Report

Cross-cutting issues in global governance

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"Should I stay or should I go?" The European Union in International Organizations

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Abstract

What is the role of the European Union (EU) in International Organizations (IOs)? This question has been controversially debated in both the academic and policy literatures, with some arguing that the EU remains below its potential and others proposing that the EU is a regulatory power shaping global governance. In this paper, we revisit the EU's involvement in the contemporary global governance system with new systematic data. To do so, we focus on a recent trend in global governance: the growing exercise of authority by IOs. Analyzing key patterns and developments of the contemporary global governance system built around IOs, we examine whether and how the EU is involved in other IOs. We find that the EU—being itself the most authoritative organization—actively participates in highly authoritative and global IOs. It appears that the EU focuses its external-relation resources and activities on those IOs that seem to matter most for global outcomes. At the same time, the EU's involvement in regional organizations is comparatively weak, while regional IOs' authority grows quickly. Our findings carry important implications regarding the debate about the usefulness of pooling EU representation in all IOs, the EU's informal regulatory power, and the possible desire of other organizations to engage and bind the EU.

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1 Introduction

What is the role of the European Union (EU) in international organizations (IOs)?[1] What does EU presence in IOs tell us about EU's engagement with global politics? What are some patterns of the EU's presence in IOs? These are some of the questions we seek to examine in this paper. Examining the EU in the context of IOs speaks to the broader question of the EU's role in global governance. Our primary goal is to describe the landscape by examining the EU presence in IOs particularly. We contribute to the literature on the role of the EU in global governance drawing on this particular sphere.

The question of the EU's role in global governance has been a controversial and much debated subject in the relevant academic and policy literatures. Some argue that the EU's role and influence in global governance remain below its potential because of its internal policy-making deficiencies, or conflicting member state preferences, or lacking recognition by third parties (Emerson et al. 2011; Pisani-Ferry 2009; Gehring, Oberthür, and Mühleck 2013). Unless the EU overhauls its internal modes of operation, makes more coherent policies, and becomes more involved in international institutions, it risks becoming irrelevant in the current global order. Others, by contrast, highlight the size of the common market, or the Union's regulatory expertise, or its strategic options and usefulness to become involved in some but not other institutions (Bradford 2020; Govaere, Capiau, and Vermeersch 2004). According to these perspectives, the EU is seen as an organization with substantial political clout, giving it the opportunity to even exercise some authority over other global actors within both formal and informal global arrangements (Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Bradford 2020). As a result of this debate, much uncertainty still exists about the place and influence of the EU in world politics.

We therefore critically examine the involvement of the EU as an actor in its own right in the global governance system.

A central characteristic of the global governance system is the exercise of authority by International Organizations (IOs). Accordingly, the paper studies in depth authority patterns across IOs and over time, across regional and global organizations, and across substantive issue areas. This will allow us to contrast and compare qualitative insights from the GLOBE mapping papers about developments in specific issue areas. For example, we show how the increasing informalization in international finance relates to IOs' authority patterns, discuss how the strong regulatory competences of trade organizations might drive their societal contestation, and discuss findings on security institutions in the light of the authority data. Importantly, the quantitative examination of IO authority also allows us to identify and summarize more general developments, such as the unequal distribution of authority across IOs and issue areas and the ensuing need for coordinating global actors and institutions.

This first analysis provides the basis for revisiting the role and potential influence of the EU within the global governance system. Authority patterns and the associated challenges condition the very ways in which the EU can shape and implement policies, both within its region and beyond. Consequently, questions arise about the nature and degree of EU representation in other IOs. Is it sufficiently represented in other IOs to make a difference in terms of global regulation? Or is it largely absent from organizations that can authoritatively promote global public goods? Focusing on the EU's presence in IOs, however, offers only a partial account of its role and weight in global governance. An important challenge in contemporary global governance is the multiplicity of sector-specific authoritative IOs operating without a central coordinating institution. Conflicts over norms and regulatory mandates can thus affect the adoption, implemen-

tation, and effectiveness of global rules. This produces a need for coordination between sector-specific institutions and generates different opportunities and constraints for actors wishing to shape global outcomes. Given that the EU is the most authoritative organization in world politics, and with growing evidence of its strong regulatory impact, we accordingly examine the extent to which the EU actively participates in policy-making processes of other IOs. By analyzing the conditions under which the EU actively participates in other IOs, we show whether and how other global actors recognize the Unions' authority and discuss whether it can contribute to tackle global challenges.

This paper makes three distinct contributions to the GLOBE project. First, we provide an analytical grid to inspect and comparatively assess central features and dynamics of the global governance system. We do so by focusing on the exercise of authority by IOs and identify issue-specific and more general developments and challenges that emerge from it. Second, we integrate qualitative evidence from the GLOBE project with quantitative data on IO authority to derive a set of conclusions about the practice of global governance. Third, we perform an in-depth examination of the EU in global governance using novel quantitative data on EU participation patterns to better understand the limits and chances of the Union to exert its influence in the contemporary global governance system. Taken together, these contributions help to resolve some of the ongoing controversies on the EU's role in global governance. Importantly, they also allow us to formulate some policy implications that can inform discussions about adequate responses of the EU to key policy challenges in an increasingly complex, interdependent, and institutionalized world.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, we present our understanding of the global governance system and the crucial role that authority beyond the nation state plays in it. Second, we define IO authority and discuss how we measured it to produce comparable

and systematic large-N data. Third, we inspect with our data global authority patterns by focusing on the exercise of authority across IOs, over time, and across substantive policy areas. Importantly, we integrate insights from the GLOBE mapping papers and findings from our data to more fully characterize and interpret central issue-specific and general challenges. In the fourth section, we turn to the EU's representation in IOs. Specifically, we examine the EU's presence and the type of participation of the EU in other IOs, considering temporal changes, but also the distribution across issue areas and IOs with differing geographic scope. Next, we analyze the drivers of EU representation in other IOs, assessing the extent to which the EU's involvement in IOs depends on their authority and a series of other factors. The paper concludes by summarizing and interpreting key findings, by discussing a road map for further research, and by highlighting key policy implications.

2   The EU in Global Governance

In this section, we discuss our understanding of the EU's role in global governance in light of the relevant literature. This helps to clarify our conceptual assumptions and analytical approach to the subject.

First, we pay particular attention to appropriately define global governance and the global governance system as it describes the environment in which the EU is embedded. Owing largely to the multitude of actors, institutions, processes, and policy areas with global, international, and transnational significance, it remains often unclear what global governance actually is. We adopt recent definitions and concepts that refer to global governance as the exercise of authority beyond nation states. This authority is exercised by international organizations (IOs) that increasingly seek to provide for global

common goods. As a result, our concepts and analyses focus mainly on IOs and not on international agreements (e.g. Paris Agreement) or informal global arrangements (e.g. G-7 or G-20). While these are important components in the global governance system, treaties and other international instruments do not exercise by themselves authority. For this reason, we focus on the EU's role in IOs.

Second, and relatedly, the literature on the EU in global governance has often focused on all types of global arrangements in one study. While contributing thus different perspectives to the debate, we suggest that it is important to focus analytically on IOs. Organizations are different from treaties that often lack the resources and legal standing to propose and implement binding policies. Assessing whether and how the EU is involved in IOs thus offers an estimate of the EU's potential influence on the policy making processes of key institutions in the global governance system that have the capacity to act. Moreover, our focus on IOs reduces the risk of conflating different types of institutions with different histories, operational procedures, and standings in international politics. By reducing the role of such factors, we enhance the comparability of the EU's role across IOs.

The formal role of the EU in IOs is limited by its legal status and legal international norms. Formally, it is an international organization, possesses legal personality (European Community [EC]), and can join existing and form new IOs. However, as Govaere, Capiau, and Vermeersch (2004, p. 158) argue, EU bodies cannot join IOs as "traditional subjects of international law". The EU is not a sovereign state and therefore its contracting and policy competences are not comparable to those of states. This has important implications for the Union's involvement in IOs because the EU can only join an IO if its competences overlap with the IO's policy area. Relatedly, the EU's particular international status also means that it cannot simply decide on its own to join an IO, as many

IOs provide only for state membership, such as the United Nations or the World Bank. IOs would have therefore to change their statues or find equivalent solutions to formally welcome the EU in their governance structures. Against this backdrop, EU involvement in IOs cannot be compared to state membership in IOs. Moreover, the Union's participation in other IOs depends on the EU's exclusive or shared competences and other IOs' willingness to accommodate the Union within its ranks.

Different analytical and empirical questions inspired scholarship on the EU's presence in IOs. Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2010) identifies two main approaches: those who discuss the EU presence with respect to its normative or value-based motivations and outcomes, and those who examine the issue from an interest-based perspective. For the latter branch, the EU does not always act as a coherent actor as disagreements among EU member states often might diminish the Union's international role (Pisani-Ferry 2009; Frieden 2004). At the same time, more recent interest-based perspectives find that the EU is a unilateral regulatory super-power in the global economy (Bradford 2020). Rather than having to rely on international organizations to become relevant, the EU seems to choose its participation in IOs on instrumental grounds (e.g. increasing its legitimacy and forcing others to adapt to its governance model). The arguments in Bradford (2020) are also compatible with perspectives that conceive of the EU as a norm-setting actor, assuming a rather coherent EU identity in its engagements within IOs. For example, the EU understands itself as a promoter of human rights and, indeed, its internal law are bound by human rights standards. However, despite the absence of an explicit competence to set and adjudicate human rights norms (Govaere, Capiau, and Vermeersch 2004), the EU is an active supporter of international human rights organizations (e.g. International Criminal Court [ICC]). In sum, the literature and recent

evidence suggest that both strategic and value-driven considerations drive the EU's engagement with IOs.

