ensure secure transfers while preserving third states’ rights to development; this is increasingly applicable to exporters, transporters and finance companies. These programs essentially facilitate MNCs’ implementation of rules and regulations. In this sense, also the Academia is increasingly seen as an addressee of this type of behavioural guides. Efforts have been undertaken during the last few years by some key institutions and referential organizations to reach out for research centres. For example, as an important part of its Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity appeal, the ICRC adopted and promoted a code of conduct for the scientific community that international organizations to take forward the work of the summits. In the last meeting (March 2016), all 53 states took part except Russia (Davenport, 2018a).

aims at fostering knowledge on humanitarian norms against the non-peaceful use of the life sciences (“Preventing hostile use of the life sciences: From ethics and Law to best practice”, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2004).

MECR exist also in the chemical and biological field, as well as in the missiles technology components, insofar they may be used to deploy WMD. The already mentioned Australia Group, Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology control regime are, together with the NSG and the Zangger Committee, highly important in the current functioning of international strategic trade controls. There is still some criticism related to the eventual limitation of the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear, chemical and biological dual-use goods, however, the acknowledgement of the need to use items-lists and transfer controls by UNSC Resolution 1540 has partly benefitted the image of these regimes.

While many different actors are active in this field, functional overlap is not common: the actors generally address the prevention of nuclear proliferation from largely differentiated angles (safeguards, transfer controls, test banning, disarmament, sanctions). Indeed, it can be argued that division of labour seems to be commonplace in the nuclear governance architecture. The interlocking network of treaties, agreements, FIGOs and IIGOs, voluntary controls and norms focus on separate aspects of threat management, thus constituting a comprehensive and organized, yet loosely linked, global governance architecture against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In contrast to the NPT, the international treaties that form the backbone of the chemical and biological weapons architectures establish the same rights and obligations for all state parties. And again, in contrast to the nuclear non-proliferation architecture, both the chemical and biological weapons conventions completely prohibit each type of weapon. This may be a contributing factor to the less active role of NGOs or social movements in this part of the WMD governance architecture. Another key difference with nuclear non-proliferation is the fact that chemical and biological weapons are much more accessible to all types of actors. Producing a nuclear weapon requires infrastructure and resources that are hardly available to any actor other than states; but chemical and biological weapons can be produced with far fewer resources. Although technical barriers prevent the latter two types of WMD from being easily deployed to cause large numbers of casualties, their proliferation may take place at many different levels – mainly industry and research centres. These two characteristics underline the importance of non-state actors in the architectures related to chemical and biological weapons.

Turning to the architecture related to chemical weapons specifically, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its intrusive verification system represent a paradigm of how to implement non-proliferation measures. This FIGO enjoys a fluent relationship with its member states and, thanks to the network of National Authorities created under the auspices of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), international inspectors can access facilities where toxic chemicals may be diverted into non-peaceful uses. Non-state actors like chemical companies or research labs are not only subject to in situ missions by the

102 Chemical and biological weapons were previously jointly regulated by the 1925 Geneva Convention.
103 Article VII.4 of the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”.
OPCW, but are also affected by the work of IIGOs like the Australia Group, which establish export conditions for strategic chemical items. With its deep connection to the CWC, the OPCW constitutes the keystone upon which the chemical non-proliferation regime is built. When chemical weapons are used (or the threat of their use is clear), the OPCW can and does cooperate with other global and regional FIGOs. A recent example is the Fact-Finding Mission deployed in Syria by the OPCW together with the UN in 2014. The chemical weapons regime, in other words, is based a central convention and FIGO with verification capabilities. The work of the central FIGO (OPCW) is complemented, through a clear division of labour and cooperative relations, by IIGOs which establish standards, and other global and regional FIGOs which assist in verification efforts.

The biological weapons regime, in contrast, lacks a relevant and strong FIGO of this type (Sánchez Cobaleda, 2017, p. 4). Since 2006, the Biological Weapons Convention (BTWC)\textsuperscript{104} has relied on an Implementation Support Unit\textsuperscript{105} located in Geneva (at the office of the UN’s Office for Disarmament Affairs), which is an administrative support cell responsible for assisting the meetings of the parties. This cell also works toward promoting the full implementation of the BTWC and its universalization (as a number of states have not yet signed). However, the BTWC did not foresee the creation of a FIGO or a dedicated verification mechanism – and although efforts have been made to establish a control and verification protocol since the convention’s adoption in 1972, negotiations have failed repeatedly.

This has increased the importance of alternative channels, such as the Secretary-General’s Investigative Mechanism. This mechanism is the only instrument in force that can be activated to conduct inquiries in the event of a violation of the BTWC.\textsuperscript{106} In the late 1980s, the UNGA gave the UN Secretary-General all necessary powers to investigate allegations of the use of chemical and biological weapons without the prior authorization of the Security Council. The Investigative Mechanism can be activated by any UN state,\textsuperscript{107} and it draws its competence to investigate the use of these weapons from the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the use of chemical and biological weapons.

In the absence of a formal IGO to control dual-use biological goods,\textsuperscript{108} other actors and mechanisms contribute to this objective. Two important cases are those of the Australia Group (MECR) and UNSC Resolution 1540 (which decrees that all UN member states shall refrain from supporting NSAs that aim to “develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer

\textsuperscript{104} Formally known as the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons (BTWC)”.  
\textsuperscript{105} The Implementation Support Unit was established in 2006, during the VI Review Conference. At first it was created on a temporary basis for five years but it has been periodically renewed since then. This unit was created to provide support and to manage the Confidence Building Measures that states parties to the BTWC make available to the rest of member states as a compliance and transparency mechanism. It also contributes to the universalization of the Convention.  
\textsuperscript{106} UNGA Resolution A/RES/34/114, C-299, 1979-1980.  
\textsuperscript{107} As it happened in the 1980s and 1990s to carry out investigations in Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq or Mozambique, or, more recently, during the civil war in Syria.  
\textsuperscript{108} Viral agents, bacterial agents, rickettsial agents, etc. Biological weapons are particularly difficult to detect because dual-use goods, i.e. commonly used equipment and materials permitted in civil society for medical and pharmaceutical purposes, which are developed scientifically and technologically at great speed, are very commonly used in the production process.
or use biological weapons, especially for terrorist purposes”). The rules that flow forth from these efforts require companies and scientific research centres to implement transfer controls when trading biological dual-use items.

Overall, the biological weapons regime has a number of deficiencies: first and foremost, the lack of a centralized actor dedicated to control and verification, which turns it (for many) into the weakest point of the international non-proliferation architecture. Indeed, the inexistence of an international organization to support the implementation obligations – which is only partially replaced by the three-people-only Implementation Support Unit – and the absence of strong methods for verifying compliance with the BTWC continue to be seen as the main flaws of this regime.

**Shortcomings and challenges in the WMD proliferation architecture**

An important challenge that is shared by all non-proliferation instruments and, therefore, the whole WMD architecture, is the speed at which scientific and technological advances happen. The fast pace of progress in science and technology has an impact on the implementation of international commitments, since the strategic materials and goods that have to be controlled are constantly being expanded or modified, making it very difficult for the states and concerned parties to update themselves. This rapid evolution hinders the implementation not only of the BTWC, but also of the CWC, the NPT and all the soft-law regulations adopted by the multilateral export control regimes.

Together with the emergence of new technologies that may pose difficulties from a normative perspective, the appearance of new actors in the field is also an increasingly relevant issue in terms of non-proliferation control and accountability. Many of the new relevant players in the field of WMD proliferation are not necessarily states nor state-related, which makes it difficult not only to monitor compliance, but also to enforce non-proliferation regulations. The unawareness or impossibility to know for sure who the new sensitive actors involved in proliferation activities may be complicates awareness-raising activities. As a result, actual addressees of the regulation may not always be aware of their implementation commitments.

In this sense, it is particularly important to engage more non-state actors like industry, civil society and academia in non-proliferation efforts. However, international norms and regulations are addressed to states. UNSC Resolution 1540 tried to resolve this gap between the international legal framework and some of its potential addressees by forcing states to adopt national legislation that would foresee specific sanctions for NSAs not respecting international (and therefore national) commitments to prevent WMD proliferation. However, when Committee 1540 evaluates compliance with the Resolution, it is obviously states that are held accountable, rather than NSAs. Moreover, compliance levels with the submission of national reports to the 1540 Committee informing on the implementation of the Resolution are still far from universal.

### 4.4 Terrorism architecture

In this subsection we will study the global governance architecture of counter-terrorism. We will start by providing an overview of the global and regional legal instruments used in the fight
against terrorism. Afterwards, we will briefly trace the recent evolution of the field and its most relevant actors.

Although the threat of international terrorism may seem to be a recent phenomenon, with 9/11 as its fulcrum, global responses to international terrorism appeared as early as the 1960s, in the shape of legal conventions and protocols. In fact, as table 7 shows, 12 out of 19 global conventions and protocols that deal with terrorist activities predate the 9/11 attacks. Still, it is eye-catching that these instruments criminalize specific terrorist acts but not terrorism as a whole. Efforts to do so – including the UN Draft Comprehensive Terrorism Convention – have stumbled upon controversial definitional issues and global consensus has been elusive so far.

Table 7: Global conventions and protocols that deal with terrorist activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Treaty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>International Convention against the Taking of Hostages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Acts Committed on Board Aircraft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The UN has created various organs and mechanisms to combat terrorism, such as the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. However, the absence of a comprehensive international treaty and/or international organization dedicated entirely to counter-terrorism could be seen as a gap in the global governance architecture of counter-terrorism. This void, nevertheless, has been covered in large part by regional FIGOs, which have adopted regional conventions on terrorism, in most cases after 9/11. These conventions provide regional definitions of terrorism and other relevant concepts and establish specific measures for the prevention of terrorism (see table 8).

**Table 8: Regional conventions and protocols that deal with terrorist activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Regional FIGO</th>
<th>Treaty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>AOU Convention on the Prevention and Combat of Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td>Malabo Protocol (art. 28G)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union (EU) Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ own compilation based on section 3
* This lengthy and comprehensive document is identified as a political declaration, which reveals that ECOWAS members were hesitant to make the text legally binding.