In addition to these debates, some scholars discuss the performance of the EU in IOs with respect to its effectiveness, relevance, and efficiency (Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin 2011). Several contributions suggest that the EU's representation and thus clout in IOs is deficient and in need of an urgent upgrade. Legal obstacles, international context, and domestic conditions within member states are suggested as explanations for the relative under-representation of the EU and its lack of policy coherence in IOs (Gstöhl 2009; Emerson et al. 2011; Jørgensen 2009). Likewise, others ask why the EU is recognized as an actor in some IOs, but not in others and explain this variation by references to the EU's capacity and legal competence to act (Gehring, Oberthür, and Mühleck 2013).

The rather pessimistic diagnoses of the Union's state in IOs stand in contrast to arguments that suggest that EU presence in IOs is not always necessary or even beneficial for strengthening the EU's influence in global governance. Situating itself within these debates, our study thoroughly examines the EU's role and involvement in authoritative international organizations. We generate systematic quantitative evidence and analyze it to shed light on these questions. Using a broad and diverse set of IOs and differentiating between various levels and types of EU involvement in other organizations, we contribute to a better understanding of the various possibilities and limitations of the EU to influence policies in the contemporary global governance system.

3 The Global Governance System

Global governance comprises diverse institutional arrangements, multi-level processes, and a multitude of actors that seek to address trans-boundary challenges. However, it is debatable whether this informal description offers enough analytical leverage to distinguish global governance from other features of world politics. Not least because of the subject matter itself, as both the concept and relevant debates about it have undergone several transformations (Coen and Pegram 2015). While earlier works have successfully delimited the field of study and broadened the analytical toolkit and empirical scope by extending their analyses to non-state actors or informal institutions, efforts at systematizing key concepts and formulating a common research agenda emerged only with the third generation of global governance scholarship (Coen and Pegram 2018; Holesch 2019). What distinguishes recent contributions from earlier ones is the assumption that global governance represents a political system *sui generis* and not just a set of diverse institutional arrangements and actors that span nation states. According to this perspective, global governance is defined as *the exercise of authority* beyond the nation state (Zürn 2018, p. 4-5).

Historically, the global governance system emerged in the 1990s, building on certain normative principles and institutions that had been developed long before (p. 126). Two such normative principles, the global common good and rights of individuals, provide the normative basis for global governance today. Almost all international agreements explicitly aim at promoting global common goods (e.g. clean environment or international peace) for the benefit of a larger, global, community, and not for individual states. Starting with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the rights and duties of individuals and societal actors developed into the second foundational normative

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principle. Not only are non-state actors recognized as subjects in their own right, but states are expected to respect individuals' entitlements. To be implemented, these two normative principles require the allocation of resources and responsibilities to actors that produce policies and regulations. This, in turn, nurtures a belief in the possibility of authority beyond the nation state and a need in institutions that channel actors' inputs and produce policies (Zürn 2018).

Thus, it comes as little surprise that the world has witnessed a remarkable rise of international institutions across all substantive issue areas: from the maintenance of international peace or arms control, over global public health or mitigating climate change, to financial stability or cybersecurity, to name just a few. This quantitative growth has also transformed world politics qualitatively. International institutions formulate policy agendas and generate substantive expertise, or propose and monitor rules of conduct between states and other global actors to further the provision of public goods for a more encompassing, even global, community. Such institutional practices often limit state discretion in important ways. In this sense, international institutions *exercise authority* over states, as well as other actors in the global governance system.

International authority, however, differs from authority relationships within nation states. First, international authority is typically issue area-specific. For example, the World Bank exercises authority in development financing, but not in international security. Second, authority in the global realm is reflexive and based on voluntary subordination. States and other addressees of global policies constantly reflect on and check the worthiness of international authority holders. Moreover, states voluntarily defer to international agents when they recognize their limitations in achieving public goods; they are seldom forced to join and obey international institutions. As a result, international authorities request and recommend policies, rather than issuing enforceable commands.

Finally, there is no meta-authority that would coordinate sector-specific authoritative institutions, especially in cases of conflict. Indeed, given the growing significance of regime complexes, normative regulatory conflicts are very likely to emerge and impact the exercise of authority and the provision of global public goods (Alter and Meunier 2009; Gehring and Faude 2013).[2] Climate change, for example, affects all aspects of human life and thus might generate regulatory and normative conflicts across a series of distinct issue areas. Lacking a central arbiter of conflicts, institutions therefore either compete, where some institutions try to expand their influence at the expense of others, or they cooperate, where institutions from different issue areas mutually adjust their policies.

In the global governance system, international organizations are the most important carriers of international authority (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Lake 2003; Haftel and Thompson 2006; Hawkins et al. 2006; Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012; Hooghe et al. 2017). Being formalized entities with a headquarters, they often embody institutionalized relations of super- and sub-ordination between an international agent and states, but also between states within an institution, and even with respect to individuals. An analysis of political developments and challenges in the global governance system has therefore to carefully scrutinize IO authority. Moreover, such an approach enables an examination of how the EU might influence global governance. Accordingly, we seek to understand in the next section how and to what extent IOs exercise authority within and across key issue areas in the global governance system.

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2. A regime complex is defined as an "array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions that includes more than one international agreement or authority" and that are meant to govern one issue area, see Alter and Raustiala (2018, p. 331)

3.1 The Authority of IOs

In world politics, states' subordination to authoritative institutions is voluntary and reflexive in that states acknowledge—without being forced or persuaded to do so—the need for an international agent that produces policies for the provision of public goods in their stead (Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012). Authority relationships thus emerge when states endow IOs with certain rights and competences and thereby recognize that an organization can make binding decisions and competent judgments. Two institutional features constitute IO authority. First, an IO must act with a certain degree of *autonomy* from its member states (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Haftel and Thompson 2006). International courts or IO secretariats typically represent highly autonomous IO bodies, followed by an organization's governing body if a subset of states decides for the entire membership (e.g. UN Security Council). Second, to exercise authority, (relatively) autonomous organizations should be able to *also* bind states to a particular course of action (Cooper et al. 2008; Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012). The policies, decisions, or interpretations of IOs can bind states legally or politically. For example, adopted rules might be directly or conditionally legally binding. Concerning political bindingness, an IO might redress noncompliance, for example, by naming and shaming or by imposing economic fines and thus affect states' reputation and sovereignty. In sum and importantly, an IO has authority only when it has some level of autonomy *and* bindingness.

International organizations exercise authority across a set of policy functions. These include: the initiation and setting of policy agendas (agenda setting); the debate, design, and adoption of rules and policies (rule making); the monitoring of rule compliance and state performance (monitoring); the interpretation of treaty norms and dispute settle-

ment (norm interpretation); the sanctioning of non-compliant behavior (enforcement); the production and dissemination of knowledge and expertise relevant to the substantive regulatory problem (knowledge generation); and, finally, the evaluation of IO-internal practices and procedures. These functions produce substantive policies and regulations.

By focusing on the formal design of IOs as defined in legal texts (e.g. treaties or rules of procedures), we code the degree of IO authority for each of the seven policy functions in order to produce a systematic quantitative measure of IO authority (for details see Zürn, Tokhi, and Binder 2019).[3] For example, to code an IO's rule-making authority, we ask who adopts policy decisions and by which voting rule (autonomy), and how legally binding they are (bindingness)? The less influence each individual state has on the adoption of rules and the more the adopted rules bind each state, the higher the IO's rule-making authority. As such, governing bodies that adopt per simple majority directly binding policies are more authoritative than state assemblies that can only adopt conditionally binding policies with qualified majority. We code the other policy functions analogously. Adding the authority score of each function per IO, we obtain a single indicator of IO authority that ranges from 0, indicating no authority, to 1. The maximum of 1 would indicate an IO that can deeply constrain state behavior and where member states are left with little to no say over IOs' policy making.

Our data inform about the exercise of IO authority for 34 IOs on an annual basis, starting in the year of an IO's creation until the year 2013. The sample is representative of the distribution of IOs across regions and issue areas. We consider five regions: Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the World, with the latter 'region' comprising all IOs with a global mandate. We define four broad issue areas. *Economy* includes

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3. We consider the primary bodies of IOs as constituted through foundational legal texts. For example, in the case of the United Nations, we code the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice.

all IOs that regulate markets or economic transactions, including trade, development, financial, and commodity IOs (e.g. World Bank or International Coffee Organization). Organizations that promote human lives, livelihoods, and liberties, including a clean environment and cultural self-determination, form the second, *Human Rights*, issue area (e.g. ICC or UNESCO). Security organizations (e.g. NATO) demarcate the third issue area. Finally, we categorize all IOs that engage in at least three distinct issue areas as *Multi-Issue* IOs.[4]

3.2   IO Authority Patterns in Global Governance

Having discussed our understanding of IO authority and the relevant data, we now turn to the empirical examination of authority patterns in global governance. We start with an analysis of the distribution of authority across IOs and discuss its development over time. Then, we examine the distribution of authority across issue areas of global governance and relate and discuss more general developments to the findings from the GLOBE mapping papers.