Overall, it could be argued that the governance architecture of counter-terrorism is relatively young and underdeveloped – at least compared to the architectures working on WMDs and the use of force. 9/11 doubtlessly constitutes a turning point in the evolution of the governance architecture. A number of FIGOs were dealing with issues related to terrorism before 2001, but after 9/11, most regional FIGOs expanded their mandate and adopted legal instruments against terrorism. The same is true for informal IGOs working on counter-terrorism: they have proliferated precipitously over the last two decades. Interestingly, while most of these IIIGOs were set up recently, certain pre-existing ones expanded their activities by linking their original focus on transnational organized crime or intelligence-sharing with the terrorism prevention agenda, such was the case of MECR like the Australia Group or the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Unlike the rapid proliferation of IIIGOs in the post-9/11 years, NSA activities to combat terrorism are scarcer. With the exception of NGOs that engage in anti-radicalization efforts and certain global banks that adopt principles and best practices against terrorist financing, the rest of the NSAs do not contribute actively to the governance of counter-terrorism.
Among global FIGOs, Interpol's Counter-Terrorism Directorate is particularly relevant, strengthening cooperative linkages among its member states' law enforcement and intelligence authorities. Among regional FIGOs, the European Union has, beyond doubt, developed the most comprehensive toolbox against terrorism. Through the Action Plan adopted in 2001 and the 2002 Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, the EU created the foundations for the establishment of new agencies and bodies and the empowerment of existing ones, including Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, EU Police Chiefs Operational Task Force, the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator, the European Maritime Safety Agency and the EU Agency for Network and Information Security. Moreover, EU members have created several new IIGOs with strong emphasis on information and intelligence-sharing and on curbing the sources of terrorist financing.

Shortcomings and challenges in the terrorism architecture

All in all, apart from the obvious limitations of global counter-terrorism efforts owed to the absence of a commonly accepted definition and of an international counter-terrorism organization, there are some additional shortcomings in the governance architecture of terrorism. The creation of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the informal Global Counterterrorism Forum have diminished the role of the already struggling Counter-Terrorism Committee, while the functional overlaps among these institutions have complicated global coordination on important issues such as compliance monitoring, technical assistance and capacity-building.

As described earlier, the absence of a centralized counterterrorist regime has been partially amended by regional attempts to fight terrorism. However, this approach can create unnecessary duplications of effort, especially among regional and intercontinental FIGOs with overlapping memberships. This substantially increases transaction costs, consuming funds that could be dedicated to other coordination activities. Last but not least, the absence of mechanisms to ensure compliance with counter-terrorism measures, varying levels of commitment among states, and state reticence to share intelligence and utilize institutions for information-sharing or police and judicial cooperation all impose limits on counter-terrorism efforts, as described in the case of Europol and Eurojust.

4.5 Comparing the architectures of the use of force, WMD proliferation and terrorism

In this mapping exercise, we have focused on the global governance of the three security threats mentioned by all E7, G7 and BRICS states in their most recent national security strategies. The regime complexes surrounding these threats are in many ways comparable, but they also present important differences. The use of force is arguably the most complex of the threats to govern, for two main reasons: first, its governance architecture has been developing for more than seven decades as it is the oldest and most pervasive security threat; and second, because conflicts are phased and an ever-increasing number of actors are involved in their governance.
A point of convergence for all three architectures is that FIGOs remain relatively central. However, the weight of global FIGOs compared to intercontinental and regional ones varies from case to case. In the use of force, regional organizations are fundamental but they are subordinated to the UN, given that they cannot employ military force in regional conflicts without explicit UNSC authorization. In WMD non-proliferation efforts, intercontinental/regional IGOs are comparatively less important when compared to the IAEA, OPCW and the UN. On the contrary, in counter-terrorism efforts, regional IGOs will continue to be the key actors, unless states agree on a common definition of terrorism to propel forward common global counter-terrorist strategies.

When it comes to the importance of IIGOs, there is considerable divergence. In non-proliferation, informal intergovernmental arrangements have traditionally been crucial, especially in standard-setting for export controls. In counter-terrorism, they have also proliferated in number and increased in importance, as they facilitate intelligence-sharing and contribute to capacity-building and to the fight against terrorist financing. However, the management of the use of force is still very much concentrated in FIGOs, with the exception of certain ad hoc contributions of international contact groups or the G7/G8. At this point, we should note that there is still an important gap in the study of the interplay between formal and informal security IGOs, unlike other fields like trade and finance (Vabulas & Snidal, 2013, p. 215).

In contrast to IIGOs, and notwithstanding their limitations, international courts and tribunals may have jurisdiction in contentious cases and condemn the illegitimate use of force by states, as well as prosecute individuals for serious crimes like genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. In non-proliferation, on the contrary, they play a marginal role, save for the advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, and no permanent court had been given jurisdiction over terrorism until very recently.

With regards to NSAs, there is also important variance. For example, in conflict management, both operational and advocacy NGOs are crucial during all three phases, whereas in non-proliferation efforts, only advocacy NGOs are actively engaged; in counter-terrorism, meanwhile, operational NGOs only play a minor role. As for MNCs, they are important in all three architectures but to varying degrees. The self-regulation of companies is vital for the functioning of export control regimes, and can be fairly important in the fight against terrorist financing. However, the contributions of MNCs in conflict management are somewhat less direct and clear. By participating in multi-stakeholder initiatives for increased transparency and by delivering on the corporate security responsibility, MNCs can play a beneficial role in structural conflict prevention. For their part, PMSCs may contribute to post-conflict efforts at security sector reform, although their contributions to global security governance are admittedly still a controversial issue.

109 Of course, as the examples of World Court Project, ICAN and Global Zero have shown, the role of advocacy networks in non-proliferation cannot be underestimated since they can gain so much support as to mobilize UN action and promote the negotiation of legally-binding treaties.
4.6 Reflections on the governance architecture of international peace and security

4.6.1 Cyberthreats and transnational organized crime

*Cybersecurity*

Cybersecurity and its governance will be studied in depth in task 4.3 of this Work Package. Nevertheless, we will offer here a few preliminary notes on the threat and its governance, drawn mainly from our prior research (Pascual-Ramsay, Saz-Carranza, Imbernon, Keller, & Swaden, 2015). First, it is clear that borders are utterly irrelevant when it comes to cyberthreats, making it a one of the clearest examples of how globalization has led to ever more porous borders. Cyberthreats to security come in various shapes and sizes, but they can be classified roughly along two main axes: whether the motivation for the actions is for profit or based on ideological reasons, and whether their impact is physical or not. Critical infrastructure disruption, for example, would have the highest physical impact, and is more likely to be motivated by ideology. More ‘petty’ cybercrime, on the other hand, is motivated by profit and generally has limited physical impacts.

The governance of cybersecurity is weak overall. This is partially due to the ideological differences and geopolitical tensions between states on this issue, which have only increased over the past few years. Whereas certain states, such as China, Russia and most Arab states, support greater governmental control over cyberspace; the US, EU, Japan and some others defend the current multi-stakeholder system in which non-governmental institutions play a basic role. Yet other countries float between these two extremes; they include India, Brazil, and South Africa. These differences have led to limited effectiveness and gridlock in international organizations with (near-)universal membership. Indeed, “[i]t is especially noteworthy that the three main poles on cybersecurity issues (the US, China, and Russia) rarely coincide in terms of their membership in non-UN-sponsored initiatives” (Pascual-Ramsay et al., 2015, p. 15). Moreover, many current actors working in the global governance of cybersecurity do not match the definition – that is, their geographical reach is far from global. Most actors are located in Europe and North America and focus chiefly on those regions. In 2014, there were only three global mechanisms based outside these two regions, in Southeast Asia: the International Telecommunications Union’s Multilateral Partnership against Cyberthreats, the Interpol Global Complex for Innovation, and the ASEAN Regional Forum, which has fostered confidence-building measures in cyberspace.

Overall, “a comprehensive and functional regime of global cybersecurity governance is clearly lacking” (Pascual-Ramsay et al., 2015, p. 13). The current architecture can be said to comprise three layers. The first layer addresses the proper functioning of network systems and it is arguably the most effective of the three. Based on a multi-stakeholder model, actors in this layer work to provide internet technical coordination, technological standards, internet number management, and incident response. Coordination between private actors is common in this layer, with FIGOs playing a supporting role. At the other end of the architecture, we find cyber warfare issues (e.g. terrorism, espionage, and politically motivated cyberattacks on critical
infrastructure). Sovereignty issues loom large here, and cooperation tends to be bilateral at best. Some of the organizations that try to take a more multilateral approach to the issue include: the G7/8 and G20, and intercontinental/regional FIGOs – both economic and security-oriented. Finally, the middle layer comprises issues such as net neutrality, freedom of speech, non-state or criminal cyberattacks, data protection and intellectual property rights. In this non-military and less technical space, the interests of industry, governments and individuals meet. While these knotty issues can be polarizing, this layer currently offers the best chances for further action by the international community, and perhaps by the EU.

Cyberthreats and their governance are almost certain to increase in importance in the near future. This is an area where multi-stakeholder partnerships have already shown their worth, where certain regional, intercontinental and global FIGOs have made tentative inroads, and where the private sector can offer many useful contributions. More IIGOs and intercontinental/regional FIGOs have an opportunity to increase their activity in this area in the near future. The former offer a level of flexibility and informality which may facilitate consensus-building in these sensitive issues, while intercontinental/regional IGOs may have greater chances of success in this area as opposed to global ones.

**Transnational organized crime**

While organized crime is not new, its consideration as an *international* security threat is relatively new. Human trafficking, drug trafficking, arms smuggling and a host of other criminal activities have been a traditional challenge for the national security of states, but it was globalization that allowed them to cross national borders and spread. Nowadays, transnational organized crime is a considerable threat to international security and its governance architecture is becoming more and more complex. Still, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols do not provide a precise definition of transnational organized crime, nor does it list the crimes that fall under the general umbrella. In this mapping exercise, we have touched upon money-laundering and drug trafficking (in Central Asia), mostly through their connections to terrorist financing. Other crimes like money counterfeiting, cyber-dependent crimes, investment fraud, illicit waste trafficking, intellectual property crime, migrant smuggling, organized property crime, sports corruption, trafficking of endangered species, trafficking of arms and trafficking in persons are often listed as transnational organized crime (Europol, 2019).