Authority across IOs and over time

In the contemporary global governance system, IOs are, on average, moderately authoritative. The average authority of an IO is estimated to be 0.22 (95% confidence interval of 0.20, 0.25). Examples of IOs that score around the estimated population mean include the Nordic Council (0.23) or the Southern African Development Community (SADC,

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4. Our sample of organizations is representative of geography and issue area. It also comprises IOs that tend to be rather well-known in order to capture key authority patterns in world politics and for it to be compatible with prior research. In our analyses, we methodologically adjust for IO prominence to draw broader inferences to the relevant IO population, which amounts to 174 organizations in our case see Zürn, Tokhi, and Binder 2019.

0.22). Such IOs are authoritative with respect to one or two out of the seven policy functions. For example, SADC has high rule-making authority, indicating that the IO secretariat is involved along with the governing body in mostly binding decision-making processes. Similarly, SADC's standing tribunal has the authority to settle disputes between members and interpret the Community's legal norms. Yet, SADC barely has any monitoring, agenda setting, enforcement, or knowledge generation authority, leaving states with considerable room of maneuver in these instances. That is, IOs with an average authority value exercise authority for very specific functions only, and not across a wider range of policy-relevant activities. States remain largely in control over the organization, with the exception of some intra-institutional pockets of formal IO authority.

No IO in our sample reaches the maximum value of 1. Apparently, states remain wary of their autonomy, reminding us that their grant of authority to IOs is voluntary and conditional. Nonetheless, authority varies strongly across IOs, as evidenced by the high sample standard deviation (0.18) and the considerable empirical value range (with a minimum of 0 and a sample maximum of 0.71). The European Union, for instance, reaches the sample maximum. Exceeding the estimated average by a factor of 3.22, the European Union is the most authoritative IO (0.71), based both on our authority measure and on others' scholarly assessments (Hooghe et al. 2017). Of note, for a series of policy functions, the European Union achieves the maximum possible score, indicating that key policy functions such as agenda setting, compliance and performance monitoring, dispute settlement, or enforcement of decisions, are designed, decided, and carried out by the IO. Individual states' control of the institution as well as their policy discretion are considerably limited and constrained by the Union's far-reaching policy-making competences. With a clear difference to the EU, the United Nations is the second most authoritative IO in our sample (0.62). A considerable share of the UN's

authority stems from the ICJ and the Security Council with its considerable rule-making competences and enforcement capacity. Interestingly, some regional organizations, such as the Andean Community (0.55), and some single-issue IOs, such as the World Bank (.48) or IMF (.68), belong to the group of highly authoritative IOs as well. Yet, some IOs have no to extremely low levels of authority. Most notably, the Commonwealth Secretariat (Commsec) or the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) score zero on our measure, while ASEAN's authority (0.10) is half of the estimated average. Authority can vary widely across organizations, both across regional or global ones as well as across multi-issue (e.g. EU, UN, or ASEAN) and single-issue IOs (e.g. World Bank or SADC).

We explore this variation further by estimating the population means of regional and global IOs for the year 2013 in order to capture contemporary patterns. Table 1 presents the estimates of average authority of global and regional IOs, along with 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. Regional organizations are more authoritative than global ones. The estimated average authority of regional IOs is by 0.06 points higher than the one of global IOs. The difference between the two mean estimates is also statistically significant as the barely overlapping confidence intervals in square brackets and a significant t-test suggest. While not being significantly different, regional IOs score above the population average (0.22), while global IOs tend to be less authoritative than the average IO. As will be explored further below, these patterns result from different institutional dynamics in the past. Overall, the finding that regional IOs tend to be more authoritative than global ones is commensurable with recent findings on the growing importance of regional integration (Haftel 2013; Börzel 2016). Beginning in Europe, regional integration and the corresponding creation of regional IOs spread across all world regions. While there are still some regional IOs with low authority (ASEAN or

Table 1: Population Mean Estimates: Authority of Global and Regional IOs in the Year 2013

	Mean	95% CI
Global	0.19	[0.15, 0.23]
Regional	0.25	[0.22, 0.28]
Overall	0.22	[0.20, 0.25]

Note: $N = 34$. The difference between the authority of global and regional IOs is significantly different from each other as indicated by a significant t-test: $t(18) = -2.43, p < 0.026$. Post-stratification weights are used to adjust for imbalances in IO prominence in the sample.

NAFTA), overall there seems to be a growth of authoritative regional multi-issue IOs, such as the African Union or the Andean Community.

As the above examples suggest, it is not clear whether single or multi-issue IOs have higher levels of authority. Organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank have similarly high levels of authority as the United Nations or the African Union. Likewise, both single-issue (Bank for International Settlements, NAFTA) and multi-issue IOs (ASEAN) cluster at the lower end of the authority distribution. To further explore this question, we estimate the population averages of authority for multi- and single-issue IOs, respectively.

Table 2 presents findings. Clearly, multi-issue IOs are on average more authoritative than single-issue IOs, although the former show higher variability than the latter.[5] The confidence intervals do not overlap and a t-test on the difference of their means is sta-

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5. The confidence interval for the estimate of global IOs' authority is wider than the one for regional IOs' average authority.

Table 2: Population Mean Estimates: Authority of Multi- and Single-Issue IOs in the year 2013

	Mean	**95% CI**
Multi-Issue	0.33	[0.26, 0.39]
Single-Issue	0.22	[0.19, 0.24]
Overall	0.22	[0.20, 0.25]

Note: $N = 34$. The difference in average authority between single and multi-issue IOs is statistically significant as the non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals in square brackets and a significant t-test indicate: $t(18) = 3.16, p < 0.005$. Post-stratification weights are used to adjust for imbalances in IO prominence in the sample.

tistically significant. Moreover, multi-issue IOs differ also strongly from the average IO authority (0.22), while single-issue IOs fall on that average. States apparently endow multi-issue IOs with higher levels of formal authority. One possible reason could be the desire to generate the institutional structures needed to address a variety of distinct global governance challenges, ranging from climate change governance, over human development goals, to classic state security and global non-proliferation efforts. The UN would be an example as it performs these and many other tasks. Another explanation is that multi-issue IOs provide public goods for a broader political community and therefore differ in their institutional design, competences, and thus authority, from more task-specific and thematically narrower IOs (Lenz et al. 2014; Zürn 2018). Alternatively, the different authority levels of multi- and single-issue IOs could be due to the larger share of regional multi-purpose organizations. Regional multi-issue IOs have a more homogeneous membership than global multi-issue IOs. Hence, agreement to delegate authority to regional multi-issue IOs might be more easily reached.

So far, we have explored IO authority patterns at one point in time. However, there are significant temporal dynamics that decisively contributed to the emergence of the contemporary global governance system. To fully grasp the current status of global governance, it is therefore important to analyze the historical developments that shaped it. Several contributions have highlighted a trend of increasing IO authority (Lake 2003; Cooper et al. 2008; Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012; Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 2019) in the past decades. And indeed, judging from our data, authority grew by 278% between 1945 and 2013 (along with the number of IOs more generally). The growth trajectory, however, has not always been smooth and equally strong. Rather, periods of sudden and substantial increases follow periods of slow growth, and even stagnation. The end of World War II marks the first substantial growth period of IO authority, as powerful organizations were created (UN, Bretton Woods institutions). During the Cold War, though, IO authority grew only moderately (by about 2.15% annually). This stands in stark contrast to the considerable expansion of IO authority after the end of the Cold War. Between 1992 and 2013, IO authority grew annually by about 4.25%—that is, at a double rate than in the preceding period. Indeed, the end of the Cold War marks a watershed in the dynamics of IO authority. It substantially and significantly increased the authority of IOs.[6]. The creation of new and influential IOs in the 1990s, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International Criminal Court (ICC), as well as the expansion of already existing IOs' mandates (e.g. Maastricht Treaty) contributed to this strong growth phase. These dynamics contribute to an important and substantial change in world politics, which is that since the early 1990s there has been an emergence

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6. We regressed changes in IO authority on a binary variable indicating the post cold war period (1992-2013), on lagged authority values, the lagged sum of IOs per year, the change in the Number of IOs, and the sum of regional IOs per year. Authority increased by more than 14 points in the aftermath of the Cold War compared to before. This difference is highly statistically significant (t-value of 2.95).

of a global governance system built around IOs that exercise more authority over states than in any other period of recent history (Zürn 2018).

The end of the Cold War seems to have sparked two further important developments. First, before the 2000s, regional IOs had on average significantly lower authority levels than global organizations.[7] In the late 1990s, however, regional integration became stronger, possibly due to the end of the block confrontation and bipolarity. In most cases, existing regional organizations expanded and deepened their mandates (e.g. African Union, European Union). Ultimately, this development culminated in them being more authoritative than global IOs in the contemporary global governance system (see Table 1). Second, with the end of superpower confrontation, several policy issues and challenges became globally salient and required regulation, such as the integration of newly independent states into the world economy or environmental governance and protection of individuals' rights. Responding to these developments, states seem to have equipped multi-issue IOs with sufficient competences to address this new variety of distinct issues. Indeed, before the 2000s, multi-issue IOs did not differ from single-issue IOs in terms of their authority.[8] Beginning with the late 1990s and the proliferation of variegated global governance challenges, multi-issue IOs have witnessed a significant expansion and deepening of their regulatory mandates. In the contemporary global governance system, they are significantly more authoritative than single-issue IOs (see Table 2).

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7. The estimated average of regional IOs before 2000 is 0.13 with a confidence interval of $[0.10, 0.16]$. The corresponding estimates for global organizations are 0.21 $[0.18, 0.25]$.

8. Pre-2000, multi-issue IOs had an average authority of .16 $[0.08, .23]$ and single-issue IOs one of 0.18 $[0.15, 0.20]$.

IO authority across issue areas

This section discusses the distribution of IO authority across substantive issue areas, allowing us thereby to ascertain how distinct governance challenges are addressed and regulated. We use four broad issue areas as defined during our sample selection (see above). These are: economy, human rights, security, and multi-issue. Figure 1 presents population estimates of the average IO authority per issue area. The average authority of all multi-issue IOs, for example, is around .32 and thus significantly above the estimated population average of IO authority (horizontal dotted line). In principle, this confirms the previous finding that multi-issue IOs are more authoritative than single-issue IOs. However, concerning single-issue IOs and their authority patterns, findings are more nuanced and depend strongly on the respective issue area.

Figure 1: Estimated average issue-area authority in 2013. The horizontal dotted line indicates estimated average population authority of IOs.

Economic IOs have on average an estimated authority of around .25, showing also

less variability. As a result, economic and multi-issue IOs do not differ much in their respective formal regulatory competences and organizational autonomy. At the 5% significance level, the differences are not statistically significant.[9] As the estimates suggest, high authority levels are not an exclusive feature of multi-issue IOs. Economic organizations exercise authority in a similar, or at least not in a fundamentally different, manner. This finding might have to do with the governance of an increasingly interdependent world. Economic IOs, both global (Bretton Woods institutions) but also regional (European Community) ones, have been among the first influential organizations to regulate the world economy. Indeed, authoritative institutional features first appeared with the World Bank and IMF (qualified majority voting and compliance monitoring) or with the European Commission (agenda-setting and enforcement role) to regulate cross-border economic transactions. The end of the Cold War accelerated the development of a complex and interdependent world, which, in turn, extended the mandate and policy portfolios of multi-issue IOs. It seems that to the extent that this interdependence grows, be it in the economic realm or encompassing more diverse issues, the authority of IOs seems to grow.

Security IOs have an estimated average authority of .18. This issue area comprises IOs that engage exclusively in security and unlike those multi-issue IOs that are also responsible for regional or global security, like the UN or the AU. Accordingly, organizations such as NATO or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are significantly less authoritative than economic or even multi-issue IOs. In fact, they score below the estimated average of IO authority. These findings are not very surprising as it is very much in line with key expectations from the relevant literature. Institutionalized security co-

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9. They are, however, significantly different at the 10% level, as a t-test shows: $t(18) = -1.96, p < 0.06$.

operation is, first, difficult to achieve and, second, even more difficult to maintain as the stakes and possible fears of being cheated while cooperating exceed possible mutual cooperative gains. Given the high politics nature of security, states are therefore reluctant to endow IOs with too much political leverage over them.

Finally, IOs in the Human Rights issue area attain the lowest average authority score (0.08). It appears that rules and norms that protect and foster individuals, their livelihoods and liberties, are weakly institutionalized in global governance. While some IOs, such as the ICC, wield significant formal powers over states and individuals, others can barely constrain state behavior. This suggests that states are reluctant to delegate authority to IOs that regulate states' behavior toward their own citizens (and the citizens of other countries). Rather, authority relationships seem to emerge where transboundary problems with some form of negative externalities appear (e.g. trade, finance, climate change). However, the estimate of Human Right IOs' average authority in 2013 conceals an important development. Between the creation of the OSCE in 1975 and 2013, the authority of Human Rights IOs grew astonishingly by 350%.[10] During that same period, by contrast, the authority of all economic IOs grew by only 100%. Starting in the mid-1970s, the remarkable rise of authoritative human rights institutions accelerated even more after the end of the Cold War. This expanded and deepened global institutions that protect individual rights and entitlements, thus contributing to the foundational normative principles of the emerging global governance system (Zürn 2018).

How do the findings on the distribution of IO authority across issue areas relate to the findings from the GLOBE mapping papers? To answer this question, we discuss the authority of those formal organizations that overlap between our data and the respective

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10. Note that we categorize the OSCE as a 'human rights' organization as the larger share of its mandate is to protect human rights. For a discussion about the OSCE's strong human rights focus, see also Sánchez Cobaleda et al. (2019, p. 46).

mapping papers. We discuss the multi-issue IOs that address several distinct policy fields separately, instead of treating them as either a security or trade institution.

Figure 2: Distribution of authority in selected IOs from GLOBE mapping papers. Mean authority in the last five years of our data set (2009-2013). Dotted horizontal line indicates the estimated population average of authority.

Levi-Faur (2019) identifies three formal intergovernmental organizations in global finance: the IMF, the World Bank, and the BIS. The IMF stands out in terms of its high formal authority. The Fund's conditional loan agreements, the technical expertise of its staff, and various monitoring and surveillance mechanisms contain provisions for promoting compliance with global financial standards. Questions arise, though, as to the Fund's financial capacity to act as a lender of last resort in times of severe financial crises (p. 17). By contrast, the BIS acts as a facilitator of informal meetings and activities with very low levels of formal authority (p. 19). Both institutions encapsulate two key features of financial governance: fragmentation and informalization. Despite its mandate and the promotion of common financial standards, the IMF is not the central

supervisor of the global financial system (Levi-Faur 2019, p. 46). It thus only partially translates its authority with respect to short-term crisis lending into governing global finance. The BIS, in turn, reflects the growing informality of global financial regulation. States are reluctant to delegate authority to IOs in financial matters and therefore mostly choose informal arrangements (p. 46-47). The BIS's low authority reflects that.

While the World Bank provides also financial assistance to borrowing governments (Levi-Faur 2019), it is more known for its influential role in development governance (Marx et al. 2019). The development (WB) and trade (WTO) organizations seem to exercise comparatively high levels of formal authority, which agrees with the general pattern of economic IOs' authority in Figure 1. Moreover, this indicates that both play a significant regulatory role in their respective fields of activity. Part of their formal authority springs from qualified majority voting or robust dispute settlement provisions. In the World Bank, for example, members' voting power depends on their financial contributions to the Bank and not on the '*one-state-one-vote*' principle. Nonetheless, their relatively high authority provokes state and non-state contestation. Marx et al. (2019) show that both institutions' effectiveness and legitimacy are challenged internally, by powerful member states, and externally, by civil society actors. The WTO's consensus-based decision making, for instance, contributed to its deadlock (Marx et al. 2019). In turn, this provided sufficient impetus for a series of novel pluri- and bilateral free trade agreements that by-pass the WTO (see also Stephen and Zürn 2019).

The security organizations that overlap between Sánchez Cobaleda et al. (2019) and our data—NATO, the OSCE, and SCO—all score below the estimated average of IO authority in Figure 2. Even if we were to count the UN as a security-only organization, the average of security IOs (0.24) would be still below the one for the trade and development organizations (0.30). The comparatively low authority of NATO, the OSCE, and the

SCO, suggests that security IOs are clearly state-dominated. States prefer to maintain control over security-related matters. Moreover, as Sánchez Cobaleda et al. (2019) argue, consensus-based decision making in NATO led to almost paralyzing debates about its funding, while in the case of the SCO, consensual decision making obstructs the formulation of clear governance goals. In that respect, Russia and China block each other, with Moscow wishing to transform the SCO into a formal military alliance, and Beijing wanting to keep it as a tool against non-state threats (p. 54). Due to its weak formal authority, the OSCE counts rather as a soft security organization, fostering dialogue on conflict prevention rather than robust peacekeeping operations (p. 46).

Finally, all four GLOBE mapping papers discuss organizations that we have categorized as multi-issue. Notably, the UN is not only a crucial organizational hub in global climate change governance (Coen, Kreienkamp, and Pegram 2019, p. 19), but also a central security (Sánchez Cobaleda et al. 2019, p. 31) and global development organization with its many sub-organizations and agencies (Marx et al. 2019). Likewise, the European Union as the most authoritative multi-issue organization is actively involved in many more issues than the four mentioned. As shown in Table 1, multi-issue IOs exercise on average more authority over states than other organizations (with the notable exceptions of the OAS and the OIC). As all the mapping papers show, multi-issue IOs seem to exercise authority unequally across the policy fields they are tasked to regulate. For example, while the EU has far-reaching competences regarding market-regulation and external trade, its authority with respect to the common foreign and security policy is limited due to the prevalence of consensual decision making. By contrast, the UN Security Council can adopt directly legally binding decisions per (qualified) majority concerning the proliferation of WMD (UNSC Resolution 1540). Its rule-setting and enforcement authority is not transferred, though, to environmental matters. These are

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often delegated within the IO to specialized bodies (UN Environment) or conferences of member states that draft and implement treaties (e.g. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change). Often, these subsidiary bodies and related organizations have lower delegated formal authority than their parent organization—the UN. For example, the UNFCCC's secretariat depends to a considerable extent on member states and lacks enforcement mechanisms (Coen, Kreienkamp, and Pegram 2019, p. 22-23).