Here we will try to provide some insights – based largely on the work of Gómez-Mera (2017) – on the governance architecture of trafficking in persons (TIP) to illustrate its rapid evolution, the increasing participation of NSAs in global governance and its overlaps with other regimes. To begin with, we should note that trafficking in persons was barely on the global security radar two decades ago. It was the adoption of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons (especially Women and Children) in 2000 that put this threat on the map. By defining and criminalizing trafficking in persons, this legal instrument led to the rapid emergence of binding norms at the international, regional and national levels, and inspired NGOs, businesses and professional associations to develop private-public multi-stakeholder initiatives in order to self-regulate their anti-TIP practices. The fact that the anti-TIP regime overlapped with international human rights law, labour standards and migration was certainly
an important factor for the proliferation of hard and soft norms, new actors and private forms of governance. Thanks to these overlaps, well-established actors within the UN-system like the UNODC and ILO started to collaborate with private actors such as labour rights NGOs (including Verité, Free the Slaves and International Labor Rights Forum) and produced an impressive amount of public-private transnational initiatives, regulating a wide range of issues from organ trafficking to the sexual exploitation of children (Marx and Wouters, 2017).

While these efforts have been laudable, especially if we consider the short timeframe in which they were produced, their overall effectiveness has been questionable at best. Laura Gómez Mera has conclude, somewhat dishearteningly, that “the success in preventing TIP still “depends on governments’ regulatory support and political commitment” (Gómez-Mera, 2017, p. 20). Further research is necessary to study the global governance architectures of the multiple organized crimes that now have a transboundary nature.

4.6.2 The broader regime complex and its overlaps with other issue areas

In this final section, we will offer some reflections on the security threats for which full consensus is elusive, but which are increasing in salience. These threats (climate change, migration, infectious diseases and economic crises), which did not fall under the definition employed in this exercise, tend to be addressed from specific legal frameworks and specialized global governance actors outside of the security field.

Climate change is becoming a major concern around the world. In fact, according to the Oxford Corpus database that contains hundreds of millions of words of written English, the use of the term “climate emergency” has increased by a hundredfold since 2018 (Schuessler, 2019). For about two decades, it has been commonplace to see climate change being framed as a threat to national, international and human security (Oels, 2012). Although the debate on the security ramifications of climate change began as early as the 1980s, it was not until the late 2000s that it found its way into the UNSC (Scheffran, Brzoska, Brauch, Link, & Schilling, 2012, p. 7). Besides a number of climate-related initiatives undertaken by the UNSC in recent years (some of which were already mentioned in Section 2), there are many other examples of the gradual securitization of climate change.

Broadly speaking, this securitization has played out in two major ways. On the one hand, states and relevant actors within the international security complex (Oels, 2012, pp. 7–9) (such as the UNSC itself) have begun to internalize climate change as a security issue, despite difficulties in defining what the concrete implications of that should be. On the other hand, some of the institutions and arrangements that constitute the regime complex for climate change (Keohane & Victor, 2010) have started to show more interest in the security dimension of this threat. For example, the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) included a chapter on human security in its Fifth Assessment Report (2014) (Adger & Pulhin, 2014), after previous reports came under heavy criticism for not addressing this issue in depth (Gleditsch & Nordås, 2014). Still, efforts to establish linkages between climate change and security have encountered several roadblocks – not least, the insufficient and contested evidence on whether climate change increases the likelihood of armed conflict (Gleditsch & Nordås, 2014).
Even though a “full securitization” of climate change is still far away (Scott, 2012), some global security actors have already found that stepping beyond their traditional boundaries into the terrain of climate change – albeit slightly – can trigger pushback. In 2011, the UNSC held its second debate on climate change, which resulted in a non-binding document that emphasized the need to take into consideration its “possible security implications”. G77 countries expressed their concern that the move could open the door to an outsized involvement of the UNSC in climate change mitigation, to the detriment of specialized institutions and arrangements like the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Venezuela, for example, explicitly ruled out any climate change initiatives presented outside the scope of the UNFCCC, which upholds the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” for developed and developing countries (Scott, 2012).

The fields of global health and migration, which contain two of the other indirect threats to security identified in section 2, are also subject to a certain degree of securitization. In fact, both health and migration patterns are thought to be affected by climate change (Schütte, Gemenne, Zaman, Flahault, & Depoux, 2018), and those complex interconnections can be studied from a security standpoint. Beyond climate change (and leaving aside those aspects of global health that, as mentioned in Section 2, are inherently securitized), the UNSC has also started to cover the spread of infectious diseases – a phenomenon that is directly linked with global health, but to some extent with migration as well. In 2014, after the breakout of the Ebola epidemic in Western Africa, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2177. This Resolution determined that “the unprecedented extent of the Ebola outbreak in Africa constitute[d] a threat to international peace and security”. Although the Resolution did not go hand-in-hand with any enforcement action, nor did it have any tangible impact on the operations conducted by the World Health Organization (WHO), it represented “the symbolic culmination of an increasing process of securitization of health” (Burci, 2014). Just what the consequences of this process might end up being, in terms of further overlaps between the international security complex and the global health regime, remains a matter of speculation. In any case, the 2014 Ebola outbreak came to demonstrate – just as the MERS, yellow fever or Zika outbreaks – how unprepared the international community was (and continues to be) to handle such fallouts (Osterholm & Olshaker, 2018, Chapter 12). Even if it mainly affected three West African states, “it exposed fault lines in global health security that put us all at risk”, as the Director-General of the WHO pointed out (Ghebreyesus, 2018). What is clear is that all attempts to forestall epidemics and provide fast responses to outbreaks still depends fully on the combination of finance, biology, solid knowledge, public health policies and political will (Garrett, 2018, p. 827).