In summary, the global governance system is characterized by the growing exercise of authority by IOs. Their authority remarkably grew after the end of the Cold War. Regional organizations have witnessed in particular a strong growth after the end of the Cold War, being by now more authoritative on average than global organizations. Authority is not equally distributed across IOs. Some wield barely any influence over states, while others, such as the European Union, convey high levels of organizational autonomy and binding policy making. Similarly, authority is unequally distributed across issue areas, with the most authoritative organizations being multi-issue and economic IOs, followed by security organizations, and lastly human rights institutions. Integrating qualitative insights from the GLOBE mapping papers, our data relate to certain developments identified in these papers. The informalization of financial governance is well illustrated by the BIS's comparatively low formal authority score, for example. The substantial authority of trade and development organizations fuels societal politicization. Our data also clearly show that security IOs are largely state-dominated organizations, with relatively modes to low authority scores. Finally, while multi-issues IOs tend to have above-average authority, their authority is not equally distributed across policy fields within the organization. For example, whereas WMD non-proliferation is in part governed by the UN Security Council with its high competences, climate change

governance is relegated to a vast UN-related network of transnational conferences and summit.

4 The EU in the Global Governance System

Having examined the exercise of IO authority in the global governance system, we now turn to the analysis of the EU's involvement in that system. Ever since its creation, the EU has been one of the most authoritative organizations in world politics. The Lisbon treaty of 2009 expanded the Union's mandate and competences, raising its formal authority by about 40%.[11] As a result, the EU is today the most authoritative IO with a score of 0.71 in our data. In principle, this high authority confers on the EU the capacity to act relatively autonomously vis-à-vis its member states and establish and maintain relations with third parties, such as IOs and transnational non-state actors. The EU's high authority shows us that the EU possesses the required action capacity to get involved in global affairs (Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Gehring, Oberthür, and Mühleck 2013).

Accordingly, we ask in this section to what extent the EU is present in other international organizations? EU presence alone, however, does not fully demonstrate the actual role of the EU in global governance. We therefore aim to understand how the EU is involved in other IOs. Does it just maintain a low-key presence or is it actively involved in the governance and decision-making structures of other IOs? Addressing these questions with systematic comparisons and novel data, we will be able to discern issue areas with particularly strong EU involvement, identify the different types of EU participation, and, importantly, obtain a better understanding of the drivers of EU involvement in other IOs. We determine the EU's involvement in other IOs using our

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11. Before 2009, the EU's authority was 0.52. After the adoption of the Lisbon treaty it grew to 0.71.

sample and data on IO authority. More precisely, we code the type of EU participation for each of the 34 IOs in our sample and for each year, starting in 1960. The temporal focus allows us to also capture possible upgrades in the EU's status in other IOs.

Before we examine the data, we clarify some assumptions necessary for our analysis. First, we focus on the EU as an autonomous organization in global governance and not on its member states. Our analyses hence do not compare EU involvement in IOs to its member states' involvement. Second, we do not differentiate between various EU bodies in our analysis. Irrespective of whether the Commission, or the Council, or the European Central Bank, for example, are represented in an IO, we understand this as EU presence (for a similar approach, see Gehring, Oberthür, and Mühleck 2013). Finally, we focus on the EU's *formal* representation in IOs. Formal status is important as it expresses the recognition of the Union as an autonomous actor by the members of other IOs, at least in legal terms (de jure recognition, see Jupille and Caporaso (1998)). Whereas informal relations between the EU and other IOs play an important role and have, indeed, existed for quite some time, a formal-legal status within another IO endows the Union with varying degrees of participation rights. Analyzing the variation in formal status is therefore important to better understand the options and constraints for the Union's global policies.

4.1 The EU's presence in IOs

The EU might be present in other IOs in a number of different ways. For example, it might send a delegation, either on a permanent or ad hoc basis, to another IO, such as in the case of the African Union (AU) or the Pacific Island Forum (PIF). Having a delegation or its own mission at another EU represents the most basic type of EU

presence as it indicates that formal diplomatic relations exist between the Union and the respective IO. A more involved EU presence is captured by the formal observer status. For example, the EU is an observer to the United Nations General Assembly or to the International Labor Organization. In this case, the IO not only recognizes diplomatically the EU, but grants it also some participation rights, such as raising agenda items in policy-making bodies or positioning itself on policy-relevant matters. Finally, the EU might be present in IOs as a full member, in addition to its own member states. The most prominent examples, and which have also been prominently studied, are the WTO and the FAO, where the EU is full member with all the associated policy-proposal and voting rights. But there are also several less prominent IOs where the EU is a full member, such as the International Coffee Organization (ICO) or the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). For the purposes of the present section, we summarize all these various formal statuses of EU presence into a binary indicator, because we seek to understand the general distribution of EU presence across IOs and its evolution over time. Accordingly, our EU presence variable assumes the value 1 if any of the above forms of EU presence holds in another IO and zero otherwise. Figure 3 plots the estimated population proportion of IOs in which the EU is present over time.

The time series starts in 1960, three years after the adoption of the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Communities (EC) and presents an estimate of EU presence in all IOs in the relevant population. Concerning our sample of IOs, the earliest presence of the EC/EU begins in 1960 with the OECD. In the mid-1960s, the central bank governors of EC member countries create a committee at the BIS. In the late 1960s, the EC estbalishes official relations with some UN-related organizations, such as the WHO and becomes observer to the UN in the mid-1970s. The EC's joining of IOs is accompanied by a European Court of Justice decision that not only confirms the EC's legal person-

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
Figure 3: The EU in other IOs. Estimated population proportion of IOs with EU presence.
Proportion in 2013: $0.50[0.42, 0.58]$.

ality, but also acknowledges its capacity to join and form international organizations (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010, p. 2).

During much of the remaining Cold War era, the EC's presence in other IOs remains constant. With the fall of the Berlin wall, though, EU presence is rapidly growing, culminating in 2008/2009, when the Lisbon treaty is adopted, to an estimated population share of 50%. The pattern in Figure 3 provides an estimate of the dynamics of EU participation in IOs and corresponds to findings in the qualitative literature. Not only does it show that EU involvement strongly varies over time with the growing importance of IOs more generally (Jupille and Caporaso 1998), but also that the "rise of EU involvement in international organizations has taken place after the end of the bipolar system and the Cold War" (Jørgensen 2009, p. 16). By the late 2000s, the EU has become an important actor in its own right, being present and formally recognized by half of all IOs, as our population estimates suggest.[12]

But where does the weight of the EU's presence lie? Does an IO's geographic scope play a role? Is EU presence equally distributed across thematic issue areas or is there a clear preference for certain issues over others? To answer these questions, we explore EU presence across global and regional IOs as well as across issue areas next. Table 3 summarizes population estimates of EU presence in global and regional organizations.

Table 3: Estimated population proportion of EU presence in global and regional IOs in 2013

	Mean	95% CI
Global	0.75	[0.61, 0.87]
Regional	0.34	[0.25, 0.43]

Note: $N = 33$.

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12. The EU is present in 66% of the IOs in our sample.

Out of all global IOs, the EU is present in 74% of them. Concerning regional organizations, the EU is present in 34% of them. Clearly, as the non-overlapping confidence intervals suggest, the EU is significantly more present in global IOs than in regional ones. In fact, the EU is almost twice as likely to be in a global than in a regional IO.

Table 4: Estimated population proportion of EU presence in issue areas, 2013

	Proportion	**95% CI**
Economy	0.55	[0.47, 0.64]
Human Rights	0.24	[0.11, 0.32]
Multi-Issue	1.00	[1.00, 1.00]
Security	0.86	[0.74, 0.97]

Note: $N = 33$.

A clear pattern emerges concerning also the EU's presence in IOs across various issue areas. As can be seen in Table 4, the EU is present in all multi-issue IOs, followed by security organizations (present in 86% of them). Out of all economic IOs, the EU is present in more than half of them. Finally, Human Rights IOs show the weakest EU presence with the EU having formalized relations to only 24% of such organizations. The differences between issue areas is statistically significant, allowing us to draw a clear ranking of EU presence depending on IOs' issue areas.

4.2 EU participation

Focusing on the EU's presence helps us to grasp whether, and how many, official relations the EU has with other organizations in the global governance system. The EU is present in 50% of all IOs. Moreover, we also have shown that the EU is predominantly involved in global and multi-issue IOs and less so in regional IOs. There appears to be also a clear hierarchy of issue areas, with the EU being present in all multi-issue IOs, in

over 80% of all security IOs, in more than half of all economic IOs, and in about one fourth of human rights IO.

Looking at EU presence alone, however, is insufficient for fully understanding the EU's role and assessing its potential influence in global governance. We therefore focus on the extent to which the EU participates in other IOs as we thus might better understand the formal options the EU has to shape other IOs' policies. Specifically, we differentiate between four types of participation: no participation, delegation, observer, full member. These types reflect a hierarchical sequence where each element indicates different participation options in other IOs' policy making. Accordingly, we assume that the Union's policy-making influence and role within the respective IO grows with each formal participation type.

Obviously, not participating in another IO—our baseline—leaves the EU without any formal influence.[13] We label the weakest possible formal participation type 'delegation', indicating that the EU itself has some form of official diplomatic relations with another IO. Often, this is expressed through an EU delegation at the headquarters of another IO (e.g. AU) and through regular consultations between officials from the other IO and the EU (e.g. NATO).[14] While this participation type might offer informal ways of influencing another IO, it does not recognize any rights and/or privileges for the EU in the other IO.