The securitization of migration is also plain to see, not only in the domestic arena of many states (where political movements that look at migration through the lens of security, or rather insecurity, have gained traction), but in the international arena as well. The approach taken by the European Union (EU) to the influx of Syrian refugees, which reached its peak in 2015, is a case in point. Indeed, this influx of refugees came to be perceived as one of the most prominent examples of the links between the external and internal security dimensions of the EU. The EU’s response, however, was not to tackle the root causes leading to this refugee influx, but

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110 See Presidential Statement S/PRST/2011/15
to harden its external borders even further. In any case, the widespread securitization of migration precedes the Syrian refugee crisis, and it precedes even older events (such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks) that may help explain the rise of anti-immigration sentiments in the West. As a matter of fact, the lack of a coherent global migration regime is partly due to a longstanding reluctance by many states to deal with the issue of border management multilaterally (Gamlen & Marsh, 2011) – a reluctance that is very much present even in the highly integrated framework of the EU.

Finally, economic crises can also be seen as sources of insecurity, as we already explained in section 2. Some economic parameters are customarily securitized – as the term “food security” exemplifies – and a growing number of academic studies deal with the security implications of famines, shortages, financial disruptions and other instances of economic turmoil. Nonetheless, the links between economic crises and episodes of insecurity are often hard to trace, particularly if we look only at those episodes that clearly transcend national borders. Moreover, the architecture that governs the global economy – i.e., the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, among other organizations – is much more robust than that which governs the other indirect threats that we discussed previously. This factor makes it particularly difficult for the international security complex to aspire to a prominent role in addressing economic crises from a security perspective.

4.6.3 Governance gaps

There are several gaps in global security governance that contribute to the suboptimal provision of the GPG of international peace and security. Below, we refer to some of the most important gaps we have detected during the drafting process of the current mapping exercise. We limit our observations to the three threats we have studied in the most depth (those identified as such by all states studied in section 2): the use of force, WMD proliferation and terrorism. Following Thomas Weiss and Ramesh Thakur, we have classified governance gaps in the security realm into five categories: knowledge, normative, policy, institutional and compliance gaps (T. Weiss & Thakur, 2010, p. 7).

By knowledge gaps we refer to a lack of empirical information or theoretical explanations about the nature, causes, gravity and magnitude of a problem. Scientific knowledge is important for governance as it forms the basis of policymaking and helps mitigate ideological biases.111 When knowledge about an issue is disputed and unclear, reaching consensus about universally acceptable norms is an extremely challenging task.112 It is at this point that normative gaps can arise. Knowledge is also crucial in policy formulation. By policy, the authors refer to “an interlinked set of governing principles and goals and the agreed programs

111 Civil society actors, including universities, research institutes, think tanks and NGOs, typically play an indispensable role in filling knowledge gaps.

112 Civil society also plays an important role in promoting consensus on emerging norms. Weiss and Thakur mention the examples of Raphael Lemkin’s efforts to promote the adoption of the UN Genocide Convention; Henri Dunant and the Red Cross movement in the field of international humanitarian law; Peter Benenson and Amnesty International’s pursuit of human rights; and Jody Williams’ work on the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (Weiss and Thakur, 2010, p. 12).
of action to implement those principles and achieve those goals" (Weiss and Thakur, 2010, p. 12). The absence of policies on an emerging issue can lead to inaction and pave the way for crises (Dutt, 2012, p. 192). Of course, policies do not exist in a vacuum; if they manage “to escape the trap of being ad hoc, episodic, judgmental, and idiosyncratic” (T. Weiss & Thakur, 2010, p. 15) they need to be housed within an institution with the necessary resources and autonomy – if these are missing, an institutional gap arises. Finally, even if institutions and treaties are put in place to tackle a certain threat, the political will to implement an agreement or provide resources for established institutions may be absent. In short, compliance gaps can raise issues of implementation, monitoring and enforcement.

Governance gaps in the use of force architecture

Even though armed conflict is as old as humanity itself, there are still important knowledge gaps that affect policy decisions. Gaps in our understanding of the causes and consequences of armed conflict still contribute to the elusive consensus about several related issues such as what constitutes war, a war casualty, aggression, self-defence, pre-emption, preventive war and war crimes (T. Weiss & Thakur, 2010, p. 60). Furthermore, many problems and uncertainties arise from the constant improvement of technology, the militarization of cyberspace and the operation of new lethal weapons like armed unmanned combat aerial vehicles (drones) and autonomous weapons systems (killer robots).

As a result, normative gaps also abound: for example, there is a lack of commonly agreed norms on cybernetics, a lack of terminological clarity in the legal application of extant norms to new weapons and uncertainty about how to establish who can be held responsible under international humanitarian law, as well as fierce debates about the legality and legitimacy of the use of armed drones to conduct extrajudicial killings through extraterritorial targeting (Garcia, 2016).

Uncertainty about the future role of drones and autonomous weapons systems in warfare and the lack of consensus on how to regulate them also explain a noticeable policy gap: the absence of a code of conduct or a treaty that would regulate the militarization of cyberspace. Another important policy gap mentioned in section 3.1.1 is the absence of formal rules to regulate the scope of peacekeeping operations.

As for institutional gaps in the use of force, they can be of three kinds: first, institutions may be needed but inexistent (for example, UNSC responses to the use of force would benefit from an intelligence analysis unit and a rapid reaction capability); second, they may exist but have no real role (like the UN Military Staff Committee); and third, institutions may exist but malfunction due to their structural design, which sometimes leads to striking internal contradictions (the veto power of the P5, for instance, is incompatible with the UN’s objectives and the Security Council’s stated role). What is more, underfunding can also be considered an institutional gap given that it can limit the scope of action and effectiveness of an institution or even lead to internal divisions, as in the case of NATO.

Finally, compliance gaps are also very pronounced, considering that the implementation of UNSC Resolutions on the deployment of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations depends on the political will of states and coalitions to commit peacekeepers and troops.
Additionally, divergent political priorities and conflicting legal interpretations within the UNSC lead to inconsistent implementation of norms and commitments. Compliance gaps have also been significant in the case of R2P. The antithetical positions of the P5 regarding the tension between the sanctity of state sovereignty (and the principle of non-interference) and the protection of human rights have contributed to a humanitarian catastrophe in Syria.

**Governance gaps in the WMD proliferation architecture**

The WMD non-proliferation architecture presents several gaps that range from knowledge gaps to implementation difficulties, including institutional shortcomings or policy challenges. Some of these are common among the three types of weapon – nuclear, chemical and biological; yet certain gaps are specific to a certain weapon class alone.

One of the main shared gaps in this arena – and possibly the most difficult to solve – is the knowledge gap that emerges due to the increasingly fast pace of the evolution of science and technological innovation. The speed at which industrial production processes are developing poses a big obstacle for institutions to keep the normative frameworks updated and, thus, to keep the threats under control. In a not-so-distant future, new types of weaponry may require regulation. This creates pressure to expand the scope of some treaties or guidelines.

This knowledge gap can therefore easily result in a normative gap: it is difficult to shape norms under conditions of uncertainty and/or when the boundaries of an issue are still unknown. Additionally, scientific developments, especially in the field of biology, genetics and bioethics, can give rise to moral questions that result in controversial dilemmas that are difficult to solve at an international level.

At present, there are no major policy gaps in this architecture: the wide variety of instruments of varying legal nature and of considerable universality cover in a fairly comprehensive way all the different areas of interest of the proliferation threat (nuclear, chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation, disarmament, trade controls, etc.). However, it is worth mentioning that since their very beginnings, multilateral export control regimes (MECR) in charge of controlling dual-use goods trade among participant states have been criticized for being considered discriminatory against those states not taking part in these voluntary arrangements. In an MECR, technology supplier states agree to harmonize their export conditions to prevent the proliferation of WMDs through the procurement of dual-use goods. Their main objective is to control strategic trade while guaranteeing an even level playing field among commercial competitors. MECRs adopt soft-law guidelines and control lists that gather the items that should be controlled by all participants and in doing so, they influence the functioning of a large segment of the market. Criticism comes particularly from non-participant states, which consider their right to the peaceful uses of dual-use goods to be limited by the trading conditions agreed among participants in the MECR.

In terms of institutional gaps in the architecture, the most evident one is the lack of a FIGO in charge of guaranteeing compliance with the BTWC. This absence makes the biological regime the weakest point of the international non-proliferation regime complex. Despite the Implementation Support Unit doing a laudable job in terms of universalization and administrative support to the Convention’s Review Conferences, the absence of a proper
verification mechanism hampers the correct functioning of the whole regime. In addition, as is the case in many other threats, institutions in the field of non-proliferation are facing financial difficulties and/or a low level of commitment by certain member states. This issue affects all actors in the architecture to some extent.

Another institutional gap which is specific to this field is weak communication channels between FIGOs/IIGOs and civil society, industries, companies and academic centres. Although the chemical regime is organized efficiently and engages regularly with the private sector in its member states through its network of National Authorities and the same can be stated about the IAEA, the biological weapons architecture – again – is clearly deficient in this respect. UNSC Committee 1540 promotes outreach activities as well as technical assistance events to improve member states’ capacities to implement their international commitments. This includes improving their approach to industries and academia. Nonetheless, there is still much room for improvement in this gap.

Compliance levels vary among the three WMD architectures. In the nuclear field, the non-compliance of nuclear weapon states with Article VI of the NPT overshadows the success and perception of the treaty. The fact that the good faith negotiations that should be pursued according to this disposition have not even started reflects how distant nuclear disarmament is from the nuclear weapon states’ security priorities. This, among other reasons, may help to explain the reluctance of non-nuclear weapon states to accept the very intrusive and still-voluntary Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol is therefore still far from universal and non-nuclear weapon states would rather continue complying with the slightly less intrusive Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In the chemical field, in contrast, member states appear to be fairly compliant with their commitments under the CWC – in spite of some inconsistencies in the regularity and periodicity of the demanded submissions by some parties. Regarding biological weapons, finally, the lack of a dedicated body to monitor compliance with the BTWC has led to larger compliance gaps. Moreover, the emergence of non-state actors and the risk of them acquiring WMDs complicates the implementation of regulations.