By contrast, having observer status, the EU can more substantively participate in another IO. Typically, observers have permanent delegations and the right to participate in regular meetings of policy-making bodies. Often, IOs enhance the observer role by granting observers proposal rights for policy agendas. For example, at the United Na-

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13. It could be still the case that the EU exercises some influence through informal channels.

14. In the case of NATO, the EU has a so-called EU cell at NATO's SHAPE headquarters, and NATO a similar unit at the EU's military governance structure, see Sánchez Cobaleda (2020, p. 56-57).

tions General Assembly, where the EU is recognized as observer since 1974, the Union can propose its own draft resolution to the Assembly. In some cases the EU receives enhanced observer status in IOs whose statutes do not foresee membership of other IOs but whose policy competences overlap with the Union's exclusive competences (e.g. International Whaling Commissions). Indeed, this is the case for a series of IOs, such as the WHO, the ILO, or the IWC that foresee only membership for states. Changing their statutes requires thus the consent of other states which is only very difficultly achieved (Govaere, Capiau, and Vermeersch 2004). A provisional solution is to grant the EU enhanced or extended observer status with options to substantively participate in the IO's policy-making processes (e.g. OECD or OSCE).

Finally, full membership represents the highest formalized participation type for the EU. The EU receives the same rights, privileges, and duties of ordinary state members to the IO. Most importantly, it not only affects IOs' agendas, but can directly influence policy outcomes through its right to vote. The EU is full member to the WTO or the Food and Agriculture Organization, but also the ICO and the NAFO, for example.[15]

This coding of participation types informs us about the EU's formal possibilities to exercise some influence on other IOs. These options grow to the extent that the EU's participation is more involved, whereby full membership represents the most substantial participation type. Having coded the participation types, we now turn to an assessment of the EU's participation types in IOs across the four issues areas of global governance from above.

Table 5 presents population estimates of the proportion of EU participation types across IOs in four issue areas. The row totals allow us to assess the relative prevalence

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15. In the case of the OSCE, we count the EU as a de facto member, although it is officially only permanent observer.

of each participation type. The EU participates in about 50% of all IOs. Putting the non-participation aside, the EU is most often a full member (21.2%), followed by delegation, and observer status. Interestingly, in IOs with EU presence, the EU is by far most often a full member (in about 42% of cases).[16]

Table 5: Estimated population proportion of EU involvement types per issue area in 2013.

	Economy	**HR**	**Multi-Issue**	**Security**	**Total**
No participation	32.3	16.7	0	0.3	49.3
Delegation	12.5	0.7	0.5	1.6	15.3
Observer	09.8	1.3	3.1	0	14.2
Full member	17.8	3.4	0	0	21.2
Total	72.4	22.1	3.6	1.9	100

The EU participates in all multi-issue IOs. In these, the EU is considerably more often an observer than having just a diplomatic representation (i.e. delegation).[17] That is, the EU participates in all relevant regional and global multi-issue IOs—such as the AU, the UN, or the Organization of American States—presumably exerting some influence through its relatively frequent observer status. However, the EU is never a full member in other multi-issue IOs, which is due, at least in the case of the UN, to non-changing membership rules. And while the presence of the EU is relatively high in security IOs (84%), it is only represented through the lowest formal status the EU can have in other organizations. That is, it only participates in security IOs through its own delegation or liaison contacts (e.g. NATO or Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons).

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16. We obtain this relative share by dividing the share of full member, 21.2, by the share of IOs with EU presence, $(100 - 49.3 = 50.7)$, yielding 41.8%. The relative shares for delegation and observer statuses are 30.2% and 28%, respectively.

17. More precisely, out of all multi-issue IOs, the EU has observer status in about 86% of them ($\frac{3.1}{3.6} \approx$ .861).

Accordingly, its prospects of influencing security IOs' policies through formal channels could be very limited.

Concerning Human Rights, which is a very broad category comprising organizations such as the ILO, the ICC, and the WHO amongst others, the EU participates only in one fifth of all such IOs. Among human rights IOs with EU presence, the EU is most often a full member (in about 15% of all human rights IOs), followed by being an observer (in about 6%). Finally, the issue area of the economy yields some interesting patterns. First, the EU is present in about 55% of all economic IOs. Second, it is most often a full member (in about 25% of all economic IOs). Third, about 84% of the Union's full membership instances are in economic IOs. Finally, when we consider the two active types of participation together—observer and full member—the EU is actively involved in almost 40% of all economic IOs, as compared to only about 20% in the case human rights IOs.

As this brief discussion has shown, the presence of the EU in other IOs cannot serve as the only indicator for its role and involvement in global governance institutions. Clearly, while the EU's presence in security IOs is higher than in economic IOs, it participates differently, and potentially with more formalized clout, in the latter than in the former. That is, the types of EU participation vary considerably across issue areas with a clear emphasis on economic IOs. Moreover, from the information in Table 5 it seems that the EU seeks more of an active participation in other IOs than just mere official diplomatic relations. For example, when adding the row totals of observer and full member, our estimates suggest that the EU actively participates in about 35% of all

IOs as opposed to sending a delegation only to 15% of all IOs. The EU participates most actively in economic IOs, followed by human rights, and lastly multi-issue IOs.[18]

An important part of the variation in the EU's participation type across issue areas is related to the EU's competences. As has been argued in the section on mapping papers, an IO's authority is rarely uniformly distributed across the different policy fields the IO is tasked to manage. In the case of the EU, for example, trade policy is highly harmonized with the EU having exclusive competences in the Union's foreign trade relations. As a result, the EU, and not its member states, is responsible for the design, adoption, and implementation of international trade policies. Therefore, it is to be expected that the EU seeks a heightened participation role in IOs tasked to govern issues where the Union has exclusive competences. The often-cited example of the FAO illustrates how an IO opens up (changing its statutes to allow EU membership) to the EU (Emerson et al. 2011, p. 76). But it also explains less prominent cases, such as the NAFO, where the EU, with its exclusive responsibility for fishery policies, is a full member. By contrast, in matters of common foreign and security policies, the EU is considerably less autonomous and relies on consensus decision making of its member states. Accordingly, the Union's active involvement in security IOs is weak to non-existent. The EU's participation types in human rights IOs is an interesting case. While human rights guide the Union's (internal) policies and actions, there is no explicit competence that the European Commission, for example, protect them (Govaere, Capiau, and Vermeersch 2004, p. 163). This might explain the relatively low presence of the EU in human rights IOs. Yet we also see that when the EU is present in human rights IOs, it tends to actively participate in them. The strong institutional and political ties between the EU and the

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18. Out of all IOs in which the EU actively participates, 78% are economic IOs ($\frac{9.8+17.8}{14.2+21.2} = 0.779$), 17% are human rights IOs ($\frac{1.3+3.4}{14.2+21.2} = 0.1694$), and about 8.7% multi-issue IOs ($\frac{3.1+0}{14.2+21.2} = 0.0875$).

International Criminal Court (ICC) are just one example where the EU is not only an observer, but offers the ICC technical, legal, administrative, and political assistance, despite the lack of an explicit objective and political mandate. This might have to do with the growing authority of human rights IOs, as presented above, of which the ICC is the most recent example, being also the most authoritative IO in that issue area.

So far, we have seen that differently institutionalized policy competences of the EU appear to drive the unequal distribution of participation types across issue areas. This finding resonates with previous qualitative accounts that highlighted the role of different EU competences for the Union's representation in IOs (Frieden 2004; Govaere, Capiau, and Vermeersch 2004; Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010; Emerson et al. 2011; Gehring, Oberthür, and Mühleck 2013). Indeed, this prediction is sustained by novel large-N data. However, another aspect that has received far less attention concerns the authority of those IOs in which the Union is present or actively participates. For example, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy depends on states' consent (unanimity decision making with weak centralized policies), yet at the same time security IOs are also relatively weak in terms of their institutional authority. By contrast, economic and multi-issue IOs are the most authoritative IOs in the global governance system. It might therefore matter a great deal where the EU actively participates. Being actively involved in IOs with high authority might matter more for global regulations and policies than seeking full membership in IOs with little regulatory and political clout. We explore these questions in the next section by analyzing how IO authority and EU involvement relate to each other.

4.3 EU and IO authority

Does the EU's participation in other IOs depend on their authority? Is the EU actively participating in authoritative IOs? Are issue-areas determining the EU's involvement in IOs? Answering these questions has important implications for the assessment of the EU's external policy-making role and influence in global governance. In this section, we therefore use regression analysis to explore the association between IO authority and EU participation types. Our goal is to understand whether and how IO authority and the EU's involvement in other organizations are related. As such, the quantitative analyses serve systematic exploratory purposes.

We first describe the variables used in our analysis. So far, we discussed two outcomes of interest—the presence of the EU in other IOs and the Union's participation types in them. Accordingly, we focus on two distinct dependent variables in our analysis. The first dependent variable is a binary coding of EU presence in an IO. It takes the value 1 if the EU is represented with its own delegation and zero otherwise. Note that being an observer or full member implies having an own delegation. The variable EU presence thus captures any type of EU representation in other IOs. Using this variable, we aim to understand the conditions under which the EU is present in other IOs. Do more authoritative IOs increase the likelihood of the EU being represented in them?

The second dependent variable is a binary coding of the EU's active participation in other IOs. We define active participation as being either a (permanent) observer or being a full member. These two formal statuses confer specific rights and privileges to the EU that allow the Union to exercise some policy-making influence upon another IO. Accordingly, we code this variable with the value 1 if the EU actively participates in another IO and zero otherwise. This variable allows us to model the probability of

the Union's active participation in IOs conditional on their authority. Taken together, we explore the conditions under which the EU is not only present in other IOs, but also actively participates in them—made possible through its formal status in other IOs.

We use a series of independent or explanatory variables. The most important one is our IO authority variable which we re-code to range between 0 and 10 thus facilitating interpretation. Higher values indicate more authoritative IOs. Next, we include an indicator variable—*Regional IO*—taking the value 1 if an IO has a regional scope (e.g. African Union) and zero for IOs with a global mandate (e.g. World Health Organization). As shown in Table 3, the EU is more involved in global than in regional IOs and we control for this pattern by using the indicator variable Regional IO. Our sample of 34 IOs is representative of the geographic and issue-area distribution of IOs in world politics. However, there tends to be an over-representation of better-known or prominent IOs. We adjust our estimates with a variable that captures IO prominence. Doing so allows us to derive broader conclusions that are not dependent on IO prominence. Accordingly, we specify a binary variable labeled *Prominence* that assumes the value 1 if an IO has more than 500 Google scholar hits and zero otherwise. More IOs in the global governance system increase the opportunities of EU presence and participation in them. Ignoring these dynamics might bias our results. Accordingly, we account for the expanding number of IOs by including a variable of the sum of IOs per year (*Number of IOs*). Because during certain historic periods (end of Cold War) the number of IOs increased markedly, we account also for this pattern by including the annual changes in the number of IOs (Δ *number of IOs*). Finally, we include issue-area fixed effects. For each of the four issue areas, we use a binary variable taking the value 1 if the respective IO is in that issue area and zero otherwise. Controlling for issue-area is important for two reasons. Methodologically, it corrects the imbalances of EU presence and par-

ticipation across them and thus minimizes threats of parameter biases. Substantively, and even more importantly, the issue areas partly overlap with varying degrees of EU exclusive policy competences. For example, in economy, the EU is more autonomous vis-à-vis its member states and speaks with one voice. Using issue-area fixed effects thus allows us to assess whether and how authority affects EU involvement in other IOs irrespective of differently institutionalized issue areas and the EU's varying presence and engagement in them. In short, we know that issue area affects EU presence and participation. By controlling for this mechanism, we ask whether IO authority contributes also to EU presence and participation or not.

Furthermore, our unit of analysis is the IO-year. We coded for all 34 organizations in our sample and for each year of their existence whether the EU was present and whether it actively participated in them. As the EU's predecessor, the European Communities, was only established in 1957, we begin our analysis in 1960 assuming that it took the EC three years before it could join another IO. That is, the EU is eligible to be present or actively participate in other IOs from the year of that IO's creation or from 1960 on if the respective IO pre-dates the EC's foundation (e.g. United Nations or IMF). Because our two dependent variables are both binary, we fit two separate logit models. Not only is logistic regression adequate for binary outcomes, it also allows us to derive various conditional probabilities of observing the outcome under study for different value combinations of the independent variables. This is particularly useful for analyzing how EU presence or participation depend on different degrees of IO authority. To avoid issues of simultaneity, where EU presence or participation might drive IO authority, we lag all our time-varying independent variables by one year. In all models, we estimate robust standard errors. Finally, we use the same set of variables to estimate the probability of EU presence in other IOs and the probability of the EU's active participation in them.

Results

Table 6 presents results.In Model 1 we examine the conditions under which the EU is present in other IOs. Model 2 has as dependent variable the EU's active participation in other IOs.

Table 6: EU participation in IOs.

	(1) Presence	(2) Active Participation
Authority$_{t-1}$	0.13*	0.18*
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Regional IO	-1.08*	-1.55*
	(0.19)	(0.20)
Prominence$_{t-1}$	1.18*	1.10*
	(0.17)	(0.17)
Number of IOs$_{t-1}$	0.27*	0.23*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Δ *number of IOs*	0.18	0.12
	(0.13)	(0.14)
Constant	-8.60*	-7.61*
	(0.54)	(0.55)
Issue Area effects	Yes	Yes
Log.-Lik.	-676.73	-622.17
χ^2	354.62*	336.45*
AIC	1371.46	1260.33
N	1406	1339

Note Logit model of probability of EU presence (1) or substantial EU activity (2) in IOs conditional on their authority level.

Interpretation: The *Authority$_{t-1}$* variable has been multiplied by 10 to ease interpretation. Percentage changes for a one-unit increase in the independent variables can be calculated by exponentiating coefficients e^β. That is, for a one-unit increase in *Authority$_{t-1}$*, the probability of the EU being present in IOs grows by: $e^{0.13} = 1.13$. This yields a percentage change of $(1.13 - 1) * 100 = 13\%$. For negative coefficients (e.g. Regional IO), the calculation is as follows: $e^{-1.08} = .34$, then we obtain percentage decrease of $(1 - .34) * 100 = 66\%$.

Significance level: $^*p < 0.05$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

In Model 1, IO authority is positively related to EU presence in IOs. For each

unit increase in an IO's authority, the probability that the EU is present in it grows by about 13 percent. That association is statistically significant, indicating that it is not a product of mere chance. Across all issue areas and IOs with different geographic scope, the EU is more likely to be present in IOs with more authority. We also find that the EU is significantly less likely to be present in *Regional IOs.* A regional organization reduces the EU's presence, compared to global organizations, by about 66%. Finally, the number of IOs in the global governance system tend to increase, as expected, the opportunities for the EU to become involved. More precisely, one more IO increases the likelihood of EU presence by about 31%. Sudden increases in the number of IOs are not systematically related to EU presence.

In Model 2, we examine the conditions of active EU participation in IOs. For each unit increase in an IO's authority, the probability of the EU being an active participant in it grows by about 20%. That is, IOs with more authority not only tend to increase the EU's presence, but also seem to encourage the EU's active participation in them. Across all issue areas, the EU is more likely to be an observer or a full member in more authoritative IOs than in less authoritative organizations. This association is statistically significant. Of note, the tendency of the EU being rather absent in regional organizations is even stronger in Model 2. Apparently, regional IOs tend to reduce the EU's active participation by about 78%, compared to global ones. Taken together, the evidence from Model 1 and 2 thus far suggests that the EU participates actively in more authoritative and global IOs.

We further explore these findings by calculating conditional probabilities of the EU's participation, conditional on the authority and geographic scope of IOs. First, we assess the probability of active participation conditional on IO authority. Figure 4 shows the predictions. The x-axis divides our authority variable into four categories, reflecting the

percentiles of its distribution. Intuitively, IOs with an authority value at or below the 25th percentile have very low to no authority at all. The 50th percentile value represents the median authority score, while the 75th and 95th capture high and very high IO authority levels. The y-axis plots the probability of the EU actively participating in IOs. For example, the probability that the EU actively participates in low-authority IOs is around 0.31.

Figure 4: Predicted probability of active EU involvement in other IOs conditional on their lagged authority levels (Authority$_{t-1}$).

The overall pattern in Figure 4 clearly shows that the EU is more likely to participate in IOs with higher authority levels. The probability grows to about 0.45 for the most authoritative IOs in the global governance system. The EU is also more likely to actively participate in IOs with the highest authority levels than in IOs that wield average

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authority levels. The difference between the predicted probability at the 50th percentile from that at the 95th is significantly different from each other.

Second, we closely examine EU participation conditional on IOs' authority *and* geographic scope. Figure 5 plots the predicted probabilities of active participation for regional and global IOs that vary in their respective authority scores. More specifically, we pick low-authority regional and global IOs (symbolized by hollow circles) and high-authority IOs (hollow squares), again drawn from the pool of regional and global IOs. Combining information on authority and region allows us to assess the relative weight the EU puts on participating in other IOs.

Overall, the EU is most likely to participate in highly authoritative global IOs, with a predicted probability of around 0.60. But also when IOs have considerably less authority, the probability of EU participation is around 0.48, given that these IOs are global. Within the category of global organizations, the EU is more likely to be active in high authority IOs, as the confidence intervals do not overlap. The finding on global IOs stands in stark contrast to the EU's involvement in regional organizations. While still being more likely to participate in more authoritative IOs, the differences between regional and global IOs are significant.

For example, the EU is twice as likely to actively participate in global high-authority IOs than in the corresponding regional ones.[19] Concerning the low-authority IOs, the EU is almost 2.5 times more likely to actively participate in global than in regional IOs. So far, the evidence suggests that the EU is by far more likely to actively participate in global IOs, and especially in highly authoritative ones. This is puzzling as the authority of regional IOs grew remarkably in the last decades, surpassing the authority of global

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19. We obtain this estimate by dividing the predicted probability for high-authority global IOs (0.60) by the respective probability for high-authority regional IOs (0.27).

Figure 5: Probability of EU active participation conditional on IO authority and geographic scope. Hollow circles indicate IOs with authority values at or below the 25th percentile, while hollow squares indicate IOs with authority values at or above the 95th percentiles. The horizontal lines around circles or squares are 95% confidence intervals.