**Governance gaps in the terrorism architecture**

Although international terrorism has been an important security challenge for decades, there are still gaps in our knowledge on the phenomenon. The roots of terrorism can be political, socio-economic, religious or a combination of these. Determining the motives and objectives of terrorist groups is not an easy task, but it is especially relevant for policymaking.

Given that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter, global consensus on a common definition of terrorism has been notoriously elusive. This is the case because an agreement on the spectrum of motives, targets and methods that amount to terrorism has distinctly political undertones that are difficult to overcome.

Given that consensus is so elusive, counter-terrorism policy is currently very fragmented. Some global legal instruments on counter-terrorism do exist, but instead of addressing terrorism as a whole in a comprehensive way, they only refer to specific terrorist acts.
As we have noted, there a wide array of intercontinental and regional FIGOs that have created legal instruments and specific bodies and committees to address terrorism. However, the absence of an international counter-terrorism organization continues to hamper global counter-terrorism measures, while institutions focusing on coordination tasks – like the UNSC’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) – struggle to overcome their several limitations.

Ultimately, monitoring the implementation of Resolution 1373 has been a very challenging task for the CTC. This has been further complicated by the deficiencies of the global counter-terrorism framework and the functional overlaps among the CTC, the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the informal Global Counterterrorism Forum. As for other prevention activities, the Financial Action Task Force also lacks autonomous enforcement capacities and has to rely on other compliance mechanisms, like the risk premiums imposed by financial markets.

Table 9, below, summarizes the governance gaps detected across the three architectures.
Table 9: Summary table of governance gaps across the architectures of the use of force, WMD proliferation and terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge gaps</th>
<th>Normative gaps</th>
<th>Policy gaps</th>
<th>Institutional gaps</th>
<th>Compliance gaps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Use of force</strong></td>
<td>- Unpredictability and lack of knowledge about new lethal technologies like armed unmanned aerial combat vehicles (drones), autonomous weapon systems (killer robots) and their operations in the cyber domain.</td>
<td>- Absence of commonly agreed norms on cybernetics. - Lack of terminological clarity in the legal application of existent norms to new weapons. - Uncertainty about how to establish accountability. - The legality and legitimacy of the use of armed drones to conduct extrajudicial killings through extraterritorial targeting (targeted killings).</td>
<td>- Absence of a legal framework or a code of conduct that would regulate the use of force in cyberspace. - Formal regulations on the scope of peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>- Institutions that are needed but inexistent (e.g. an intelligence analysis unit and a rapid reaction capability at the UNSC) - Institutions that exist on paper but have no real functions (e.g. UN Military Staff Committee). - Malfunctioning owed to structural design (e.g. veto right of the P5 at the UNSC) - Underfunding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WMD proliferation</strong></td>
<td>- Fast evolution of science and technology.</td>
<td>- Potential divergent opinions on the need to regulate new components of WMD. - Moral controversies related to bioethics and genetics.</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Lack of a FIGO in charge of guaranteeing compliance with the biological weapons regime. - Absence of verification mechanisms in the field of the BTWC. - Underfunding - Margin for action to bring institutions closer to civil society and industry. - Criticism to MECRs (considered discriminatory).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terrorism</strong></td>
<td>- Causes of terrorism.</td>
<td>- Lack of a commonly accepted definition of terrorism.</td>
<td>- Lack of a comprehensive global treaty to address terrorism – only on certain terrorist acts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ own compilation
4.7 Final remarks

In this paper, we have provided a modest preliminary overview of the current configuration of the global governance of international peace and security. This all-important global public good can be threatened by myriad actors and from myriad angles. Correspondingly, the global governance architecture that has developed to provide international peace and security is immense and highly fragmented, and we have provided only a partial look at it within the scope of this paper.

A productive way of studying the provision of this global public good is by grouping the actors at play according to the specific security threat they address. In this exercise, we have done so at length for the three security threats identified by all key state actors – the use of force, non-proliferation of WMDs, and terrorism – while providing some insights into the governance of other threats for which full consensus is as of yet elusive.

As has been shown, the perception and scope of international peace and security is widening and deepening; all while the three traditional threats remain present and continue to evolve. Their governance is therefore likely to remain front and centre for the foreseeable future, while other threats will gain relevance: the global governance architecture, in other words, will likely increase in scale and complexity in the future.

In addition, outside the mainstream security field, important critical voices are shining the spotlight on the issues of power relations, gender, inequality and disciplinary politics. In this paper, we have presented a dialogue between both sides, in order to highlight the diversity of voices.

Later in this work package, we will turn our attention to two of the security threats that are likely to rise on the agenda: cybersecurity (D4.3) and migration (D4.4). The future of the global governance of international peace and security is uncertain, and varies immensely depending on the threat addressed. In task 4.2 of this work package, we will take an in-depth look at how the European security architecture can address this evolution.
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