IOs by now. A possible explanation could be that the EU is primarily involved in those IOs where its member states are also represented. That is, EU participation depends on prior representation of its member states in the same IO. By contrast, we also observe cases of regional IOs—such as the Pacific Island Forum (PIF)—where the EU is represented with its own delegation, but where the overwhelming majority of its member states is absent.

5 Discussing Findings and the Road Ahead

In this section we summarize our main findings and discuss possible explanations and policy implications. Three central findings stand out. First, the EU's presence in the contemporary global governance system is substantial, yet its participation significantly varies across issue areas. While the Union is represented in about half of all IOs, it is actively involved in economic IOs, where it is most often a formal observer or even a full member to the IOs in that issue area (see Table 5). Its role is weaker in those IOs where the EU's policy competences are concurrent to its member states' competences (e.g. security). Our population estimates on a broad set of IOs and issue areas correspond to expectations in the relevant qualitative literature. The EU is more present and active in those IOs that relate to its exclusive and shared competences (e.g. economy). In sum, the EU is—at least formally—in a position to actively participate in those IOs that matter to it. Accounting for this important dynamic, our second finding presents a new and so far unexplored pattern. The EU is significantly more likely to be actively involved in more authoritative IOs. Both the Union's presence and substantive participation increase in IOs that wield higher levels of autonomous and binding policy making over their member states. This paper thus presents an additional factor to take into account when

assessing the role of the EU in contemporary global governance: the authority of IOs as a crucial feature of global governance. Authoritative organizations, like the EU, seem to become actively involved in other authoritative IOs. Third, we find that the EU is considerably more involved in global than regional IOs. Taken together, our findings suggest that the Union not only engages in issue areas that matter to it but also with those institutions that possess the institutional capacity to act relatively autonomously and to adopt binding rules with a global reach.

Our findings have important implications for current debates on the EU's global role. An immediate question that arises concerns the controversy about the usefulness of EU representation throughout all global governance institutions. As some argue, the EU should pool its resources and increase its joint presence in many more IOs than it currently does (Gstöhl 2009; Emerson et al. 2011). To remain relevant and expand its clout, the EU would need to "engage in the upgrading, rationalisation and concentration of its external representation in a radical and comprehensive manner." (Emerson et al. 2011, p. 2). Our findings warrant a more nuanced reading. The EU *already* possesses the formal means to partake in and influence policy making in those IOs that are important for global rule-setting. At the same time, authoritative IOs recognize the EU's relevance by granting it certain participation rights, either through observer status or full membership. It is therefore important to discuss whether expanding the Union's current status is desirable. Several extant arguments raise doubts about the necessity and benefits of an expanded EU presence. Given limited resources and a possible divergence of preferences among its member states, the EU should weigh the costs an benefits of its joint or pooled institutional representation. As Frieden (2004) argues, for example, efforts to bridge divergent member state preferences might quickly outweigh the benefits of joint representation in IOs. More importantly, the decision rules of IOs affect

the prospects for EU presence and participation. For instance, in organizations where unanimity voting dominates, pooling EU votes (i.e. having one EU veto instead of EU member states' individual vetoes) might lower the Union's influence over policy outcomes within that organization as it moves policies further away from the EU's average policy preference. By contrast, in IOs with simple majority voting—and where the EU enjoys exclusive competences in the respective policy field—pooling might strengthen the Union's influence and relevance (Frieden 2004). Indeed, our findings suggest that such a mechanism might be at play: IOs where consensus decision making prevails typically have less authority. The EU is considerably less likely to actively participate in such organizations. Accordingly, strategic choices might drive the Union's higher presence and more substantial participation in authoritative IOs.

Others have argued that formal EU participation in IOs helps to sustain the EU's market-regulating and standard-setting powers. According to Bradford (2020) the EU already possesses the *unilateral* power to set binding standards—in the global economy —through its large market size and dense web of stringent regulations. It is not the Union's participation in international institutions that constitutes this power. Rather, institutions help the Union to legitimize this power, project it to more jurisdictions, and ultimately to stabilize it. This instrumental logic suggests that the EU carefully chooses in which IOs to become involved and how. While Bradford (2020) examines the Brussels effect (EU's unilateral regulatory power) within the global economy, the EU exerts also significant influence on other IOs without actively participating in them. In security, for example, the Union's experiences in crisis prevention and post-conflict reconstruction diffused and were partly echoed by NATO (see Sánchez Cobaleda 2020).

The discussion about the EU's regulatory power, either unilaterally exercised or through IOs, offers a change of perspective on the EU's role and influence in global

governance: The European Union generates significant externalities for third parties due to its market size and regulatory capacity. That is, both state and non-state actors alike are increasingly affected by regulations and policies in Europe. Product standards or environmental regulations developed and enforced in the EU oblige producers from third countries to comply with them should they wish to export their products to Europe (Bradford 2020). UN member states, and in particular the UN Security Council, rely on the EU to implement and enforce economic sanctions (Govaere, Capiau, and Vermeersch 2004), otherwise the Security Council's decisions have little bite. Non-state actors, especially the non-governmental organizations are particularly effective in pushing the EU to international organizations to further their advocacy. After the Cold War, many IOs adopted a governance model that embraces the participation of transnational actors (for a comprehensive overview, see Tallberg et al. 2014; Tallberg et al. 2013; Tallberg et al. 2016; Jönsson and Tallberg 2010). In this context, the EU is an actor that is relevant for NGOs not only to participate in but also an actor through which they can take their causes to a global stage through IOs.

In short, the EU's formal authority and market power have consequences for others. Accordingly, the relationship between IO authority and EU participation might be seen from the perspective of third parties. Affected by EU action and regulations, third parties might want to "discuss, modify, or simply understand them" (Jupille and Caporaso 1998, p. 215-216). To the extent that this holds, third parties might therefore seek the active involvement of the EU in international organizations. For example, recognizing that the EU is a crucial power in agricultural policies, the FAO member states changed the organization's statute to enable the EU to become a full member (Gehring, Oberthür, and Mühleck 2013). In this regard, it is important to emphasize that becoming a member to an IO is not only associated with policy-making rights, but also with constraints

(see also Govaere, Capiau, and Vermeersch 2004). That is, the EU is expected to abide by the IO's rules and decisions just as any other member. Accepting an authoritative IO that creates externalities or whose cooperation is required to provide for public goods is maybe one way to mitigate externalities or ensure its cooperation. More authoritative IOs can more easily bind their members and rule addressees and hence it appears plausible that it is authoritative IOs that would want the EU to be present.

The discussion so far suggests several intriguing patterns that merit further study and attention. There are several rationales that might account for the EU's active role in authoritative IOs. Notwithstanding their individual explanatory appeals, our finding, however, begs a question concerning the global governance system more generally. Given that this system is characterized by the lack of a central arbiter of conflicts, it is IOs themselves that need to coordinate when their individual norms overlap and their rules conflict with each other. Intuitively, coordination efforts, either in a competitive or cooperative mode, are likely to take place between two or more authoritative IOs and less so between organizations with little regulatory influence (such as between the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Arab Maghreb Union). The involvement of the EU—as the most authoritative IO—in other authoritative IOs might therefore reflect attempts to avoid, negotiate, and settle conflicts and coordinate global rules and policies between key institutions of the global governance system. Whether this coordination happens through a competitive mode, where one institution tries to impose its rules on others, or in a cooperative one, deserves further inquiry by analyzing inter-institutional relations more closely. At this stage, we observe that authoritative institutions tend to establish formal relations between themselves, providing thus the basis for increased interactions and possibilities to jointly shape global outcomes.

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A Appendix

Table A.1: IAD IO Sample

Name	Abbreviation	Start Year	End Year
Association of Southeast Asian Nations	ASEAN	1967	2013
African Union	AU	1963	2013
Andean Community	Andean	1969	2013
Bank for International Settlement	BIS	1930	2013
Central African Economic & Monetary Union	CEMAC	1994	2013
Caribbean Community	CARICOM	1973	2013
Council of Europe	CoE	1949	2013
Commonwealth Secretariat	Commsec	1965	2013
European Union	EU	1958	2013
Food and Agriculture Organization	FAO	1945	2013
International Criminal Court	ICC	1998	2013
International Coffee Organization	ICO	1963	2013
Intergovernmental Authority on Development	IGAD	1996	2013
International Labour Organization	ILO	1919	2013
International Monetary Fund	IMF	1944	2013
International Whaling Commission	IWC	1948	2013
North Atlantic Fisheries Organization	NAFO	1979	2013
North American Free Trade Agreement	NAFTA	1994	2013
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	NATO	1949	2013
Nordic Council	NC	1962	2013
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries	OAPEC	1968	2013
Organization of American States	OAS	1951	2013
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development	OECD	1961	2013
Organization of Islamic Conference	OIC	1972	2013
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	OSCE	1975	2013
Pacific Island Forum	PIF	1973	2013
Southern African Development Community	SADC	1993	2013
Shanghai Cooperation Organization	SCO	2003	2013
Arab Maghreb Union	UMA	1989	2013
UN Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization	UNESCO	1946	2013
United Nations	UN	1945	2013
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	WB	1945	2013
World Health Organization	WHO	1948	2013
World Trade Organization	WTO	1994	2013